






DESTABILIZING GENDER NORMS: WOMEN IN MASCULINE OCCUPATIONS IN THE 




















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology 
in the Graduate College of the  










 Professor Asef Bayat, Chair 
 Professor Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi 
            Associate Professor Rebecca L. Sandefur 







This dissertation tackles the vastly discussed puzzle of women’s low rates of labor force 
participation in the Middle East, using the case of Iran while focusing on an under-explored 
perspective. Iran has one of the lowest rates of female labor force participation in the region and 
marks an unstable labor market with minimum institutional supports for attracting and retaining 
women in the workplace. Through an in-depth exploration of the experiences, challenges, and 
aspirations of women within traditionally masculine careers — as a group who face most severe 
forms of discrimination to access those sectors that fit into their needs, interests, and 
backgrounds — the dissertation sheds light on the shortcomings of the dominant approaches of 
women’s work and employment in the region in two ways. First, while women’s 
underrepresentation in the labor market is predominantly ascribed to patriarchal states and their 
conservative gender ideologies, the narratives of women who participated in this research show 
that the mechanisms that “gender” and “sexualize” the arena of work against women are multi-
faceted and multi-level, and that the concept of state patriarchy does not capture the complexities 
embedded in discrimination against and inequalities toward women in the workplace. Second, 
while liberal-feminist accounts of women’s agency imagine women’s empowerment only in 
actions or movements against incidences and manifestations of patriarchy, my analysis suggests 
that women can empower themselves from within patriarchal discourses by strategically 
cultivating them to become empowering tools for their public participation and livelihoods, 
particularly at work. Contextualizing the narratives of participants into the broader post-
revolutionary gender discourse in Iran, the dissertation examines what constitutes the core of 
discrimination against women and their reactions and strategies for overturning incidents of 





a range of socioeconomic backgrounds and walks of life—not solely middle-upper class, 
educated women, who tend to be better represented in current scholarly and political accounts of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
On March 8 of 2018, Iranian women’s rights activists called for public demonstrations on 
International Women’s Day after more than a decade of relative silence. Dozens of women 
gathered in front of the ministry of work in Tehran, protesting discrimination against women in 
the labor market. The demonstration was soon violently disrupted by police, and tens of women 
and men were arrested.  The previous months had witnessed a revitalization of public discussions 
surrounding women’s rights and their status in post-revolutionary Iran, particularly regarding the 
issue of mandatory hejab following the symbolic action of dozens of urban women, who climbed 
tall utility boxes, platforms, and benches on busy streets or squares, pulling off their headscarves, 
tying them to the end of sticks, and brandishing them in protest to compulsory hejab.  
In addition to the high visibility it attracted from media, the public, activists and scholars, 
this so-called “daughters of the revolution street” movement was alarming enough for the 
supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, to deliver an entire speech on the issue 
of hejab and the Islamic model of womanhood. He gave the speech on March 9, Iranian Mother’s 
Day, which signifies the birth of Fatemeh, the daughter of the prophet Mohammad. Calling the 
girls of the revolution street naive and deceived, he framed the entire movement as a foreign-
initiated idea, lamenting the “outsiders” and “enemies of the Islamic republic” for falsely 
assuming that “Iranian women” do not support hejab. Later, a tweetstorm on his verified Twitter 
account reiterated the Islamic model of womanhood that had been reinforced during the years 
after the revolution: “a woman can have active presence and deep influence on social arenas—as 
Iranian women are so influential. The features of today's Iranian woman include modesty, 





into appeasing men.” In this account, he emphasized hejab as a representation of “immunity” 
rather than a “restriction” for women.  
The image of young girls removing their hejabs in public places is undoubtedly inspiring 
and heartwarming and coincides with liberal-feminist idea(l)s of equality, activism, and 
empowerment. On the other side is the image of an aged Ayatollah and a pioneer Islamist, 
enforcing the idea of hejab through an ideology and policies that require women to cover their 
bodies, with no tangible association with individual faith. What could possibly more exemplify 
an image of patriarchy? This tension between the so-called Islamic versus liberal-feminist 
models of womanhood is not a new phenomenon. In Iran, the juxtaposition of the two models 
was an important part of Islamic discourse that gained political power with the 1979 Islamic 
revolution.  
Underneath these ideological tensions and irreconcilability, however, Iran has witnessed 
a plethora of manifestations of women’s empowerment during the years following the 
revolution, under the umbrella of a patriarchal state. Without the possibility of organizing strong 
movements that press for gender equality in different arenas and enjoying safety and protection 
for engaging in gender-specific civil activities, women have made astonishing changes in their 
living conditions (Bayat, 2009), These changes have facilitated the blossoming of this group of 
daughters of the revolution street movement among a post-revolutionary generation. In sum, 
women outnumber men in the universities, participate in the labor market, contribute to social 
causes, and empower their communities and families.  
While current academic literature published in English provides us with invaluable 
insights on women’s public participation, the issue of women’s work and employment is 





women has been in the area of work. While women have managed to gradually adjust the state-
imposed compulsory hejab to their tastes by loosening their headscarves, improving their 
education, maintaining public livelihoods through different activities, and improving their status 
in families, they remain highly underrepresented in the country’s formal labor market, struggling 
with extremely discriminatory labor codes. Most often, the issue of women’s work is addressed 
as one element of larger projects with regard to women’s status and, most importantly, the voices 
of women are not represented in the academic and political evaluations of gender discrimination 
in the Iranian labor market.  
This dissertation aims to address a part of this gap in the literature by exploring the 
experiences of Iranian women in those sectors of the labor market that are most unfriendly to 
women—the masculine sectors—using a qualitative methodology. Using the case of on-site 
engineering and taxi driving, both gender-atypical jobs for women, this dissertation provides an 
analysis of challenges facing women and their strategies for achieving empowerment and their 
discourses on that issue. Contextualizing the narratives of participants into a broader post-
revolutionary gender discourse, the dissertation examines what constitutes the core of 
discrimination against women, and their reactions and strategies for overturning incidents of 
inequality and oppression. In so doing, the dissertation draws on the experiences of women from 
a range of socioeconomic backgrounds and walks of life, and not just middle-upper class, 
educated women who tend to be better represented in current scholarly and political accounts of 
women in work.  
Many scholars have already made this point, that to reduce women in the Muslim Middle 
East to being victims of religious patriarchy, is problematic; the stereotypical depictions of these 





Grünenfelder, 2012; Abu-Lughod, 2002; Keddie, 2007). However, the academic and journalistic 
accounts of these women still develop and perpetuate a homogenizing picture of the state’s 
patriarchy as a major burden on women’s drive toward empowerment, without delving into 
nuances and complexities of how inequality is manifested in women’s day-to-day lives. In 
particular, the state’s patriarchy has served as an easy explanation for low rates of labor force 
participation among Middle Eastern women (Soltani, 2017; Haghighat-Sordellini, 2009).   
The experiences and narratives of my participants challenge those accounts that simplify 
the various difficulties facing women in the labor market by reducing the causes of those 
difficulties solely to the matter of state patriarchy and its manifestations, especially segregation. 
My analysis demonstrates the complexity of mechanisms and elements that render work an 
unfriendly arena for women. Rather than using patriarchy as the lens of analysis, I show how 
these jobs are constructed as masculine, not merely through discriminatory, state-imposed laws 
and regulations, but also through institutional and interpersonal dynamics to which the 
homogenizing concept of state’s patriarchy does not do justice. I will show how women’s work 
in these jobs are gendered and sexualized on a daily basis, through mechanisms that reach 
beyond Islamic patriarchy and state oppression.  
As Patricia Collins (2000) rigorously and powerfully argues, oppression is complex and 
multifaceted. Structures, interpersonal dynamics, discipline, and hegemony, she argues, all serve 
as venues for formation and perpetuation of oppression. Structural domain — including, for 
example, policy, economy, laws, and legislation — establishes the foundation and parameters 
that determine the overall distribution of power. The disciplinary domain contains organizations 
and institutions that routinize and rationalize the status quo and create a specific distribution of 





justification of oppression. It relies on a system based on “commonsense” that is advanced by a 
dominant group that infuses subjectivities by means of institutions such as religion, education, or 
media. Hegemony, as Gramsci has conceptualized it, deals with a dominant group molding 
subjects that carry out and perform desired ways of being. At the interpersonal level, oppression 
occurs by individual “thoughts and actions that uphold someone else’s oppression” (Collins, 
2000 p. 287). through day-to-day interactions in which stereotypical or incorrect assumptions 
about others’ identities, capacities, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and so on, become constructed 
and reconstructed.  
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into the complex ways that 
gender oppression in the context of contemporary Iran is manifested at these various levels, it 
certainly seeks to take a step toward complicating the current conceptualizations of gender 
inequality in post-revolutionary Iran, particularly by extending the focus of the analysis beyond 
the state’s patriarchy, which only tackles the structural dimension of gender inequality. Each 
element of Collins’ conceptualization of oppression deserves attention and analysis on their own 
merits, and, in the context of Iran, digging into each element might require a distinct dissertation. 
Learning from Collins’ approach with respect to oppression and the experiences of my 
participants, however, I intend, by using a different angle, to tackle the issue of Iranian women’s 
social empowerment, particularly in the area of work.  
Collins also teaches us that acceptance of the complex nature of oppression must come by 
developing “a complex notion of empowerment.” Incidences and acts of oppression are 
embedded in our daily lives in all their mundaneness as much as they can be found in macro 
structures and institutions. In the same way, activism for empowerment among women covers a 





She warns us against “labeling one form of oppression as more important than others, or one 
expression of activism as more radical than another” (Collins, 2000 P. 288).  
The second goal of this work is to shed light on women’s daily acts of resistance against 
inequality and to show the complexity embedded in their collective discourse of empowerment. 
The stories of these women show how their strategies for and discourses of empowerment in the 
face of unfriendly working environments cannot be simplified to an explicit and direct backlash 
against inequality, as liberal-feminist accounts of empowerment prefer to observe. While bold 
actions such as those of the “daughters of the revolution street” dance mesh well with ideals of 
empowerment and therefore attract media and public attention, the day-to-day lives of women in 
Iran are pervaded with alternative forms of empowerment that urge us to extend our 
understanding of forms and manifestations of women’s empowerment beyond liberal accounts. 
This is not to undervalue the movements among women that explicitly and radically target the 
core of state patriarchy. Such actions are certainly courageous, invaluable, and influential. 
However, in order to achieve a realistic account of gender dynamics in post-revolutionary Iran, 
we need to incorporate different accounts, understandings and actions of empowerment among 
women as they navigate daily incidences of discrimination, marginalization, and exclusion. 
Positioned in the margins of the margins, the experiences of Iranian women who work in 
masculine sectors provide us with a unique opportunity to expand our theoretical understanding 
of the complex elements that disempower or empower women who live in patriarchal states. 
These complexities cannot be captured and appreciated if we do not expand our 
definitions of what counts as acts of empowerment, as Collins and many other feminists have 
encouraged us to do (Mohanty, 1988 ; Mahmood, 2005 ; Abu-Lughod, 2002). Using the 





based on the liberal definition of empowerment, women’s discourse of empowerment is not 
necessarily contrary to the the state’s gender discourse. In many senses and, interestingly, as I 
will argue using the case of taxi drivers, what feeds these women’s discourses and strategies for 
empowerment intersect with state-promoted models of womanhood. Based on the narratives of 
my participants, I will show how women incorporate concepts of motherhood, modesty, 
segregation, and gender differences (all being main elements of the patriarchal state’s gender 
discourse) to carve out empowering spaces for themselves in careers that are severely unfriendly 
toward women. This is not to grant any credit to a state that is based on a deeply-rooted 
patriarchal structure. My goal, however, is to recommend a framework for thinking about women 
living under patriarchal states, particularly in the Middle East and Iran, that goes beyond the 
reductionist “women versus state” model and recognizes the complexities of the state’s approach 
to womanhood, as well as women’s responses to its structural oppression. By so doing I intend to 
open a space for destabilizing the modern dichotomies (Moallem, 2005; Mahmood, 2005, 
Avishai, 2008; Essers et al., 2010), such as modern versus traditional; liberated versus oppressed, 
and agency versus patriarchy as it relates to women. These notions, along with the very concepts 
of womanhood and gender, are discursively constructed and contextually contingent (Foucault, 
1982; Butler, 1990; Borgerson, 2005). Recognizing gender, patriarchy, and empowerment as 
contextualized discursive constructions, I will propose an alternative framework for describing 
the mechanisms that disempower women in the labor market and their strategies for navigating 
the conflicting worlds of work and gender (D’Enbeau et al., 2015) in the context of Iran and the 
Middle East in general.  In the remainder of this chapter I will delve more into feminist accounts 
of women’s agency and empowerment and review some of the previous research on 





methodology and situate my positionality, as an Iranian woman, in the context of the fieldwork I 
conducted.  
 
Women, Empowerment, and Agency 
The issue of women’s agency has been at the core of the feminist scholarship although 
there are deep differences among feminists, gender scholars, and advocates of women’s rights in 
how they understand women’s agency and the way they envision acts of empowerment among 
them. In its origin, the feminist ideology and movement assumed a shared gender identity among 
all women and hoped for their collective action toward liberation from patriarchal suppression. 
Women’s agency was to shine in its power to dismantle gender discrimination (Hekman, 1991).  
The feminist discourse, however, had to move away from a universal account of women’s 
identity and agency as women of different backgrounds brought their voices and life experiences 
into feminist debates and complicated the very concept of womanhood (Hooks et al., 1994). 
Black feminism came to problematize the totalizing conceptualizations of womanhood by 
contextualizing expressions and experiences of being a woman at the intersections of multiple 
axes of suppression, especially race and “reconceptualizing all dimensions of all dialectics of 
oppression and activism” (Collins, 2000 P.13). It deconstructed the concept of womanhood and 
exposed its cultural and ideological basis by showing how oppression and domination are shaped 
and perpetuated through the multifaceted matrix of domination that is structured along multiple 
axes, not soley gender. Women’s experiences were to be understood with a recognition of the 
heterogeneity within the category of women and intersecting nature of gender with other 





of privilege and underprivilege among women themselves (Collins, 2000; Rodó-de-Zárate and 
Baylina, 2018; Horowitz, 2017; Hopkins, 2018).   
Following a similar paradigm, tenets of post-colonial feminism argue that women’s 
agency and their discourse of empowerment are products of intersecting identity categories and 
social belonging. In particular, the post-colonial feminist scholarship warns that agency among 
women is manifested in forms that go beyond explicit backlash against what is understood as 
patriarchal, as seen through a secular liberal-feminist lens (Mohanty 1988, 2003; Pande, 2015; 
Charania, 2008; Mahmood, 2005). While some feminists put forward universal definitions of 
agency as “the capacity for autonomous action in the face of often overwhelming cultural 
sanctions and structural inequalities” (McNay, 2000 cited by Burke, 2012), post-colonial 
feminist scholars like Abu Lughod (2002) contend that “we need to develop serious appreciation 
of differences among women in the world — as products of different histories, expressions of 
different circumstances, and manifestations of differently structured desires.” Scholars of post-
colonial feminism have explored manifestations of agency and empowerment practices among 
women that, if we limit our accounts of what empowers women to outspoken positionalities 
taken against patriarchal structures and institutions, do not receive the credit they deserve and 
even become undermined as women’s participation in their own subjugation (Mahmood, 2005; 
Abu Loghoud, 2002; Rinaldo, 2014; Bahramitash et al., 2018; Shams, 2016; Pande, 2015; 
Griffith, 2000; Gatwiri and Mumbai, 2016).  Among the inspirational studies within this 
literature are those that focus on women’s experiences with conservative religious movements. 
From a secular-liberal perspective, conservatism and patriarchy go hand in hand and, therefore, 
women’s observance of these religions becomes paradoxical. Unsettling the very assumption that 





2008; Burke, 2012; Chong, 2006) these studies put forward alternative ways of thinking about 
women’s agency and empowerment.  
For example, in her influential work on the urban Muslim women’s Mosque movement in 
Eygpt, Saba Mahmoud observes a “non-liberal” form of agency among these women that does 
not feed the “western feminist” conceptualization of women’s agency. By negotiating what 
Mahmoud calls a “pious agency,” these women find empowerment in conforming to religious 
ideals and a virtuoso Muslim subjectivity (Mahmood, 2005). Rinaldo (2014) talks about a form 
of “pious critical agency” among Muslim women activists in Indonesia, manifested in their 
“capacity to engage critically and publicly with religious texts” for re-interpretations that provide 
the discursive framework of their political activism with the intent to empower women. These 
women adhere to their religious beliefs and live up to their religious norms while simultaneously 
turning the conservative interpretations of Islamic texts on their heads and opening up space for 
negotiating equality from within. Avishai (2008) observes agency among orthodox Jewish Israeli 
women in the sense of their “doing” of religion, conceptualizing agency of these women as 
religious conduct. Women in her study are neither “passive targets” of religion nor “strategic 
agents” who seek extra-religious ends such as gender empowerment through religious 
observance. Religious observance rather manifests “a mode of being, a performance of religious 
identity, or a path to achieving orthodox subjecthood” (Avishai,  2008). And Kościańska (2009) 
finds that while silence is often viewed as a lack of power from a “western, liberal feminist” 
perspective, it constitutes the core of women’s agency in participating in two fundamentalist 
religious movements in Poland. Both as an act of non-speaking and a behavior that signals inner 
humility and non-violence, silence was applied as a source of power by women to make 





Post-colonial feminist scholars have also observed forms of agency that appear to 
“oppose western progressive sensibilities,” (Burke, 2012) in other venues of women’s lives. 
Pande (2015), for example, re-conceptualizes arranged marriages among the immigrant 
population in Britain from some South Asian countries, from a cultural practice for forcing 
women into patriarchal marriages, to agentic practices through which women manage to find 
ways around cultural expectations while taking control of their own lives. In a recent work, 
Bahramitash et al. (2018) show how Islamist and religious women in Iran, who are often 
depicted as victims of the state’s patriarchy, express and perform powerful forms of agency 
through providing economic and in-kind aid to their communities, serving as pillars of social 
economy during difficult times while also belonging to very low-income households.  
Along the same lines, tenets of transnational feminism show us how meanings of gender, 
work, agency, and empowerment shift with context (D’Enbeau et al., 2015) across cultural 
repertoires (Frenkel, 2008), and in addition can be the result of encounters between local and 
global discourses (Grünenfelder, 2013). In particular, there is a stream in this literature that 
explores how women whose identities are not fully produced inside the dominant western gender 
framework reconcile the transnational idea(l)s of gender equality with locally contextualized 
discourse of womanhood in ways that destabilize conventional conceptualizations of agency. In 
studying Muslim businesswomen in the Netherlands, for example, Essers et al. (2010) explores 
the intense identity work these women engage in to navigate their gendered ethnic identities 
within the discourse of entrepreneurship. They observe that these women “construct their 
identities beyond dichotomies and stereotypes such as western or non-western, local or foreign, 
and modern or traditional, which are often used to place them in fixed categories with respect to 





professionals produce subjectivities that emerge from complex intersections of ethnic-religious 
notions of female piety and liberal-secular subjecthood. There are identities that borrow from 
both of these seemingly contradictory discursive domains rather than being fully produced within 
one in particular.  
These studies and a plethora of others provide us with a theoretical basis and an 
analytical lens through which to recognize all manifestations of women’s agency and 
empowerment in their great diversity. Additionally, they allow one to develop more humility 
toward those women, who courageously and creatively find ways around structural inequalities, 
but who do not necessarily engage with the collective form of anti-patriarchy movements and 
practices that we, as feminist scholars who are passionate about equality, would like to witness 
before our eyes. These approaches help us understand how agency exists “within structural and 
cultural limitations and not outside them” (Burke, 2012) and to turn our heads around and note 
how empowerment is at work underneath structural injustices that we aspire to resolve. In this 
sense, this dissertation speaks to post-colonial feminist scholarship, even though I have learned 
from a wide range of studies and theoretical traditions during the course of my research. Thus 
this dissertation aims to shed light on the complexities of how gender inequality is created and is 
sustained in the Iranian labor market, and how women engage via available pathways and 
discursive possibilities to creatively express their agency in the face of the institutionalized 
inequalities.  
Methodology 
This dissertation relies on ethnographic fieldwork that I conducted between July and 
December of 2015 in Esfahan and Tehran, the first and third major cities in Iran. My work 





(Agar, 1996, p. 119), ethnography, which allows for “telling a credible, rigorous, authentic story” 
and to “give voice to people in their own local context […] as they pursue their daily lives” 
(Fetterman, 2009). Ethnographic fieldwork allows researchers to immerse themselves in the 
social environment they seek to reflect on and produce knowledge through a collaborative 
process with their interlocutors (Mosher et al., 2017). This knowledge emerges from interactions 
between the researcher and subjects and is the product of the positionality and agency of both 
sides (Denzin, 1999; Collins, 2000).   
As a whole, my ethnography involved nearly 90 interviews with women in gender 
atypical jobs, in the form of one-on-one or focused group discussions; informal conversations 
with men and women from different backgrounds and in various occupations; an analysis of the 
formal discourse surrounding women’s work and employment though an examination of laws, 
journalistic narratives, media, and officials’ statements; and in-depth observations of 
participants’ working environments. The bulk of my analysis will be based on interviews with 
two groups of women: drivers of women-only taxis and on-site engineers. However, my 
theoretical inferences are informed by all the conversations and observations I conducted over 
the course of my fieldwork.  
I conducted 40 interviews with taxi drivers, including four focus groups of 2, 3, 5 and 30 
interviews with on-site engineers, including two focus groups of 2 and 3 interviews. In-depth 
interviews allow the researcher to explore participants’ views and lived experiences through 
focused questions, while simultaneously allowing the participants to make their voices heard and 
reflect on portions of their lives (Charmaz, 2014). These are valuable methods for understanding 
individuals’ interpretations of social processes and their experiences with them (Weiss, 1995; 





understanding perceptions and experiences. They create a context for participants to engage in a 
moderated conversation. In focus groups the interactions between the participants and the ways 
they impact one another’s views becomes an important part of the data (Greenbaum, 1999 P. 11).  
A number of my driver participants in Tehran said that they were more comfortable being 
interviewed as a part of groups. Two of them voluntarily invited other colleagues to the 
discussions. In Esfahan, however, drivers preferred one-on-one interviews. The majority of 
interviews with engineers took place in Isfahan in the form of individual conversations, except 
for two cases in which I conducted a focus group session. I left it open to participants’ 
preferences, although, in the end, the combination of interviews and focus groups provided a rich 
and unique data source that uncovered many neglected aspects of these women’s problems, 
aspirations, and perceptions. In addition to drivers and engineers I was able to interview one 
truck driver, one intra-city bus driver, and six bread bakers (nanva).  
I treated the interviews and focus group discussions as venues in which women engaged 
with discursive and performative work (Butler, 1990; Borgerson, 2005) to negotiate their 
gendered and professional identities with me in the role of researcher. I was particularly 
concerned with the nuances of how women reflected on and articulated their views regarding the 
concepts of paid work and segregation as it related to women’s lives. My interview questions 
opened a space for participants to reflect on women’s issues in the Iranian labor market as a 
whole, as well as beyond their particular jobs. In most of the interviews, women took advantage 
of the interviews to express their views on women’s status in post-revolutionary Iran, and in 
particular their attitudes on the impact of Islamization following the revolution. Women also 
shared their opinions about normative gender roles and constructions of masculinity in the 





analyzing how meanings of womanhood, inequality, and empowerment are produced in the 
particular historical and discursive contexts in which I conducted my research (Rootham, 2015; 
Smart, 1998; Denzin, 1996). While a bulk of journalistic narratives and some academic 
scholarship depict Muslim women as victims of patriarchy, by committing myself to a moral 
ethnography I searched for those moments in which my interlocutors “resisted those structures of 
oppression” (Denzin, 1999) and made changes in their personal lives from within (Burke, 2012). 
In response to Denzin’s well-known call for a “vulnerable” and “performative” ethnography, I 
aspired to simultaneously remain attentive to private and public, personal and historical, 
emotional and political factors during the phases of fieldwork, analysis, and writing. I intend to 
raise “morally informed” criticisms of the structures of gender oppression and the embedded 
nature of patriarchy in the political, cultural, and discursive endeavors in post-revolutionary Iran, 
while engaging in the “politics of hope” (Denzin, 1999) to celebrate women’s power in changing 
systems of gender inequality. 
I recruited participants through snowballing: engineers turned out to be more accessible 
for interviews owing to my personal networks as a prior female engineer in Iran in addition to 
the social desirability that a conversation with a “gender scholar” about women’s issues in the 
workplace noticeably elevated among these women. My positionality, however, did not come 
through as an advantage for recruiting taxi drivers. These women had busy lives, driving under 
conditions of heat and snow on the crowded streets of Esfahan and Tehran in order to provide for 
themselves and their families. In between the day-to-day struggles of doing the labor of 
household work and taxi driving with minimal institutional supports, they barely had time to sit 





known female drivers in the local community of taxi drivers in one of Tehran’s neighborhoods 
explained: 
You are a dear to me but you do your interview and publish it somewhere, then others think: 
Wow! How great! Women are taxi drivers in Tehran and they are allowed to be taxi drivers. But 
no one does anything for us! We have many problems. 
After nearly one week of spending time at regular taxi stations in the city and acquiring 
information from male taxi drivers and taxi firms, I recruited my first participant in Tehran while 
visiting a taxi services company that encompassed most of the women-only taxis at the time I 
carried out my fieldwork. She agreed to have me in her home and invited two of her co-workers 
for a group interview. This was my point of entry into the network of female drivers through 
which I managed to interview 19 more women in their homes or in public places such as in 
public parks. In Esfahan, I contacted and talked with each participant during their wait time on 
street sides; in all cases they were called on during the interviews but kindly accepted having me 
in their taxis as they picked up and dropped off passengers. At such times I paused the interviews 
in the presence of passengers and conducted observations, while on some occasions I chatted 
with the passengers. In addition to women who with the women-only taxi firms, I was also able 
to speak with one woman in Tehran who was working as a rotating mixed-gender van driver, and 
briefly talk over the phone to another woman who was called “auntie” in the local community of 
taxi drivers and known as one of the most experienced female taxi driver in that area. While I 
have not used these interviews directly in the presentation of my findings, they were essential to 
my analysis and ability to grasp the underlying dynamics of women’s entrance into taxi driving 
and the nuances of their experiences. As a note here, the laws and regulations are not clear about 





this. There is not an articulated ban against it, while at the same time women cannot easily buy or 
register official mixed-gender taxis, as described by these two participants.  
Taxi drivers constituted a quiet homogenous group in terms of family situation, 
educational level, and socio-economic background. As I will discuss further, women-only taxi 
firms in particular were framed as a response to the need for creating jobs for female 
breadwinners and women in poverty. In the early years, as some of the drivers and also officials 
pointed out, priority had been given to breadwinners; all drivers were asked about their family 
situations in recruitment interviews and some had included their divorce certificates in their 
applications. Therefore, the majority of my taxi driver participants were the primary or only 
breadwinners of their families. Except for one single participant, the rest had children. Nineteen 
(avoid starting sentences with numeral) were divorced, two were widowed, and 18 were married. 
Among the married group, only 2 were married to well-off men. The rest had husbands who 
were unemployed due to physical disabilities, illness, drug addiction, or bankruptcy, or who had 
low-income jobs.  Except for four women with some post-secondary education, the rest had a 
high school diploma or less. A lack of proper educational background was the main reason for 
many of these women to choose the physically demanding job of taxi driving.  
Drivers, however, were more diverse in terms of religious convictions. This is important 
because as previous research has shown, religiosity is an important differentiating factor among 
Iranian women in terms of attitudes, experiences, and lifestyles (Bahramitash et al., 2018). While 
interviews did not include direct questions on religious beliefs, these issues emerged most of 
conversations, especially when participants discussed their views on gender segregation — even 
though the data did not reveal any positive correlation between religiosity and support for gender 





forms of hejab such as chador1 with all hairs and body curves covered, while others wore more 
relaxed outfits. Women-only taxi firms in both cities enforced specific dress codes for drivers, 
which included a loose manto2, a long and tight scarf (Maghnae) and front headbands that 
entirely covered the hair. However, as I witnessed, especially in Isfahan, many women did not 
follow the code and wore their personal, routine outfits.   
My sample of engineers included young women, mostly in their late 20s or early 30s, 
with the exception of two women who were older and more advanced in their careers. Most of 
these women were introduced to me through personal connections and some by institutions like 
the chamber of commerce, a construction engineering firm, and the research park of Isfahan’s 
university of technology. In particular, I recruited engineers whose jobs involved site activities. 
Twenty-eight of interviews took place in Isfahan and two in Tehran; I interviewed most of these 
women in their workplaces, with the exception of three interviews which were conducted in 
green parks, cafes, or restaurants, plus two phone interviews. Twenty of the participants were 
single and the rest were engaged or married. All of the engineer participants identified 
themselves as middle to upper class, and except for one single woman who was living 
independently, the rest did not describe their work as detrimental to the economic well-being of 
themselves and their families.  
Socioeconomic class appeared to be an essential differentiating factor between engineers 
and taxi drivers in terms of both experiences with work and the discursive sphere in which they 
                                                             
1 A chador is a large piece of cloth wrapped around the head and upper body. It covers the whole 
body except for the face. 
2 A manto is a loose shirt and a more relax form of practicing hejab. Women wear it combined 





navigated and negotiated their gender identities at work (Rootham, 2015). Compared to taxi 
drivers, engineers appeared to be more homogenous in their adherence to the Islamic hejab and 
engagement with religious discourse, as witnessed during the interviews. Except for one woman 
who had a black chador on at her workplace, the rest wore moderately loose and relaxed outfits 
during the time of interviews. The spiritual and religious concepts also did not emerge during 
these interviews in the same way as the interviews done with drivers.  
Overall, the individual interviews lasted between 30 to 100 minutes and the focus groups 
between 95 to 165 minutes. The interview questions revolved around women’s motivations for 
choosing their particular jobs, their working experiences, attitudes toward women’s work in Iran, 
gender segregation, and gender roles. All interviews were tape recorded, except for one one-on-
one interview from which I took detailed notes. I manually coded and transcribed the interviews. 
The coding process involved two rounds of open coding to read the interviews line by line for 
emergent themes. This phase was followed by a round of axial coding to connect the initial codes 
and make theoretical inferences on how women were experiencing their work environments and 
their strategies for overcoming challenges. The final analysis let me explore the multi-faceted 
mechanisms that masculinized taxi driving and on-site engineering based on women’s narratives 
that went well beyond state patriarchy. It further allowed me to understand the content of the 
discourse that women drew on to articulate their strategies for survival and empowerment.   
 
Conducting Ethnography Back Home 
Research is not an objective reflection on reality; it is “a process of knowledge 
production” (Madison, 2014) in which “the biography of the researcher(s)” plays a central role 





in short, one’s positionality, shape the type of knowledge one produces about their subjects 
(Fuchs, 1992). Ethnographers cannot be detached from their subjectivity (i.e.  how they 
understand and experience the world as a person); what they observe, hear, and learn in the field 
is tied to who they are as individuals (Rose, 1997; Agar, 1996). Regardless of their level of 
expertise in conducting research, they cannot turn into “all-understanding” observers who depict 
an objective picture (i.e. free from their personal values and pre-occupations) of the life of the 
group they study (Chattopadhyay, 2013). If this is true and research can never be detached from 
the “material, emotional, and intellectual” (Alford 1998, P. 21) conditions of the researcher, then 
an important duty for ethnographers is to scrutinize their positionality.  As Rose (1997) has 
argued, “The need to situate knowledge is based on the argument that the sort of knowledge 
made depends on who its makers are.”  
I realize that my ethnography “moved from my biography to the biographies of others” 
(Denzin, 1999). Rather than a representation of my participants’ experiences, this dissertation is 
the product of the complex interactions between me, the field, and the participants (Rose, 1997). 
The knowledge that I have produced in this research emerges from my particular positionality as 
a west-educated sociologist and a non-religious Iranian woman, belonging to the post-
revolutionary generation; it is shaped by the excitement, anxieties, and vulnerabilities of going 
“back home” (Chattopadhyay, 2013) after some six years to conduct ethnography.   
I never perceived myself as an outsider to my home country while spending the first 24 
years of my life there. I traveled to Iran, imagining myself as an insider from outside—as an 
Iranian woman with some educational background in the United States.  The majority of scholars 
in the West who study Iranian women belong to the pre-revolutionary generation of Iranians who 





witnessed the revolution and the sudden shift it made in women’s public life. Many of them are 
among the pre-revolutionary activists whose ideologies contradicted the Islamic movement and 
chose or were forced to leave the country after the establishment of an Islamic republic. Some 
are women who felt uneasy with the post-revolutionary rhetoric about womanhood and were 
privileged enough to immigrate and continue their education in western countries.  
I, on the other hand, belong to the post-revolutionary generation. I was born to an 
Islamized Iran. My secondary phase of socialization happened in the post-revolutionary 
educational system through which the state set out to perpetuate its own ideology of womanhood 
among the new generation. Despite many of the “scholars in diaspora,” my subjectivity is a 
product of the Islamic state’s “technologies of power” (Foucault,1982) and the discourse and 
practices of day-to-day resilience against the state’s systems of oppression (Bayat, 2009). My 
gender identity during the years at home was shaped by the confused and complex encounters 
between the local-Islamic discourse on gender difference and the transnational ideal(s) of 
equality (Lewis, 2013; Rootham, 2015). I belonged to a generation of women whose femininity 
was shaped by everyday navigations between the top-down dictates of the formal establishment 
for making us “good” Muslim women, and the bottom-up informal resilience in our communities 
for “undoing” state-promoted gender socializations. While formal education encouraged us to 
prioritize family roles over paid work, we all aspired to educate ourselves and become 
economically independent. While the borders between masculine and feminine domains of work 
and education were reinforced through laws and cultural norms, many of us aspired to transgress 
gender boundaries through every channel available to us. The stories of everyday oppression and 





The way my positionality unfolded during the fieldwork, however, was deeply impacted 
by my years outside Iran. Soon after starting my work I noticed that with six years of sociology 
education in the United States, I no longer was entitled to count myself as a complete insider. For 
six years I had read books and articles, mostly written by outside scholars and in English, about 
Iranian women and the ways their lives were impacted by the Islamic revolution. I re-learned my 
own life experiences in post-revolutionary Iran through what these great scholars (but mostly 
towards the outsider end of the spectrum) had written about Iranian women. My understanding 
of gender policies in Iran became reshaped through what I learned as a graduate student as 
imparted by more advanced sociologists. It was after starting my fieldwork that I noticed the 
extent to which I was socialized into an academic perspective on women in Iran. As Alford 
(1998) argues, “No work springs out of thin air; it is a historical product, grounded in the 
intellectual traditions you have absorbed, in the theories of societies you have learned” (p. 21).  
I was also not well positioned to connect with major events and realities that shaped 
dominant public discourse, concerns, and struggles. During my fieldwork, the country’s 
economy shrank under the impacts of Western-imposed economic sanctions, which were meant 
to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program but had severe impacts on people’s lives, and there seemed 
to be public hopelessness with regard to economic conditions. While these sanctions were put 
into place in 2006, before I left the country, their impacts on ordinary people’s lives reached their 
peak when I was in the U.S. It was only through talking to my participants and through field 
observations that I could see the depth of serious economic challenges facing lower and even 
middle-class groups. The price of housing and merchandise were astonishingly higher than when 
I left, while the level of income for the lower and middle classes in formal sectors of economy 





was disabled from fully engaging with the suffering of my participants, especially the taxi 
drivers, most of whom belonged to vulnerable groups.  
The well-known green movement in the aftermath of the presidential election in 2009 
emerged months after I had left Iran, but the memories, anger, anxieties, and pessimism toward 
political reform was still detrimental to how many people, particularly the political liberals and 
seculars, viewed the conditions and perspectives of life in Iran. Predominantly referred to as an 
elitist, middle-upper class movement, the trauma caused by the regime’s violent suppression of 
the protesters — a large number of whom were women —convinced a large number of college 
students, young professionals, and intellectuals to leave the country. This put me in a very 
unbalanced power relationship (Rose, 1997) with all of my interviewees, particularly the 
engineers, who were hoping for or actively seeking emigration status. This was an unwanted 
power that, ironically, was not empowering during the fieldwork; it placed me in the 
uncomfortable and, in many senses, vulnerable space of being seen as advantaged. I was placed 
in the “space in between” (Kobayashi, 1994) where I was unable to build a coherent identity in 
my interactions with the participants—as an entire insider or outsider.  
The chapters that follow must, therefore, be read, understood, and evaluated in relation to 
the complexities of my positionality. To contextualize the individual narratives of my 
participants within historical specificities, Chapter 2 will discuss the predominant gender 
discourse, its overarching characteristics, and embedded inconsistencies in post-revolutionary 
Iran. I will discuss how the very making of the Islamic state went hand in hand with the making 
of Muslim women to embody its desired gendered subjects. I will borrow from the literature on 
other countries in the Middle East that shows how constructions of womanhood have always 





discursive context in which women’s subjectivities are shaped after the revolutions and the 
contradictions that the state’s failure to address the needs and tastes of the diverse groups of 
Iranian women has created in its gender politics. In so doing, the chapter particularly discusses 
the state’s project of gender segregation, which centers on the Islamic discourse of gender 
difference. It will discuss the ways spatial and social segregation became transformed from 
cultural practices and possibilities to create a political apparatus for controlling women’s lives 
and bodies after the revolution. The chapter also provides evidence from officials’ statements 
and policy changes to show that the state, as a heterogenous body, has not been consistent in its 
adherence to segregation as a tool of governance. It conceptualizes segregation in contemporary 
Iran as a matter of contestations among politicians and state officials themselves.   
Chapter 3 will contextualize women’s work and employment during the post-
revolutionary era and reviews laws, policies and statistics related to women’s work during 
different political periods. This chapter will show that regardless of the political environment 
during each period, and despite the significant changes that women witnessed in their conditions 
over the years, the labor market has remained one of the most inaccessible arenas to women. It 
will discuss the impact of local and international economic factors and their intersections with 
the sociopolitical atmosphere in shaping women’s opportunities for finding employment in the 
labor market.  
With the background provided in chapters 2 and 3, Chapter 4 delves into the ways those 
discriminative policies and discursive practices are manifested in women’s day-to-day lives in 
the workplace and provides a detailed qualitative picture of the realities facing those women who 
manage to find jobs in a very tight labor market while simultaneously destabilizing state-





data with engineers and taxi drivers, the chapter shows that an entire set of structural, 
institutional, and interactional factors create gendered, sexualized, and hyper-masculinized 
working environments for these women. The chapter also challenges those accounts that simplify 
all incidences of inequalities carried out against women in Iran, tying them directly to the state’s 
Islamic patriarchy, while urging that more attention be paid to the multi-faceted nature of how 
gender discrimination is produced and sustained. This chapter will show how concepts of 
segregation, gender difference, and masculinity are manifested in women’s day-to-day lives, 
creating consequential struggles and difficulties. It aims to provide a from-below picture of how 
macro-level inequalities created against women in the labor market after the revolution are lived 
by women on the ground. The goal, however, is not to depict these women as victims of 
discriminations and inequalities. I will end the chapter with a brief discussion of the engineers’ 
strategies for achieving empowerment for maintaining their hope, aspirations, and livelihoods in 
their unfriendly working environments. The chapter argues that the discourse with which these 
women engage in order to overturn incidences of oppression in their day-to-day lives cannot be 
fully grasped by the liberal-feminist conceptualizations of empowerment, as their agencies and 
subjectivities are not produced within a Western-born discourse of gender equality.  
Chapter 5 delves more into an analysis of women’s discourse of empowerment by 
narrowing its focus to taxi drivers’ data. I devote an independent chapter to taxi drives because 
of the amount of fascinating nuances and complexities embedded in emergence of women-only-
driven taxis in Iran.  In a highly male-dominated labor market with deep-rooted barriers to 
women’s employment, particularly in male sectors, the state-promoted ideology of segregation 
and difference, ironically facilitated women’s access to the highly masculine occupation of taxi 





rationale behind establishment of women-only taxi firms. It will then delve into the ways taxi 
drivers interpreted their jobs for the purpose of empowering themselves in the face of the 
struggles discussed in Chapter 4. Here, I will again argue that women’s strategies for 
empowerment and their underlying discourse do not speak to liberal conceptualizations of 
women’s agency. This chapter suggests that these women’s accounts of empowerment in their 
jobs are heavily centered on concepts of difference, segregation, and motherhood, which, 
interestingly, constitute the core of state’s gender discourse. The intersection and commonalities 
between these two discourses destabilize modern dichotomies of empowerment versus 
disempowerment when it comes to manifestations of Islamic gender discourse, particularly 

























Nation-Building, Modernization, and the Remaking of Women 
The making of modern nation-states goes hand in hand with the making of subjects; this 
is the process through which human beings turn into subjects that embody what nations are 
imagined to be. In a Foucauldian sense, power operates in a positive and productive manner in 
the making of subjects that are governable and bodies that are docile to modalities of discipline, 
surveillance, and administration, or “disciplinary technologies” (See Rainbow, 1984; Foucault, 
1982; Ong, 1996). For modern nation-states, individuals, their bodies, and their lives are targets 
of “the art of governance,” as are social institutions, groups, organizations, and the collective 
sense of society. As Rainbow puts it, “The power of the state to produce an increasingly 
totalizing web of control is intertwined with and dependent on its ability to produce an increasing 
specification of individuality” (Rainbow, 1984 p. 22).  
In the Middle East, the notion of citizenship is not as individualistic as what is seen in 
Western democracies; individuals are considered as members of “subnational communities,” 
especially the family. However, individual lives are targeted by nation-states’ modes of 
governmentality as much as collective lives (Joseph, 2017). Central to the projects of nation-state 
building in the post-colonial Middle East has been the regulation of the lives of men and women 
through re-constructing notions of gender and sexuality. Different forms of womanhood and 
manhood were imagined with the establishment of the new states (See Abu-Lughod, 2002) that 
marked the transition to a new era.  
These transitions had gendered outcomes, with particular impacts on women. Formation 





emergence of new ways of thinking about women, their rights, and their private and public lives. 
Abu Lughod (1998) argues that the turn of the 20th century witnessed “an intense 
preoccupation” with the “women question” as nationalist movements incorporated idea(l)s of 
modernity in the region. In non-colonized, independent countries like Turkey and Iran, 
modernization was at the heart of the nationalist reforms by which the newly established regimes 
of Ataturk (1923-1938) and Pahlavi (1925-1979) aimed to decrease foreign control. They 
worked to strengthen their countries through modernizing their economic, political, educational, 
and cultural spheres.  
Women’s lives were at the heart of the modernization project. In Turkey tremendous 
changes were made in women’s lives as a part of a top-down secularization of state and society 
as carried out by Ataturk. Sharia, which was the basis of family law during the Ottoman Empire, 
was substituted with the Swiss Civil Code in 1926. Polygamy was outlawed, and men and 
women were given equal rights to initiate divorce and assume custody of children. Women were 
granted the right to vote at the national level and modern dress codes took the place of the 
traditional veil in public offices and universities. The Islamic veil, as a symbol of tradition, 
became outlawed in public sites, including schools and universities. Women’s status improved 
significantly as regards education and professional activities, although many of these changes 
occurred in urban areas.  
Similar to Turkey under Ataturk, the Pahlavi regime imposed a series of top-down 
modernization projects, which led to radical changes in women’s civil and family rights in Iran 
(Naghibi 1999; Faghfoory 1993; Chehabi 2007; Burki 2013). Reza Shah seized the power in the 
aftermath of World War I by means of a military coup which had the support of nationalists and 





1934, Reza Shah’s visit to Turkey and his fascination with women’s improved status under 
Ataturk’s modernizing government led him to put in place a series of policies and practices that 
meant to ignite serious changes in women’s status, including the unveiling decree of 1936 as his 
most radical adjustment. Modern dress codes were introduced for both men and women, and 
women were prohibited by law from appearing in public with veil. Reza Shah also expanded 
opportunities for women’s education and work status. The number of primary and secondary 
schools for girls increased and women were granted admission into some universities. As regards 
paid work, opportunities became available for women to serve in gender-typed professions such 
as nursing and teaching. While the matter of women’s veil was historically significant in drawing 
a line between religious and non-religious families, under Pahlavi’s regime its symbolic 
implications became even more highlighted in signifying a transition from tradition to 
modernity. Unveiled women, wearing Western styles, becoming educated, and educating and 
nurturing future generations as mothers, teachers, or nurses, marked the state’s aspiration to 
modernize the country (Najmabadi, 1998).  
Mohammad Reza Shah, Reza Shah’s son, continued his father’s legacy of modernizing 
women’s lives. Under his so called “White Revolution” in the 1960s, women gained the right to 
vote, and a progressive family protection law was introduced, which provided a ground for the 
advancement of women’s rights. The new family protection law secularized marriage and 
divorce registration, imposed  restrictions on polygamy (although polygamy was not abandoned), 
eased abortion penalties, increased the minimum age of marriage from 15 (increased from 9 to 
15 during Reza Shah) to 18 for girls and to 20 for boys, and facilitated conditions for women to 
work in positions that were previously exclusive to men such as judges (Mahdi 2004). Divorce   





decisions, and women’s equal right to request divorce and custody was recognized. During this 
period the Women’s Organization of Iran (WOI) was established under the presidency of the 
Shah’s sister. While a state-controlled institution, WOI played a notable role in facilitating the 
above-mentioned legislation.  
As many scholars have argued, however, more than an attempt for warranting women’s 
equal rights, these changes in gender politics were a part of the modernizing regime’s efforts to 
negate the Orientalist accounts that undermined their nations as barbarians or backwards. While 
the legal changes in women’s status in conditions that women experienced in Turkey and Iran at 
the turn of the century improved their status to some extent, it is well-known by scholars that 
top-down modernization projects marginalized women’s issues in many regards (See Keddie, 
2007 for a review; Moghissi 2008). In both Iran and Turkey independent women’s organizations 
were removed and activities surrounding women’s issues were channeled into state-controlled 
institutions. These institutions were mainly focused on women’s education, health, and family 
roles and did not foster their political empowerment. In Iran only voices for upper and middle- 
class women who echoed the legitimacy of the regime were heard, and independent feminist 
movements were suppressed, along with other change-seeking movements such as nationalists 
and socialists. Also, the Westernization of dress code, educational systems, and workplaces 
marginalized women from religious households and reinforced inequalities not only between 
men and women but also among women themselves. The majority of improvements that were 
made benefited upper and middle-class women in urban areas, with minimal impact on rural 
women.  
As Moghissi (2008) argues, “women’s emancipation” in most of the countries in the 





were expected to participate dutifully in state building while simultaneously maintaining their 
nurturing role as mothers and wives.” This is not different from what scholars are observing in 
work narratives of professional women today in neoliberal economies in a developed context. 
Women’s issues continue to be de-prioritized in the shadow of nationalist causes, and in many 
countries women’s independent organizations are suppressed (Keddie, 2007). As reproducers of 
future generations, educators of the new citizens, and symbolizers of national culture, women’s 
bodies, time, and labor are charged with nationalist ideals and visions of nation and society. The 
production of new nations has been intertwined with production of new women who have 
marked the transition to the new era (Moallem, 2005). As Kandiyoti (1988) put it, “Women bear 
the burden of being mothers of the nation, as well as being those who reproduce the boundaries 
of ethnic/ national groups, who transmit the culture and who are the privileged signifiers of 
national difference.”  
In countries with a colonial history the “women” and “nation” questions were integrated. 
In most of these countries women played active roles in nationalist movements, united with men 
for the cause of independence. Women in Egypt, for example, had developed a strong and 
independent movement during the colonial period, which made significant contributions to 
Egypt’s nationalist struggles, leading to the declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922. In 
Syria and Lebanon most women’s organizations joined nationalist causes. In Algeria women 
bravely fought, often armed, against the French settlers. Establishment of independent nation-
states brought about some improvements in women’s status. Some governments, such as those in 
Eygpt and Tunisia, relied heavily on women’s potential, encouraging their education and work to 
retain their support against religious and conservative movements. In Tunisia, women were 





immediately after independence, without having an independent feminist movement for 
advocating such changes. The state supported women’s work, education, and even activism, 
which in practice, incorporated them into its efforts to prevent the empowerment of conservative-
Islamist movements. At the same time, however, these changes did not overturn gender 
inequality or grant women more control over the politics of nations.  
Despite the differences between countries in the region, including the way these nation-
states experienced modernization, the positioning of Islamist movements, and their own political 
structures, one issue remains intact: the lives of women, in the private or public spheres, were 
seen by the developing states as a venue for implementing and showcasing projects of 
modernity. Modernization, either as an ideology in opposition to Islamists or to top-down, state-
run projects for facilitating development, did not necessarily deliver on its promises of equality 
for women. On the contrary, it reinforced gendered divisions of labor and regulated women’s 
public lives in accordance with gender roles. In Iran, Najmabadi (1998) shows that the transition 
from tradition to modernity went hand in hand with the “remaking” of women as managers of the 
domestic sphere and educators of new generations, as guardians of children’s intellectual, 
physical, and moral development. Women were encouraged to educate themselves and assert a 
public presence to become “modern” wives and mothers, the types who were not limited to the 
domestic sphere but who would take advantage of new possibilities created for public 
participation (particularly in education), to become managers of the family (Najmabadi, 1998). 
In Egypt, Shakry (1998) shows that a shift in the discourse of motherhood marked the nationalist 
discourse of modernity in the post-World War I era. The idea of a scientific and rational 
motherhood was promoted to mark the transition to a new era, with promises of progress and 





citizens through responsible and educated motherhood. These modernizing nationalist 
movements undermined traditional (Islamist) gender norms and laws as signs of backwardness, 
while at the same time re-envisioned the notion of womanhood and femininity along the lines of 
gender segregation. As Moghissi (2008) astutely observed, “While modern developmentalist 
states of different types invariably made some efforts to lift social and cultural barriers to 
women's participation in public life, and to curb the controlling power of religious leaders and 
fathers' authority over women's lives, more often than not they ended up solidifying gender roles 
and regularizing sexual discrimination, albeit on a slightly altered basis.” Either by re-defining 
women’s domestic roles to their rational and scientific responsibilities for raising the nation’s 
children giving them the right to vote, or simply imposing modern codes of dressing, the modern 
nation-states in the region relied heavily on women issues as signifiers of national identity 
(Moghadam, 2000). To draw this discussion back to a Focauldian framework of power 
relationships, the changes made in women’s status and the transformations made in the concept 
of womanhood were not simply to create structural adjustments for improving or even 
deteriorating women’s situation. These changes were manifestations of subject-making processes 
for “remaking” women (Abu-Lughod, 1998) and for imagining different ways of being a woman, 
as modernization cannot be consummated without the modern bodies that carry out its imagined 
ways of being and living. These changes exemplify efforts for producing subjects that mark the 
transition from tradition to modernity, from the past to the future.  
Similar to the modernizing nation-states in the region, the Islamic revolution and the 
post-revolutionary regime could not deliver its promises and imaginations of change without 
transforming norms of gender and sexuality and re-regulating men’s and women’s bodies to bear 





lives and bodies another round of “remaking,” one which followed Pahlavi’s modernization 
era—this time in the opposite direction. Imagining a new form of society and a new style of 
governing that were markedly different from those promised by Western capitalism or Eastern 
socialism, the Islamic regime imagined new models of womanhood.  
 
Remaking Women into Revolutionary Subjects 
In the late 1970s discontent against Mohammad Reza Shah and his pro-West, pro-
modernization regime, led to rising support for Ayatollah Khomeini, a charismatic Shia Muslim 
religious figure. With the impetus of this new movement, eventually a revolution emerged that 
ended two thousand years of monarchy. Modernization projects of the Pahlavi regime led to 
resistance on the side of Ulama and Islamic clergies, whose public roles in juridical and social 
systems were limited under the Shah’s modernization approach. In addition, they were exposed 
to tight and close control by the state. The majority of Ulama, in addition to religious classes of 
society, demonstrated their disagreement with traces of Westernization by resisting modern dress 
codes and women’s unveiling (Faghfoory, 1993; Chehabi, 1993). 
Shah’s interest in westernizing the economy and culture of the country in addition to 
rising poverty and economic inequality rasied popular dissatisfaction and resistance against him. 
The growth of income inequality (Assadzadeh and Paul 2004; Piraei and Ghanaatian 2007) 
mobilized the middle and lower classes against the Shah. Popular discontent against the Shah 
created a political vacuum, which paved the way for Khomeini to come forth with an agenda that 
unified the opposition, including the leftists, nationalists, and Islamists, under the banner of 






Among the supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini emerged a large number of women, 
despite the fact that the Pahlavi’s projects of modernization and Westernization resulted in some 
improvements in women’s rights. From a liberal feminist perspective, women’s participation in a 
revolution to overthrow a regime that was promoting Western models of gender equality became 
one of the most puzzling phenomena of the 1970s (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2016). While Khomeini had 
explicitly opposed all improvements made in women’s rights during Pahlavi’s regime, he 
ironically could mobilize masses of both religious and secular women to join the revolution. 
Despite his prior conservative readings of Islam, which emphasized women’s exclusive roles in 
the private sphere as mothers and wives, Khomeini presented a fundamentally different model of 
Islamic womanhood during the revolution, as he needed women’s political support. Highlighting 
women’s historical role in Muslim society (ummah) and their engagement in political matters, 
Khomeini encouraged women to come out of their homes and participate in demonstrations. 
Putting forward role models such as Fatemeh and Zeinab (the daughter and granddaughter of the 
Prophet Mohammad) he linked women’s historical role shoulder to shoulder with men in 
building Muslim society. As Moallem (2005) argues, Khomeini envisioned an Islamic 
community in which women would complement men as “veiled sisters” to their “warrior 
brothers.”  
Both Fatemeh and Zeinab were sacred historical icons in the hearts and minds of 
religious groups and well-respected for their political roles and leadership in building the Islamic 
community. Equating women’s role in the Islamic revolution with such sacred figures, therefore, 
legitimized religious women’s participation in such a public and political matter. Many religious 
families who resented their daughters’ presence in public space, even for improved education 





events. This was a mission that could not be accomplished by nationalist, socialist, or feminist 
discourses in the Iranian context. Liberal feminists had long been writing about the public/ 
private division as the domain of powerful versus powerlessness in trying to facilitate women’s 
access to the public sphere, through progressive tools such as education and employment. The 
revolutionary phase in Iran manifested a puzzling moment when women were mobilized to 
transgress boundaries from the private to public sphere through an Islamic discourse. This 
occurred while Islam had been traditionally understood as a burden to both gender equality and 
the advancement of women’s rights, particularly in public arena (Charrad 2011).  
The writings and speeches of Shariati, an intellectual Shia ideologist, played an important 
role in the mobilization of educated women against Shah’s modernization and the formation of 
an oppositional Islamic femininity (against notions of Western femininity). Shariati introduced 
Fatemeh’s femininity in opposition to traditional and Western-progressive models that were 
viewed as limiting women solely to her sexuality.  He urged Iranian women to release their 
potential for building an Islamic community in which all individuals are respected for their 
morals rather than bodies. Many educated, modernized women voluntarily started wearing hejab 
following his model to demonstrate their opposition to the Shah (Naghibi 1999). 
The Shah’s Western-modernist discourse fell short of what the majority of women 
needed in their lives, which paved the way for an Islamist discourse to win over women’s hearts 
and minds. While Pahlavi’s reforms improved the public representation of upper-middle class, 
educated, and secular women, it did not make any serious changes in women’s degree of 
political power (Naghibi 1999) which made the educated, middle class highly critical of the 
regime. The new regime’s overall political repression and exacerbated income inequalities in the 





changes made marginal impact upon the lives of the majority of women who lived in rural areas, 
as well as for the working class and urban poor. The labor force participation rate of women 
increased slowly during the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, but the new jobs that were created 
during these decades existed mainly for the members of the privileged class.  
With women at the forefront of demonstrations, the Islamic revolution succeeded in the 
winter of 1979 when the Shah left the country and Khomeini ordered a referendum to establish a 
new regime. Subsequently, 99.3% of voters opted for the establishment of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. From its inception in 1979, the issue of women has been central to discursive formation 
of the Islamic state in Iran (Terman, 2010; Moallem, 2005; Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2016). Despite 
many stereotypical accounts that depict the revolutionary movement as predominantly 
masculine, women’s participation was welcomed, encouraged, and praised. In one of his 
speeches in 1979 Khomeini remarked:  
You noble people witnessed for yourselves how the respected, committed women of Iran entered 
the arena ahead of the men to free the country from the trammels of imperial rule. We are all 
indebted to them for their uprising and their efforts.  
In his book, Ghamari-Tabrizi (2016) demonstrates in great detail how during the 
revolution and the early years after its establishment, Iranian women embodied a powerful form 
of female subject-hood that was not fully comprehensible by pioneering feminists of the time, 
such as Simon Dubuar and Kate Millett. While veiled women were depicted as victims of 
Islamists — in the same way as women of Iraq and Afghanistan are depicted in today’s media in 
Western “rescue narratives” that justify U.S. foreign (Western) interference in these countries — 
they were actually in the center of revolutionary events and the discursive construction of an 
imagined society that the revolution sought to deliver. Women of different religious, educational, 
and economic backgrounds participated in revolutionary events as agents of change and took a 





consumerism inherent in Western modernism. Centering his historical reading of women’s 
participation in the revolution on voices of both religious and secular female activists at the time, 
Ghamari-Tabrizi shows how the liberal-progressive frame of second-wave feminism lacked the 
conceptual tools for making sense of gender relations and the ways they were manifested in 
Iran’s revolution. He argues that the Islamic revolution, materialized “a moment of historical 
rupture” that created new possibilities for gendered subjectivities to emerge. At this moment of 
rupture, issues such as veiling or gender segregation, as other scholars like Terman (2010), 
Mohatny (1998), Moallem (2005), Abu-Lughod (2015) have discussed, were far beyond being 
signs of repression. The revolutionary moment debunked the meanings attached to these realities 
by the liberal-feminist approach and showcased their empowering potentials. The post-
revolutionary years, however, witnessed a myriad of controversies and, perhaps, unexpected 
complexities that did not allow the revolutionary aspirations of making “new” women to 
materialize in imagined ways.  
 
Remaking of Women into Spiritual Guardians of the Nation: Complexities and 
Controversies 
 
The gender discourse in post-revolutionary Iran has been formed in opposition to any 
concept, politics, or values that were promoted by the Pahlavi regime under the projects of 
modernization. Feminist ideal(s) of gender equality were conceptualized as Western values and 
thus rejected within post-revolutionary gender politics. The Western feminine subject was 
depicted as hyper-sexualized and abused by capitalism while the Islamic female subject was 
modest and respected for her moral rather than physical values in the society (Terman 2010). In 





In the name of wanting to liberate women, they oppressed the women; they [the Pahlavi Regime] 
committed outrages against them. They dragged them down from that position of honour and 
esteem that they occupied, from that spiritual position that they enjoyed, making them instead 
mere objects […] They turned women into dolls, whereas women are human beings, great 
human beings.  
Khomeini saw men’s and women’s roles as complementary. Instead of encouraging 
women’s entrance into men’s domains, as the Western models of equality did in his view, he 
politicized feminine roles by conceptualizing them as women’s social responsibility in relation to 
the nation and the revolution. Women, in his framework, are seen as essentially different from 
men and thus carriers of different responsibilities, with a focus on their motherhood role. In a 
speech on the occasion of Women’s Day in 1979, for example, he declared:  
Women are the educators of society. It is from the laps of women that true human beings 
originate. The first stage in the development of sound men and women begins in the lap of a 
woman. Women are the educators of human beings. A country’s success or its misfortune 
depends on women. If they impart sound teachings, they create (sound) human beings and a 
flourishing country.  
Gender difference ideology and its religious justifications continues to the present to be at 
the core of post-revolutionary gender politics. The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, 
highlights men’s and women’s complementary roles and rejects the concept of gender equality as 
a pathway to women’s empowerment. In one of his speeches in 1988 while addressing Muslim 
women from Iran and nine other countries, he said: 
With respect to their human values, Islam accepts the equality between men and women. With 
respect to their social responsibilities, however, no! Islam assigns specific responsibilities to 
women which are not lower than men’s. We should note that the specificities of women’s 
physical and psychological conditions prepare them for different duties [than men].3 
It is important to note that the difference ideology does not by itself lead to the 
eradication of women’s participation in public life, although it has served as a ground for many 
                                                             





of the state’s discriminatory policies against women. Rather, it undermines the perspectives that 
de-politicize and thus devalue private space as a domain of disempowerment for women and 
segregation as a tool for excluding them from the public arena. Through the difference ideology, 
the revolutionary and post-revolutionary gender discourse envisions an eminent status for 
women, higher than men’s, and promises to bestow up on them their “true” position in society. 
This “true” position was one that protected women’s bodies form over-sexualization, their labor 
from being exploited by capitalism, and their family status from being interrupted by 
breadwinning responsibilities. In the aftermath of revolution, while the state continued to rely 
heavily on women’s volunteer labor for social causes and their work in health, education, and 
segregated space, it never gave up its bold emphasis on women’s family roles as a duty toward 
the revolution and the Islamic nation. In another speech at the international conference of 
Women and Islamic Awakening in 2013, Khamenei stated:  
In an Islamic society, women make scientific, political, personal, and spiritual progress and 
remain at the forefront of the most important social causes while maintaining their feminine 
values. Distancing women from their womanhood and household responsibilities does not 
privilege them in any sense […] Undervaluing motherhood and wifehood roles does not dignify 
women […] the western culture ruins the family and this eventually will seize western societies. 
 
From a theoretical perspective it has been well-established by academic scholars that 
simplifying Islamization in post-revolutionary Iran as a mere suppression of women’s public life 
is problematic, as it fails to capture the complexities of how an Islamic feminine subject was 
imagined. However, despite its success in mobilizing masses of women around the idea(l)s of 
social justice and the unique context this mobilization provided for emancipatory forms of 
subjectivity to emerge—ones that free men and women from exploitation of Western capitalism 
and Eastern socialism—the post-revolutionary politics of the Islamic state clearly failed to 





flexibility regarding issues such as compulsory hejab, family laws, and women’s equal access to 
paid work. There has been a transition from revolutionary subject-making to down-to-the-earth 
policymaking for establishing an Islamic state, which had no precedent in the Muslim world and 
thus no pre-tested script to follow. This created a deep discord between what was imagined of 
women’s status in Islamic society and the mundane realities of their lives, as I will discuss in 
more detail in the next chapter. Contradictions arose in 1982, when all women astonishingly 
became obligated to wear hejab despite their personal beliefs. Women also lost many of the 
family rights which they were granted by the Shah’s reforms and they were excluded from 
professions such as mining, construction, or the judiciary through strict segregation policies. In 
addition, the government closed women’s journals and marginalized female publishers (Halper 
2005). Many religious women, particularly those who had developed a sense of entitlement 
toward the revolution due to their engagement in revolutionary events voiced against the 
patriarchal policies of the state in different forms, pronounced the failure of the regime to deliver 
justice even to religious and revolutionary women. For example, Azam Taleghani, an anti-Shah 
activist, a member of the first parliament elected after the revolution, and the daughter of 
Ayatollah Taleghani, the most popular revolutionary figure after Khomeini, signed up for her 
presidential candidacy in 1997. Her goal was to protest to the ban on women being eligible to 
serve as president following the revolution. She argued that in Islam there is no difference 
between men and women in their right to access positions of political power. She continued 
doing so in proceeding elections, joined by other women, to open up a space for public 
discussion around the discrimination against women in politics and to direct public attention to 
the issue. Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani, a one-time member of parliament, the head of the 





revolutionary figure close to Khomeini, caused controversy when she denounced limitations on 
women’s biking in the public space, as published in her Zan newspaper.  
The economic hardship facing the country due to U.S-led international sanctions and the 
eight years of war with Iraq also had important role in highlighting the conflicts between the 
models of femininity put forward by the state and the realities facing ordinary women in day-to-
day life. While the state-promoted model emphasized women’s roles as mothers, conceptualizing 
motherhood as a political responsibility for them to raise the next generation of the Islamic 
society, many women of, in particular, working and middle-class backgrounds simply could not 
afford to be fully devoted to domestic responsibilities. Women were urged to work or be present 
in the public sphere in order to handle matters such as banking, shopping, or children’s schooling 
while their husbands had gone to work, in many cases double shifts, to run the family under 
conditions of economic hardship. Lack of opportunities for women’s work and the burdens they 
faced in accessing the labor market despite their economic needs also became an important 
impetus for women acting to problematize a state gender ideology. In a recent national survey on 
women’s expectations from the government, the majority of women viewed gender 
discrimination and unemployment as the main issues facing them. The same survey shows that 
women aspire to gain more representation in macro-level decisionmaking and to take more 
active roles in the public domain.   
Moallem (2005) argues that such discord between the imagined Islamic female subject 
and how women’s lives are in actuality was indeed the inevitable outcome of the uneasy 
encounter between modernity and Islamic fundamentalism in the manner in which it occurred in 
Iran’s context. Islamist ideology and its success in mobilizing masses of women “put in crisis” 





as a source of women’s honor and their empowerment in society. In return, however, the model 
put forward by Islamists fell into crisis due to the questions that women’s demands for equality, 
especially in accessing the public domain posed to the state. Western egalitarian feminism failed 
to recognize the diversity among women, their needs, their ideals of womanhood, and the 
unbalanced relationships of power among them along lines of race, class, religions, and 
nationality. On the other hand, Islamic fundamentalism in Iran did not recognize the diversity in 
women’s ideal lives in an Islamic society promised by a revolution, for which they had made 
sacrifices beyond imagination.  
The state struggled with ideological and political contradictions to reconcile its 
“transnational claims of Islamic particularities” — which aimed to put forward the Islamic 
Ummat as an alternative form of governing, with promises of equality for all — including the 
mundane technicalities of nation-state building. The revolutionary spirit created new possibilities 
for subjectivity to emerge or at least be imagined, a trend which unsettled the modern 
dichotomies of domestic versus political, public versus private, and tradition versus 
progressiveness, by inspiring women who were marginalized under the Pahlavi’s modern regime 
to participate in a political matter. These were the same religious women who were deprived 
from participating in public spaces and instead pushed back to home due to Pahlavi’s enforced 
Westernization. The post-revolutionary nation-building project, however, failed to bypass such 
dichotomies and instill its desired models of womanhood in the hearts and minds of all women. 
Instead of creating new forms of subjectivity and alternatives to modern ways of being and 
living, the state turned toward suppressing its undesired forms of subjectivity (the Western 





in many ways into reinforcing the dichotomies that associated religion with tradition and 
(Western) modernity with progressiveness. As Moallem (2005) puts it:  
Contradictions between subject formation and agency have created unsustainable tensions that 
threaten the coherency of the idea of the unified will of the Islamic ummat. As it encounters the 
liberal subject of modernity, the Islamic subject of post-revolutionary Iran creates a crisis for 
both religion and modernity because the discourse of equality — that is, the will to rule in the 
name of the people and under the rubric of men as equal by nature — challenges the Islamic 
concept of ummat, which is based on the inequality of men and women” (p. 152)  
Today, there is much diversity among women and one cannot homogenize their views 
and experiences. Even among religious women, there are deep differences in their attitudes 
toward the Islamic state and expectations from living in an Islamic society (Bahramitash et al., 
2018). The ideology of gender difference, however, is placed into crisis by women one way or 
another. Those religious women who became educated professionals and political activists owing 
to the Islamization of public space and the possibilities it created for women of religious 
households do not silently tolerate discriminatory treatment under the banner of difference 
ideology. Many of these women push for a re-interpretation of Islamic texts to advocate gender 
equality. Those secular women who never accepted the state’s approach to gender issues after 
the revolution join international movements for advocating equality within a liberal framework 
of rights. Working and lower-class women whose work is central to the economic survival of 
their families undermine inequalities in pay and opportunities between men and women based on 
the difference ideology. Additionally, today’s young generation of girls places their focus on 
individual advancement prior to starting their own families. Despite the state’s heavy focus on 
women’s family roles, the divorce rate has sharply increased in recent years and the decline of 






Gender segregation is one of the manifestations of the difference ideology. Because men 
and women are seen as essentially different in both characteristics and needs, segregation is 
framed as a tool for facilitating their engagement in roles that best suit them. The implications of 
gender segregation in women’s lives and how they have dealt with it throughout the years 
following the revolution, however, are very complex. In some ways, segregation has benefited 
women and in other ways it has served as a basis for depriving them of certain resources. 
Regardless, it has given birth to paradoxes, or, as Shahrokni (2014) calls it, unwanted outcomes 
that are not fully grasped within the current literature.  
 
Paradoxes of Gender Segregation 
 
Gender segregation remains one of the most controversial issues regarding women’s 
social lives after the revolution. In Khomeini’s view, mixing of sexes was rejected as an 
interruption to women’s true duties. In a speech he gave in 1964 (well before the revolution), 
Khomeini clearly rejected the mixing of sexes, even in schools and thus women’s activities in 
masculine environments. It is a legacy that continues until today and has put severe barriers on 
women’s engagement in male-dominated domains, especially in politics: 
Instead of looking for ways to improve the economy, to prevent the bankruptcy of the respected 
traders, to provide bread and water for the poor and to find employment for the young graduates 
and others, the ruling clique has put forward practices that lead to moral corruption, such as the 
employment of women teachers for boys’ high schools and men teachers for girls’ high schools, 
and insisting on employing women in government offices to spread corruption.  
After the revolution, gender became central to the construction of space and its division into 
categories of public and private as domains of masculinity and femininity (Massey 1994, p. 180). 
Women were immediately banned from certain jobs such as serving as judges or in certain 





engineering (Shahrokni and Dokoohaki, 2013). Schools, hospitals, recreation centers, hair salons, 
and many other sites became segregated, and some places such as sport stadiums or traditional 
coffee shops (Ghahveh Khaneh), became exclusively male (Bayat 2009; Bahramitash and 
Esfahani 2011; Mirhosseini 1999; Paidar 1995; Shahrokni 2014).  
The so-called “cultural revolution” (1980-1983), which was meant to remove Western 
influences from universities and Islamize academia, provided a ground for segregation of 
universities as well. The rulebook for maintaining Islamic values and rituals in universities and 
academic units stipulates that female and male students must sit in separate rows in the 
classrooms; in populated areas in the universities men’s and women’s spaces should be 
segregated; male and female students must use laboratories, computer rooms, and workshops in 
different shifts as much as possible; for group projects, men and women must be assigned to 
different groups unless that is not possible; in the office areas of universities, the mixing of sexes 
must be avoided as much as possible; male officials must hire male secretaries; public spaces 
such as library study spaces, food courts, gyms, and dorms must be separated or used at different 
times for men and women; women must follow the Islamic dress codes in universities and avoid 
wearing tight outfits or makeup. Lastly, the rulebook maintains that men’s and women’s 
classrooms must be segregated if financial resources are available and the quality of learning is 
not impacted.  
Previous research shows that outcomes of Islamic sex segregation for women are not 
homogenous. While sex segregation deprived many secular women of job opportunities and 
closed many doors to them, it also created more space for religious women of all socioeconomic 
classes to participate in public life compared to the pre-revolution period (Abigail and Shahrokni 





limited women’s access to many sites of employment such as engineering, manufacturing, and 
transportation on one hand, but created more opportunities for them in female-only spaces as, for 
example, teachers, trainers, and nurses (Povey 2005).  
The state, however, has not pursued a single path in reinforcing segregation. States are 
not homogenous constructs, and contain different and even conflicting interests in national and 
global contexts (Mitchell 1991). The Islamic state of Iran, too, hosts a handful of sectors, 
institutions, and organizations that stand differently on the conservative-liberal/progressive 
spectrum. There are elected and non-elected institutions, with the former being under the control 
of the clergy’s authority, whose ultimate authority comes from the supreme leader (Hoodfar and 
Sadr, 2010). The elected institutions, particularly the presidency, parliament and their associated 
organizations, including the ministries, NGOs, and municipalities, are the main sites of 
policymaking and practices that impact women’s day-to-day lives, although the non-elected 
Guardian consul and the supreme leader can annul changes when they are perceived as 
inconsistent with the Islamic values. Among them, the two organizations that directly deal with 
women’s issues are the center for women and family affairs, headed by the vice president in 
women and family affairs, and the women’s cultural-social council, established nearly a decade 
after the revolution as a subdivision to the cultural revolution council. The cultural-social council 
is in charge of overarching policy designs regarding women’s social lives.  
 Until now, depending on the political parties in power, discussions about segregation 
have been gaining or losing momentum in political discourse and policymaking initiatives. 
Under conservative presidents and cabinets such as that of President Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), 
the conservative segments of the state and institutions such as Basij gain more power to enforce 





study in 36 universities (Shahrokni and Dokoohani, 2013). In the same period, some universities 
announced that they will segregate large classes, although the president placed an order to stop 
that. During the reform (1997-2005) and moderation (2013-2021) eras, under presidents Khatami 
and Rouhani respectively, women’s rights activists and officials in the system enjoyed a better 
atmosphere through which to challenge discriminatory aspects of segregation (Hoodfar and 
Sadeghi 2009; Moghissi 2008; Bahramitash 2007; Tahmasebi-Birgani 2010; and Paidar 1995). 
One recent example is President Rouhani’s order in 2016 to suspend the annual state recruitment 
examinations for those seeking government jobs until what he saw as “unjust” and 
“discriminatory” gender quotas were removed (Esfandiari, 2016). In the original format, nearly 
one-third of the open positions were held open exclusively for men. Later in his speech, given in 
2017, he addressed activists and deputies of women’ affairs by saying:  
Some men believe that if it is only them in the public arena, spirituality, ethics, and everything 
will be maintained, but if women step into men’s domains all of these will be ruined. This is not 
the case! Within the Islamic framework, men do not have any privilege over women.  
In an earlier speech given at the national women’s conference in 2014 he emphasized that 
women’s role cannot be limited to any specific domain, whether it is in the family or in particular 
types of jobs: 
There is no doubt that motherhood is a respected and elevated role. But do men forget their 
fatherhood roles by pursuing social activities? Women too can reconcile motherhood and social 
responsibilities […]. Our talented women make their ways into all domains through persistence 
and hard work. They are in schools, universities, hospitals, factories, research centers, 
everywhere.  
The discourse represented by Rouhani’s statements does not fit into the difference 
ideology, advanced by conservative segments of the state with the supreme leader on top, as it 
entitles women access to all sectors of public space, from schools to factories, in the same way as 





for women and family affairs under Rouhani’s first term created one of its four missions to 
promote gender balance in men’s and women’s roles in family, economy, culture, society, and 
politics as a way to encourage women’s access to sources of power in the public arena. 
Shahindokht Molavardi, the assistant to the president for women and family affairs during 
Rouhani’s first term and in civil rights during his second term, has been forthcoming in rejecting 
segregation when it burdens women’s equal access to public space and all labor markets. One 
important example is her efforts to remove bans on women’s entrance into sport stadiums and 
direct opposition to the bans. In one of her interviews she commented:  
After all, after some thirty years past our revolution, we must find a way to respond to this 
demand of a part of our women’s population within the ideological frame of our Islamic state, 
without causing concerns for our religious clerics. 
Molavardi’s approach represents a Muslim feminist discourse that seeks to reconcile 
Islamic values with an ideal(s) of gender equality, although she has not explicitly identified 
herself as a Muslim feminist. Within this framework, Islam provides a ground for advocating 
women’s equal rights, as it testifies that all human beings are equal in God’s eyes regardless of 
their gender, race, etc. Based on this, women like Molavardi work to undermine conservative 
trends that view segregation as an Islamic order, and instead highlight Islamic values that entail 
equality between men and women, including their respective access to the public arena. In a note 
on Rouhani’s government approach to women’s public life, Molavardi points out: 
Some people associate gender segregation to Islamic values and laws […] but the question is, 
why in the most sacred Islamic place, which is the holiest site, and in the most important Islamic 
ritual, men and women gather together in a small space (Kaaba) without any purdah or wall 
separating them, to worship god together? Do we want to surpass Islam and Prophet 
Mohammad? 
In a more recent interview, as the assistant to the president for citizenship, she prioritizes 
women’s civil right for equal access to urban facilities and spaces, while criticizing the matter of 





segregation that are tied to revolutionary values in conservatives’ views raise resistance on the 
part of even female conservatives. Molavardi was the target of much criticism. The head of the 
women’s section of Islamic Basij militia, for example, lamented that “instead of being concerned 
with issues of hejab and modesty, Molavardi is pursuing women’s entrance into stadiums.” On 
Molavardi’s criticisms of gender inequalities in the labor market, Basij added: 
There is no reason for women to take jobs that require them to interact with a lot of men. Women 
should take jobs that only deal with women such as teaching and medical professions [in 
women-only sites]. 
Therefore, the issue of gender segregation and the state’s approach to it is more complex 
than what is often assumed. To say that the state as a whole promotes gender segregation is not 
accurate, as the progressive segments, groups, and individuals attempt to find ways around the 
segregation discourse through legal pathways and within the Islamic framework. The 
conservative readings of the different ideologies lead fundamentalist institutions and groups to 
press segregation as a way to enforce what they understand as Islamic and revolutionary ideals of 
womanhood. The progressive sectors borrow from the very same Islamic values and 
revolutionary rhetoric to destabilize the fundamentalist accounts.  
Regardless of the political atmosphere though, certain aspects of segregation remain 
intact because, as previous research has shown, spatial gender segregation provided more 
opportunities for many women, especially in the religious and working classes, to work, study, 
and consume (Andrews and Shahrokni 2014; Mir-Hosseini 1999; Shahrokni 2014; Bahramitash 
2013; Velayati 2011; Shams 2016). These opportunities cannot and will not be taken back from 
women. As Shahrokni (2014) argues, gender segregation in today’s Iran is legitimized through 
“a discourse that permeates both the state and society and that justifies gender segregation as a 
response to [women’s needs and rights] and not as a requirement for an Islamic order.” Gender-





country that it cannot be simply removed. As my fieldwork reveals, many women in today’s 
Iran, even among the secular and non-religious, enjoy and support women-only spaces such as 
green parks, coffee shops, or taxis. In the urban areas and all the risks they create for women’s 
safety, gender-segregation is seen by many women, including my participants, as a solution. 
While compulsory segregation is not favored by many women as an option it is surely welcomed 
and supported. This is not specific to Iran; even in contexts where segregation has no 
institutional basis, it is seen as a way for improving women’s safety in urban areas. In the United 
States, for example, a ride-hailing start-up was launched as a women-only ride-sharing project in 
which female drivers were exclusively assigned to female riders.  
The complex ways that segregation as an institution and discourse are manifested in 
society and within the state leads to a series of paradoxes, which are the focus of this 
dissertation. For female drivers of women-only taxis, segregation facilitates their access to an 
otherwise hyper-masculine job. The mobility that women gain and their ability to perform a 
masculine job, however, undermines, in their view, the very difference ideology on which 
segregation is grounded. For female engineers, segregation is a burden to accessing jobs that fit 
their educational backgrounds. These women rely on their individual capital and undergo severe 
difficulties to find and hold jobs in male-dominated fields of engineering. These transgressions, 
however, do not necessarily lead to refuting the difference ideology in ways that might be 
expected. Many of them borrow from the difference ideology to adjust strategies to open up 
empowering spaces for themselves in the workplace. These paradoxes are manifestations of what 
Moallem had theorized in her 2005 book as discords between the ideological imaginations of 
womanhood in post-revolutionary Iran and women’s lives on the ground. The stories of my 





beneficiary or harmful to women by centering their analyses on voices of women who transgress 
boundaries in male-dominated domains. The views and experiences of these women show that, 
as the case of the contradictions and complexities in state’s approach to segregation, women 
themselves adopt segregation and difference discourses in paradoxical ways.  
Masculine domains of the labor market provide unique sites in which discourses of 
segregation, difference, and equality become significantly relevant. The narratives of my 
participants show how women borrow from these discourses in unique and creative ways to deal 
with the discriminatory environment of work. Women’s narratives challenge dichotomous 
accounts of segregation and difference discourses, depicting them as either empowering or 
oppressive. My informants addressed the oppressive implications of segregation by discussing 
accounts of empowerment in which difference, segregation, and equality were not counterparts. 
They creatively integrated these discourses to empower themselves in the face of challenges 
within highly male-dominated occupations. At the same time and equally important, these 
narratives urge us to avoid over-crediting spatial sex segregation for creating opportunities for 
women’s public presence. The goal of this work is to shed light on the unique ways that the 
combination of segregation, difference, and equality discourse and their inevitable tensions—as 
Moallem (2005) has theorized—informs women’s discourse of empowerment. Through this in-
depth ethnographic work among women who make gender atypical occupational choices, this 
dissertation explores how the historical tensions between the liberal discourse of equality and the 
Islamic discourse of differences are represented in women’s accounts of empowerment and 













In this chapter I review the complexities of women’s situation, with a particular focus on 
their work and employment during the years after the revolution. Having established the 
discursive context in which women’s public participation is regulated, this chapter provides a 
more detailed picture of women’s status in the labor market and multi-faceted factors, beyond 
the state’s gender ideology, that have been shaping its trend.  
The international labor organization defines “decent work” as containing four key pillars: 
employment opportunities, rights, protections, and voice. And women’s equal access to decent 
work has and continues to be central to international discourse on the subject of women’s 
empowerment (International labor organization, 2014). The most recent UN women’s initiative 
recognizes women’s full participation in the “economic life across all sectors and throughout all 
levels” as essential for (1) building strong economies; (2) establishing more stable and just 
societies; (3) creating sustainable development while upholding human rights; (4) improving the 
quality of life for women, men, families, and communities; (5) and propel businesses’ operations 
and goals (UN Women, 2017).  
In 2017, and following the agreement reached among Iran, members of the UN security 
council and EU, Human Rights Watch released a comprehensive report on women’s status in 
Iran’s labor market, highlighting the deficiencies in the country’s laws and legislation with 
regard to creating an inclusive and stable environment for women’s economic participation. The 
report further highlighted the Iranian government’s failure to ratify international conventions for 





internal laws, civil code, and legislation to promote women’s equal access to work and 
employment and to prohibit discrimination against them (Human rights watch, 2017).   
Based on Article 6 of Iran’s labor code all Iranians, regardless of race, gender or 
ethnicity, are equally protected by labor laws and have the right to choose any profession as long 
as that choice does not go against Islamic values, the public interest or the rights of others. 
Article 38 of the labor code prohibits discrimination in pay based on gender, race, ethnicity, and 
similar characteristics and states that men and women should be paid equally for performing 
work of equal value under equal conditions (Iran’s labor law). Under the section titled 
“Women’s Working Conditions,” the labor code prohibits employers from using the female labor 
force for dangerous, arduous, or harmful work or to allow women to carry, either manually and 
without mechanical means, loads heavier than the authorized limit (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
This section further stipulates employers’ duties to provide a total of 90 days paid leave for 
child-bearing, proper conditions for breastfeeding, and child care centers, under specified 
conditions.  
While the Iranian constitution promises equal political, economic, social and cultural 
rights to men and women, and labor codes follow a gender-neutral language in stipulating the 
rights and limitations of workers, privileges given to men in the marriage contract and other 
legislation, such as passport laws, all translate into presenting serious disadvantages for women 
in employment. For example, unless added as an addendum to the marriage contract, women 
cannot assume the right to study and work without a husband’s permission following marriage. 
Married women are not granted a passport or permission to exit the country without their 
guardians’ approval, causing many employers to avoid hiring women for positions with travel-





discriminating against women in recruitment on the basis of their family conditions or life plans, 
including pregnancies.  
Other institutions engaged in policy design and establishing provisions with regard to 
women and family can enforce regulations that lead to discrimination against women despite the 
stipulated equalities in the labor codes and the constitution. For example, in 1992 the Council of 
the Cultural Revolution put forward a series of policies titled “Employment Policies for Women 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” to set the tone for the country’s overarching approach to 
women’s work. Emphasizing the importance of women’s family roles, especially motherhood, in 
Islamic society, these policies specify the extent to and the economic sectors in which, women’s 
work should be supported. Article 2 of the employment policies states that women’s employment 
is essential to the fulfillment of social justice and the advancement of society. Article 4 
emphasizes the importance of creating proper conditions for women in workplaces. Article 5 
distinguishes between four types of jobs as regards the suitability for women in (a) jobs for 
which their presence is desirable based on Islamic codes, such as midwifery, teaching, nursing, 
and some areas of medicine; (b) those jobs that fit women’s assumed physical and mental 
conditions, such as laboratory sciences, electrical engineering, social work, pharmaceutical 
sciences, and translation; (c) those jobs that are presumed to be equally suitable for men and 
women, such as a regular laborer; and (d) those jobs such as judging and firefighting, that are 
deemed unsuitable for women based on authorities’ interpretations of Sharia and on the basis that 
some work conditions are not appropriate for women. Other articles in the employment policies 
forbid discrimination against women in professions that are considered suitable for them. 
However, these articles also clearly set out the ground for enforcement of occupational 





also fail to address discrimination in the hiring process and fail to enforce available 
nondiscrimination protections in the workplace (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In the next chapter 
I will delve into the day-to-day struggles facing working women and the shortcomings of 
policies that could protect them against discrimination.  
Despite the deeply rooted discriminatory policies and institutionalized inequalities, 
Iranian women have always made significant contributions to the country’s economy. Women 
have historically played important roles in production in the various and diversified regions of 
the country. Iran’s agriculture has significantly benefited from women’s work in all stages, from 
planting to harvesting, and its carpet and textile industries would not have survived without 
women’s manual labor. Finally, women’s work in the informal economy has been central to 
economic survival and the overall wellbeing of families, especially the lower-class households 
(Bahramitash 2013). 
Iranian women’s economic participation has been impacted by a variety of local and 
global factors, with the 1979 Islamic revolution as a turning point (Bahramitash and Esfahani 
2011). Scholars have mostly discussed these factors under the dichotomy of pre-revolutionary 
western-modernization versus post-revolutionary Islamic-developmental approaches. Mod-
ernization of the industry which started in the late nineteenth century and reached its pick during 
the Pahlavi’s regime in the twentieth century reshaped women’s engagement in economy by 
separating work from home. This separation limited economic participation of the majority of 
women who lived in rural areas or in culturally traditional and religious families while creating 
more opportunities for a minority group of upper class, educated, and non-religious women in 
urban areas. The 1979 revolution, which substituted the secular regime of Pahlavi with an 





and international relations that made a significant impact on women’s economic participation. 
The Islamic state pursued a different approach to women’s public life than the pro-West Pahlavi 
regime and enacted a series of changes that improved the public mobility of religious women 
while alienating and limiting the impact of secular groups. A variety of international factors that 
emerged after the revolution, including the 8-year-long war with Iraq and Western-imposed 
economic sanctions, also impacted women’s work opportunities and economic status. This 
chapter reviews women’s economic status during the years after the revolution. Different time 
periods after the revolution mark distinct political and economic environments and approaches to 
women’s social lives, including the realm of employment. This chapter covers the important 
patterns in women’s economic participation.  
 
Post-Revolution and War 
The first decade after the revolution was marked by a major economic recession and 
increasing poverty. The per capita GDP of the country decreased by 30% between 1978 and 
1988 as a consequence of the eight-year-long war with Iraq and U.S.-led economic sanctions 
(Esfahani and Pesaran 2009). As discussed in the previous chapter, despite women’s active 
participation in the revolution, their social status was not improved in an expected way.  The 
Islamic state’s new laws, including veiling and gender segregation, alienated some middle class, 
professional, and secular women and forced many of them to leave their jobs and even the 
country. With regard to work and employment, the data reveals a drop in women’s share of labor 
force in the early years following the revolution, from 11.3% in 1976 to 10.6% in 1986 in urban 
areas, and from 17.6% to 9.8% in rural areas (Statistical Center of Iran). Kian (1997) argues that 





challenges, especially those of the lower classes and war widows, their issues were marginalized 
owing to the post-revolutionary crisis. 
Considering the immediate and visible impacts of the revolution on women’s public 
lives, especially compulsory veiling, the decline in women’s employment buttressed the 
assumption that women were pushed back to home under the Islamic state. However, scholars 
have shown that this is a more complex pattern that cannot be understood in isolation from the 
overall instabilities of the post-revolution era, which weakened the country’s economy as a 
whole and caused the total employment rate to drop from 42.6% to 39% during the same time 
period (Esfahani and Pesaran, 2009; Bahramitash and Esfahani 2011; Bahramitash 2007). When 
taking other factors, especially the eight-year-long war and subsequent economic sanctions into 
account, Islamization rates low in the decline of women’s employment during this period.  
For example, during the time when many countries in the region, such as Egypt and 
Tunisia were opening their markets to international investments as a response to the World Bank 
structural adjustments in the 1980s, Iran was not only fighting a war but was also isolated due to 
economic sanctions imposed by U.S. These economic sanctions, especially after the war, when 
the government was determined to open up its markets, attracted international investors, and 
increased non-oil exports—all of which impeded the globalization of Iran’s economy (Olmsted 
2011), leading to what some scholars have called a period of de-globalization (Bahramitash and 
Esfahani 2011, p. 22). While the impact of economic isolation on women’s unemployment is 
difficult to measure, scholars agree that the carpet industry, which hosted a large percentage of 
women’s work, especially in the rural areas, was the hardest hit by sanctions. The market for the 
handwoven carpet industry began shrinking after the revolution due to the deterioration of 





Persian carpets.  Between 1978 and 1988, carpet exports declined by 70 percent. Deterioration of 
the carpet market disproportionately impacted rural and working class women for whom carpet 
weaving was the main source of income and discouraged many from seeking jobs (Olmsted 
2011; Karimi 2011; Velayati 2011).  
The eight-year-long war with Iraq was also a key factor in shaping women's economic 
participation. The war not only unsettled the labor market but also channeled women’s available 
time for managing household needs during the economic hardship of wartime, especially women 
whose husbands fought the war for the Iranian military. In addition, the increased fertility rate 
during the decade following the revolution expectedly increased women’s responsibilities at 
home and impacted a pattern of female labor force participation. Moreover, some of the state’s 
policies, such as early retirement offers to government employees (Moghadam 2004) and 
retirement benefits for rural workers, encouraged many women to leave their jobs.  
Despite the decrease in women’s share of the labor force, this decade saw an increase in 
women’s public mobility in a unique way. Following the revolution, one of the important 
mobilizing forces remained economic justice (Bahramitash 2004), and the Islamic Republic 
placed a great emphasis on addressing poverty and inequalities in health and education by means 
of increased access to social protections. Khomeini called for a series of social justice programs 
or jihads to improve literacy, health, and housing in rural areas. These programs relied heavily on 
the work of volunteers and mobilized a large population of women to join the jihad’s cause. 
Many of the women who joined Khomeini’s jihad were from traditional and religious families 
who were alienated during the Shah’s regime. The Shah’s projects of Westernization and 
modernization rendered the public sphere an uneasy arena with which such women could 





places and became disadvantaged in public sector employment. Khomeini’s call for women’s 
contribution to a national cause brought groups of women into the public domain who otherwise 
would have been confined to the private sphere (Paidar 1995; Bahramitash 2014).  
When the Shah relied on women’s work in his literacy and health corps in rural areas, 
mostly unveiled women joined his cause; their presence in some rural communities caused 
resentment. Khomeini’s call, on the other hand, was received by masses of not only religious but 
also, upper middle class, secular women. Many feminists and leftists worked shoulder to 
shoulder with Islamist women in literacy campaigns and, owing to women’s volunteer work, the 
campaign made a significant improvement in women’s literacy rate. The literacy rate among 
females ages 10 and older rose from 30.9 percent in 1976 to more than 47.6 percent in 1986 
(Statistical Center of Iran). The fact that many literacy campaigns were held in mosques, with 
veiled women as teachers, paved the way for many women of traditional and religious 
households to participate in these classes without the objection of their families. Veiled women 
turn out to be much more accepted in rural communities than the unveiled women during the 
Shah’s campaigns. Khomeini’s campaigns, in this sense, created an opportunity for different 
groups of women to work for the cause of women’s empowerment.  
Enforcement of spatial gender segregation after the revolution also increased women’s 
mobility in public spaces, especially those women who were raised in religious families 
(Shahrokni 2014), and created more job opportunities for them in some formal sectors such as 
teaching and nursing (Povey 2005). Owing to gender segregation, some of the jobs became 
exclusively women’s, as men were not allowed into certain spaces such as women’s security 
checkpoints or costumes in airports, all-female dorms, hair salons, and recreation centers. 





public arena by creating a safe means for them to commute from home to schools, workplaces, or 
other public places such as markets, banks, and so on. Therefore while gender segregation 
limited women’s access to certain fields, it improved their public mobility in other ways.  
 
Post-War and Reconstruction 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989 started a new era in Iran’s political economy. 
Ayatollah Khamenei was appointed as the new supreme leader and Ayatollah Rafsanjani, a 
wealthy and influential cleric and a former student of Khomeini, was elected as president. 
Rafsanjani’s policies focused on accelerating economic growth; the eight years under his 
presidency is referred to as the economic reconstruction period. Despite the centrality of 
economic justice and equality in revolutionary discourse, Rafsanjani was less interested in 
promoting economic redistribution through the strengthening of the public sector. He instead 
pursued policies that empowered the private sector and its entrepreneur class.   
The war versus Iraq ended in 1988 and the new government placed an emphasis on social 
and economic development to pump new blood into a society devastated by nearly a decade of 
instability under the twin strains of war and revolution. Rafsanjani put a great emphasis on 
economic recovery through a series of adjustments to open markets and empower the private 
sector. While during the first decade after the revolution the political discourse of Iran was 
centered on the idea of social justice and economic equality, during Rafsanjani’s presidency the 
liberal discourse of economic development substituted the discourse of jihads for equality.  
However, the government lacked the trained personnel necessary for making these fundamental 
changes in the economy. Moreover, the plunge in oil prices and international economic 





During the first few years of Rafsanajani’s term the income of Iranians saw an overall 
increase. However, this improvement turned out to be short-term due to poorly designed policies 
and rising international debt (Bahramitash and Esfahani, 2011). The prices of goods began to 
increase, with adevastating impact on lower-class families, including women.  During this period 
inequality slowly returned to levels seen during the pre-revolutionary era and the poor or 
“mostazafin” who were central to revolutionary discourse and politics became alienated. This 
raised popular dissatisfaction and a sense of disappointment toward the revolution. To preserve 
the legacies of the revolution in the face of economic challenges, the government opened up a 
political space for more progressive Islamist intellectuals and clerics to reconfigure Islamic laws 
and reinvigorate civil society. This eventually gave birth to the idea of dynamic jurisprudence or 
“feghh e pooya,” which opened up new ways for merging Islamic values with demands of the 
modern globalizing world.  
In addition to economic conflicts, women’s overall condition posed one of the most 
puzzling questions to the government: how to manage women’s public lives? (Bayat, 2009). A 
large population of women gained public mobility during the revolution and later in Khomeini’s 
jihad programs (Povey 2001). Rafsanjani’s government also continued to rely on women’s free 
labor during its well-known Volunteer Health Worker program, starting 1992, during which 
women delivered health and family planning education in their neighborhoods and communities. 
This program turned out to be a large success, particularly as regards population control. The 
fertility rate dropped to 2.72 in 1997 compared to 6.52 in 1982 (World Bank Statistics). The 
program specifically targeted low-income communities through face-to-face education. Female 
volunteers were mostly middle-aged mothers with some education who were invited to join the 





classes held in their neighborhood mosques, some by door-to-door recruiters, and others by 
fellow volunteers. Nearly 100,000 women in all joined the program. Hoodfar (2010) argues that 
the implications of the program in women’s lives went beyond volunteer work for promoting 
health; the public mobility they gained through the program caused many to redefine their 
positions in their families and communities and “reinterpret” or even “reverse” state patriarchy 
and the more traditional gender ideology.  
Women’s major contributions to the country through volunteer work gave them a status 
and a sense of entitlement that could not be reversed. Many conflicts also arose from 
discriminatory laws enforced by Khomeini immediately after the revolution. For example, under 
the new family law martyrs’ wives had to give up custody of their children to paternal 
grandfathers or uncles. Also, Islamist, female activists were excluded from key political 
positions, including the presidency, based on the Arabic term “Rajul” in the new Sharia-based 
constitution. The term “Rajul” was translated as “men” and used as a pre-condition for taking 
such positions. Dynamic jurisprudence facilitated a shift in gender policies and led to the 
emergence of an Islamic discourse for pressing women’s rights. The state was compelled to deal 
with challenges of a global economy, geo-politics, and a trend toward modernity, all tests for 
which fundamentalist readings of Islam did not suffice. With respect to women, Islamist 
ideology failed to address their needs, especially in the public arena, while socio-economic and 
global cultural conditions were increasingly necessitating women’s active public engagement 
(Bayat 2009; Kian 1955).  
By the late 1980s the government revived some of the rights given to women under the 
1967 family protection laws, despite Khomeni’s earlier ban. Women were afforded the right to 





housing and nafagheh (money given by the husband to the wife periodically for life expenses). In 
addition, women became entitled to half of the wealth accumulated during the marriage, 
excluding the ‘mehr’ (money or possessions that the groom is obligated to pay the bride at 
request) and inheritances in the case of divorce. In 1991 the government passed a law which 
obliged men to pay wages for women’s domestic labor during the marriage in the case of 
divorce, if the court was convinced that the woman had fulfilled her wifely duties. Women also 
gained the right to initiate divorce, assume custody of children, and continue education, work, 
and travel without their husband’s permission if this stipulation was included in the marriage 
contract, with the groom’s consent. These progressive elements are among the most significant 
achievements of women’s rights activists in Iran. However, improvements in family rights were 
not accompanied by significant changes in women’s economic participation, although the trend 
was positive.  
Female labor force participation (LFP) began to recover, although at a low rate of 4.4% 
(Bahramitash and Esfahani, 2011 p. 126). The recovery of the carpet industry during the 1990s 
helped increase rural women’s participation in the labor force, from 7.9% in 1986 to 10.7% in 
1996. However, female LFP in urban areas did not see a major change during this period, as the 
1980s “baby boomers” dictated that many urban women would have to dedicate increased time 
to childcare. Women’s employment rates began increasing following the general improvement in 
the country’s economy in the first years of Rafsanjani’s administration. Their share of the labor 
force increased from 10.2 percent in 1986 to 13.4 percent in 1999 (Bahramitash 2007). In urban 
areas, the share of the manufacturing sector as regards women’s employment increased from 
11.8 percent in 1986 to 19.2 percent in 1996. The share of women’s employment in the private 





women’s employment sharply dropped, while simultaneously rising in the manufacturing sector, 
especially in the carpet industry, from 33.6 to 51 percent. Overall, women’s employment moved 
away from the agricultural sector toward manufacturing and service during this period and later 
became more dominated by service sector jobs. The positive trend in women’s employment and 
labor force participation continued during the next two decades, as I will discuss. Higher 
education was a key factor in improving women’s social status, although not to as large an extent 
as their economic opportunities. As a part of its developmental project, the government removed 
a gender quota system that restricted women’s entrance into certain fields of education (Boozari, 
2001), although some of these restrictions were later replaced. Women gained more 
opportunities for education under Rafsanjani’s presidency, as he explicitly encouraged women to 
pursue higher education. The percentage of female applicants to university admission exams 
increased from 39 percent in 1988 to 49 percent in 1997 and continued to rise in the following 
years. While public universities provided free education to everyone, Rafsanjani established a 
series of private universities as a part of his economic liberalization projects. These private 
universities created unique opportunities for women’s education. The percentage of employed 
women with higher education increased from 75.8 in 1987 to 82.5 percent in 1999, although their 
overall employment rate increased slightly, from 8.2 to 9.1 percent (See Rezai-Rashti and 
Moghadam 2011 for a review).  
 
Political Reform  
This period is marked by the presidency of Khatami, a progressive Islamic scholar and 
cleric, and an advocate of dynamic jurisprudence. Khatami’s policies focused on strengthening 





known idea of dialogue among civilizations. Compared to Rafsanaji, Khatami focused less on 
economic issues and spent more time on social issues, particularly by empowering non-profit and 
private sectors. Many opportunities became available to different groups, including women, to 
make their voices heard in civil society.  
The women’s rights movement after the revolution became most organized, effective, 
and visible during the reform period (1997-2005) under Khatami’s presidency. After eight years 
of post-war economic reconstruction, the reformist party mobilized women by promising 
improvement in their political and social status. Women’s rights were central to the reformist 
campaign in 1997, and more than 78 percent of women voted for Khatami. Despite pressure 
from fundamentalist sectors of the state, such as the guardian council, the parliament at the time, 
and the office of supreme leader, civil society and women’s organizations improved considerably 
during this period. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and environmental grassroot 
organizations increased in number, and civil society opened up for women so that they became 
more publicly visible, with fewer restrictions on clothing codes. During this eight-year period, 
particularly the first four, women successfully increased their number of publications, organized 
their level of activism, and established links with global women’s movements by participating in 
international conferences (Hoodfar and Sadeghi 2009; Moghissi 2008; Bahramitash 2007; 
Tahmasebi-Birgani 2010; and Paidar 1995).  In 2001 two public universities in Tehran began 
offering degrees in women and gender studies with courses on gender and development, 
women’s rights, feminism, and gender in Islam; a number of public and private universities in 
other major cities joined them in later years. The positive trend in women’s education also 





Women’s political representation also improved during the reform era. In 1999, many women 
became elected for local councils. The female delegates of the reformist parliament elected in 
that year formed “the women’s faction” in Majlis and put forth a serious effort to pressing gender 
equality issues. A number of women-friendly drafts that aimed to improve women’s rights and 
status, such as equal custody rights for divorced women, were passed during this term. The 
women’s faction also successfully passed a bill for Iran to join the UN Convention for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Unfortunately, council of 
guardians (a conservative institution of fundamentalist clerics) vetoed all of these bills that were 
passed (Mohammadi 2007; Bahramitash 2011, p. 84). 
Female officials helped to attract more attention to women’s employment. The Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs became more sensitized to matters of women’s unemployment and 
their working conditions. A series of efforts were initiated during this period for providing health 
insurance for housewives and to promote women’s entrepreneurship through micro-credit and 
self-employment programs. Through these efforts, women gained advantages by receiving funds 
through credit support programs (Bahramitash, 2007; Rezai-Rashti and Moghadam 2011). 
However, overall the pattern of women’s employment and labor force participation did not see a 
major change during the reform era, compared to the previous period. Women’s rate of labor 
force participation increased at the low rate of 5.8 percent during this period, and their share of 
urban employment only increased by about 1 percent between 1996 and 2006. Therefore, 
women’s empowerment in civil society did not lead to a proportionate change in their work and 
employment.  
However, it is well documented in the field of women and development (Bahramitash 





economy. In Iran, women’s work in the informal economy is not captured in available data. For 
example, a large number of women from different socioeconomic backgrounds work as 
hairdressers, dressmakers, fashion designers, food processors, taxi drivers, babysitters, maids, 
private caterers, and tutors. The informal sector typically offers more flexibility than is the case 
in the formal sector, which is why the informal arena has been a growing part of the economy 
throughout the world, as many women work informally (Bahramitash 2013).  Olmsted (2011) 
estimates that despite economic isolation and the shrinking of the relative numbers of women 
working in public sectors, Iranian women’s participation in the labor force in their own country 
has been increasing, as more women are participating in private and informal sectors.  
Despite the limitations of data, it is reasonable to argue that women’s demand for work increased 
during this period for several reasons: first, women’s average age of marriage increased more 
than four years between 1966 and 2006 (Bahramitash 2011, p. 92); second, the fertility rate 
continued to decrease, reaching 1.87 in 2005; third, women’s educational attainment continued 
to rise and in 1998 women outnumbered men in the universities; and fourth and more 
importantly, rising poverty and high inflation have forced women to seek employment 
(Bahramitash 2007). Moreover, the opening of civil society during this era and the emergence of 
a powerful discourse about gender equality relaxed many of the limitations on women’s work 
and public mobility in general.  
At any rate, the reform era ended with a bitter sense of disappointment among the public. 
Some field observations during this period suggests that Khatami’s supporters, especially the 
urban middle class, saw his presidential term as a failure in addressing economic, political, and 
social issues. Persistent poverty and a lack of political freedom promised by the reformist 





activists and political analysts in Iran argue that the reform movement should have placed more 
emphasis on economic development in order to succeed. Dissatisfaction with the reformist 
government created a political vacuum that Ahmadinejad, a conservative presidential candidate, 
was able to fill. 
 
Fundamentalism and Populism 
In the 2005 presidential election, Ahmadinejad introduced himself as someone supportive 
of the poor; his major political campaign slogan was addressing the problem of poverty. One his 
most well-known claims was to bring oil money to the people`s table; he also promised more 
economic development in rural and impoverished areas. He wore inexpensive clothing and 
advocated a simple lifestyle. This ultimately led to his victory versus Rafsanjani in 2005. He 
continued to articulate a populist agenda during his presidency, particularly in speeches given in 
many impoverished rural areas.  
In 2010 he pushed through a major spending reform despite concerns about its 
deteriorating impact on already high rates of inflation. The reform involved massive cuts in 
public subsidies for fuel and various food items. In its place the government introduced a cash 
transfer program and gas cards. While Ahmadinejad’s original intent was to make the cash 
transfer program targeted to lower class households, the government instead began to enact a 
cash transfer program for household heads (Salehi-Isfahani 2011).  
Ahmadinejad’s victory over his reformist rival, Mousavi, turned out to be a shock for a 
large number of Iranians who were hoping to remove him from office. Ahmadinejad made 
radical changes in both local and international affairs, which negatively cost the country, both 





green movement, and the devastating impact of new rounds of international sanctions against 
Iran’s nuclear program, made Ahmadinejad’s second term more challenging. During this period 
he also lost the full support of the supreme leader.  
Ahmadinejad’s election overturned many of the positive moves that had been made 
during the reform era with regard to removing gender discriminations. This particular period was 
characterized by a “neo-fundamentalist approach” to gender issues (Moghadam and Rezai-Rashti 
2011). Conservative ideologies regarding women’s social roles gained institutional support by 
focusing on women’s role in the family. For example, the Center for Women’s Participation, 
established under Rafsanjani’s presidency, was renamed the Center for Women and Family 
Affairs. Additionally, many of the women-led NGOs established and promoted during the reform 
era were practically disabled due to budget cuts, and a new population program for increasing 
fertility rates substituted the well-known family planning program, which had successfully 
decreased the population growth rate. In addition, as a response to women’s over-representation 
in universities, a series of restrictions on women’s entrance into certain fields was re-introduced. 
In 2012, women were excluded from 77 fields in 36 universities. According to Shahrokni and 
Dokouhaki (2013), “The new gender segregation measures [were] primarily aimed at protecting 
the life chances of men, in education, marriage and the job market.”  
Women’s share of the labor force dropped from 19.96 percent in 2005 to 17.56 percent in 
2008 based on the World Bank Statistics. Women’s labor force participation decreased from 
20.14 percent in 2006 to 15.5 percent in 2011 (Javaheri, 2015). Between 2009 and 2013 — the 
second term of Ahmadi Nejd’s presidency and when the impacts of the economic sanctions on 
the country’s economy reached their pick — the number of employed women decreased by 14.2 





year, women constituted 14.7 percent of the employed and 31.1 percent of the unemployed 
population. The labor force participation of women was reported as low as 12.4 percent, 
contrasted with 63 percent for men. In the same year, the same category numbered 22.84% for 
women in Egypt and higher than 25% in Tunisia (The World Bank). 
 In 2013, 51.6 percent of employed women were in service, with 25 percent in industry 
and 23.4 percent in agriculture sectors. This distribution changed compared to 2009, when 44 
percent were in the service sector, 30.5 percent worked in agriculture, and 25.5 percent labored 
in industry. The 2013 numbers signal the transformation of women’s work from industry and 
agriculture, to the service sector, as previously mentioned. Interestingly though, between 2009 
and 2013 women’s share of managerial and decision-making positions improved from 11.8% to 
15.2%, despite a decrease in women’s share of overall employment. This signals a disjuncture 
between women’s representation in decision-making positions and their opportunities in the 
labor market. It also signals an intersection of gender and class in determining women’s 
opportunities in the labor market. Despite this overall decrease between 2009 and 2013 women’s 
share of employment improved among those with bachelor or higher degrees.  
Therefore, on the whole, opportunities in the already hyper-masculine job market 
deteriorated for women from 2009 to 2013. In lacking support for women in formal sectors, the 
informal sector serves as the main resource for women, especially those in lower class 
households. The lack of data on women’s informal employment makes it difficult to develop a 
reliable statistical picture. However, in informal sectors women enjoy more support from the 
community and networks among women, which act to more easily reconcile family and work. In 
her study of lower class women’s participation in the informal economy, Bahramitash (2013) 





for women’s economic empowerment. The informal sector in Iran has created opportunities for 
lower class women in what she calls a “shadow/ other market,” owing to which women can sell 
their services and commodities, provide emotional and economic support for one another, direct 
their families, support the education of their children, and empower themselves not only 
economically but also socially. In 2011, 94.99 percent of female breadwinners of lower-class 
households worked in the informal sector as compared to the 1.81 percent in the public-formal 
category (Javaheri 2015). Furthermore, Moghadam (2011) shows that an increasing proportion 
of middle/upper class women preferred the “unregulated” and “unorganized” informal labor 
market. Overall, findings about women’s employment suggest that a combination of local and 
global factors relegates women’s participation in the formal economy to low levels while making 
the informal sector more reliable for them to have an income (Olmsted 2011).  
On the negative side, informal jobs lack the income stability, benefits, and protections 
provided in the formal sector, especially the public arena and in the over-representation of 
women, especially lower-class women, in these sectors, which releases the public realm from its 
responsibilities for providing welfare. After all, the informal economy emerges due to the 
downfall of the formal economy and its failure to meet the economic needs of society (Raghfar 
and Babapour 2015). During the second term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the country’s 
economy shrank under the impacts of economic sanctions, and there seemed to be a sense of 
hopelessness among the public regarding the job market. Evidence from other developing 
countries during economic crisis show that women are exposed to a disproportionate risk of 
losing education, jobs, and healthcare during the crisis (Aslanbeigui & Summerfield, 2001). 
Women also bore the double burden of establishing social safety nets for protecting their families 





previously discussed, fieldwork observations demonstrate that women of different socio-
economic and religious backgrounds remained the pillars of social economy, playing an 
important role in the reduction of poverty during the economic crisis (Bahramitash 2014).  
 
Political Moderation 
In 2013 Iran’s political economy saw another round of changes, which coincided with the 
end of Ahmadinejad’s term and the election as president of Seyed Hassan Rouhani, a politically 
moderate cleric. Rouhani did not identify with either reformist or fundamentalist parties and 
introduced himself as an agent of hope to put conflicting political groups and institutions into the 
conversation by following a politically moderate agenda. He made promises to open  social 
space for more freedom and a stronger sense of citizenship. In particular he emphasized his 
belief in gender equity and women’s empowerment in his campaign, which mobilized a large 
population of women to support him. Only three women were included in Rouhani’s first- and 
second-term cabinets, none of them as ministers. However, the first female ambassador was 
assigned during Rouhani’s first term, and women’s representation in county, district, city and 
village consuls increased (Human Rights Watch, 2017).  The current parliament, elected in 2016, 
has the highest percentage of female representatives since the revolution took place, although 
this percentage has been as low as 5.8% of the total number of representatives.   
While there has not been any major change in women’s status, including work and 
employment, the hope for fulfillment of women’s demands and their motivation for activism has 
increased. Shahindokht Molavardi, vice president for women’s and family affairs, promoted a 
discourse centered on equality and women’s rights and pressed gender mainstreaming in policy-





language of this sixth developmental plan remains gender neutral and women’s issues are 
occasionally brought up under initiatives for improving the institution of family, there have been 
some improvements compared to previous plans. For example, the plan has stipulated that 
women’s human capital and the importance of gender justice in sustainable development must be 
recognized by the executive branch. The plan also requires the Center for Women and Family 
Affairs to design indexes for measuring progress in different sectors with respect to improving 
women’s overall status. The Center is also required to monitor such progress and report annually 
to the parliament and the cabinet. With regard to women’s economic participation, however, the 
plan remains limited to emphasizing the necessity of creating jobs for female breadwinners and 
the advancement of home-based jobs. The final report of the Center for Women and Family 
Affairs, published before the 2017 election, also is devoid of any information on progress toward 
improving women’s participation and status in the formal economy.  
The country’s economy has been recovering slowly but surely during this period. The 
GDP growth rate rose from -.2% in 2013 to 13.4% in 2016 and the inflation rate sharply 
decreased, from 34.73% to 9.04% in the same period. The unemployment rate, however, rose 
from 10.4% in 2013 to 12.45% in 2016, with a widening gender gap (The statistical center of 
Iran). The International economic sanctions were removed in 2015 after the well-known Iran 
deal—the nuclear agreement between Iran and the UN Security Council’s P5+1 members. The 
impact of these improvements in the country’s economy and women’s work and employment are 
yet to be explored. However, the overall picture of women’s underrepresentation in the formal 
economy and discrimination in women’s access to work, as discussed in previous sections, has 





some more recent statistics, released by Iran’s statistical center, to put the qualitative arguments 
of the next chapter into perspective.  
In 2015 the overall population of the country was reported as more than 78 million, with 
more than 57 million living in urban areas. In the same year, the province of Isfahan had the 
urban population of more than 4 million, with nearly 49% female. Tehran, the most populous 
province, had an urban population of nearly 12 million, with nearly 50% women. Table 1 shows 
the overall labor force participation and the unemployment rate between 2006 and 2015. The 
labor force participation during the past one and a half decades remains at or below 40%. To put 
this in perspective, in 2015 labor force participation in the United States was nearly 62.12%, 
nearly 64.53% in Sweden, and 50.27% in Japan. In the MENA region, Iran has one of the lowest 
labor force participation rates, compared to 80% in UAE, more than 69% in Kuwait and Bahrain, 
and 49.44% in Egypt.  
When adding gender to the equation, women’s participation fares are significantly lower 
than those of men. Graph 1 compares male and female labor force participation between 2001 
and 2015. As we see, over the years women’s rate of participation remains considerably lower 












Table 1: Overall labor force participation and the unemployment rate for the Iranian 
population, of ages 10 or older, 2006-2015. The Statistical Center of Iran  
Year Labor Force 
Participation 
Unemployment Rate 
2006 40.4 11.3 
2011 36.9 12.3 
2012 37.4 12.1 
2013 37.6 10.4 
2014 37.2 10.6 
2015 38.2 11 





Graph 1: Female and Male Labor Force Participation (Statistical Center of Iran) 
 
In 2015, 87.2% of urban women, age 10 or above, were not participating in the labor market. Out 
of those, 18.4% were students and 63.9% home-makers. In the same year, more than 20 million 
women, as compared to some 200,000 men, reported family responsibilities as the reason for not 
seeking jobs. Table 2 compares women’s labor force participation in Iran and some other MENA 

























the countries, the rates in Iran are lower than most other countries in the region with comparable 
economic structures (Moghadam, 2013). 
 










As my fieldwork for this research revealed, those women who stepped into the labor market and 
found jobs that fit their educational backgrounds, skills, and needs faced many difficulties in 
advancing their careers, factors that will be discussed in the next chapter. The next graph, which 
compares unemployment rate between men and women, clearly outlines a discriminatory labor 
market.  






















As we see, the gender gap in unemployment has remained high in recent years as well. While 
during Rouhani’s term we observe a slight increase in men’s rate of unemployment and a 
decrease in women’s unemployment, the gender gap is still significantly wide. This is true 
despite Rouhani’s heavy reliance on female constituencies during both of his campaigns and the 
increased hope among women for an improvement in their overall condition. 
 
Table 3: Employment Across Economic Sectors (Statistical Center of Iran) 
Year Women Men 
 Agr Ind Sr Agr Ind Sr 
2001 (1380) 31.2 31.8 37 25.2 30.4 44.4 
2006 (1385) 30.9 31.7 37.3 21.3 31.7 47 
2011 (1390) 26.3 23.3 50.4 17.2 35.2 47.6 
2015 (1394) 22.8 23.8 53.4 17.1 34.2 48.7 
 
Table 3 splits men’s and women’s employment into different sectors in the years from 
2001 to 2015. While in 2001 the industrial sector provided more than one-third of women’s 
employment, these jobs have been substituted with service sector jobs over the course of years. 
Opportunities for men in the industrial section, however, have increased during the same period. 
Women’s employment, therefore, is leaning more toward the service sector, which in 2015 
hosted more than half of employed women. While evidence from Asia, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean show that export-oriented industries heavily rely on women as a cheap, flexible labor 
force (Park, 1995; Ngai, 2007; Bosse & Acosta-Belén, 1995), in Iran, and other industrializing 
countries in the region, industry has not absorbed female labor force to the same extent 





gender discrimination in the employment process, as well as the trend toward the increasing 
attractiveness of service sector jobs to women.  
In addition to health and education, which have been persistently female-dominated, new 
opportunities in sales, administration, hospitality, retail work, restaurants, and so on, in the 
modernizing sectors of the economy have been attracting more women. Although the overall 
pattern of women’s employment does not show any significant improvement despite new service 
sector opportunities, the service sector has not yet been feminized, as opposed to what was seen 
in the global north during the 1970s (Haghighat-Sordelini,	2009). It appears that these types of 
jobs are dominating women’s work in the formal sector. Overall, while manufacturing jobs 
detract from women’s overall employment, the service sector is not vibrant enough to attract 
them and compensate for the shortage of opportunities in industry and agriculture (Moghadam, 
2003). It should yet be noted that women’s participation in the informal service economy as, for 
example, hair dressers, caterers, bakers, personal trainers, or masseuses (See Bahramitash, 2014) 
is not fully captured by available statistics (Langsten & Salem, 2008; Donahoe, 1999). A recent 
report by the Center for Women and Family Affairs estimates that some 50% of the jobs held by 
women are in the informal sector (Human watch report, 2017).  
Tables 4 and 5 show more specific information on economic participation in the urban 
areas of Isfahan and Tehran, where fieldwork was conducted in 2015. Women in urban Isfahan 
have a higher rate of labor force participation than in Tehran, but fewer opportunities for 
employment. In addition, a larger proportion of working women are attracted to the service 
sector in Tehran than in Isfahan. This may signal to a more vigorous service sector in Tehran, 






Table 4: Women’s Labor Force Participation and Unemployment in Isfahan and Tehran 
(Statistical Center of Iran) 




Urban Isfahan 16.2 27.9 




Table 5: Women’s Employment Across Different Economic Sectors in Isfahan and Tehran 
(Statistical Center of Iran) 




Share of industry 
in women’s 
employement 








Urban Isfahan 1.7 38.3 60 30.8 
Urban Tehran 0 20.5 79.5 37.1 
 
 
The differences between Isfahan and Tehran in terms of female labor force participation is also 
noteworthy. Tehran offers a more flexible cultural atmosphere for women’s public livelihoods 
than many other cities, including Esfahan, which is stereotypically known as a traditional and 
religious city. This is not to argue that in Isfahan one cannot easily observe women’s public 
participation, behind the surface, in shopping malls, banks, restaurants, green parks, etc. 
However, owing to its larger and more diverse population, Tehran is known to offer a more 
tolerant and vibrant public environment to different groups of women, especially the non-
religious, secular, and young. Pardis Mahdavi’s work (2009), for example, provides deep 
ethnographic evidence that shows how the new generation of youth in Tehran push the 





It is therefore unsettling to make stereotypical assumptions that see a higher rate of labor 
force participation among women in urban Isfahan than in Tehran.  The higher FLP in Isfahan 
can signal that there are more severe economic conditions facing families in Isfahan, ones that 
enforce women to increase their participation in the labor force.  Based on a study on household 
expenditures and budgets undertaken by the central Bank of Iran, in 2015 the average household 
budget in Tehran was significantly higher than in other regions. This difference has been 
lessening during the course of past decade, as shown in Table 6. Taking household spending into 
consideration, inequality between households in Tehran and other regions remains significant.  
 
Table 6: Average Household Budget in Tehran and Other Provinces (million toman)              
(Central Bank of Iran) 
 
 Tehran  Other Provinces  
2016 4.84 3.3 
2006 5.2 2.77 
 
The Gini Index can also provide some insights into the overall amount of inequalities in 
the country. Despite a sharp decline in the Gini index from 2010 to 2011, the index has been 
rising from 2013 onward, signaling an increasing level of inequality throughout the entire 
country during Rouhani’s term. The cash transfer program during the administration of Ahmadi 
Nejad and his emphasis on social programs decreased economic inequalities during his term. For 
example, my taxi-driver participants, who predominantly belong to lower-class households, were 






Graph 3: Gini Index: 2010-2016 (Iran’s Central Bank) 
the fieldwork that was done, different cities such as Isfahan, Arak, and Tabriz witnessed protests 
and strikes among factory workers for delayed pay and unfulfilled benefits. 
The combination of statistical information from Rouhani’s presidency thus far indicates 
that the average living conditions of Iranian families have continued to deteriorate, while 
employment opportunities have not increased. While the government was successful in 
controlling inflation, the prices of commodities, food, and housing have continued to rise. To 
people’s disappointment, the removal of some international sanctions did not deliver immediate, 
visible improvements in day-to-day life. The last days of 2017 witnessed the surprising 
expansion of popular unrest as people protested economic pressures. As research in different 
regions of the world shows, women are particularly vulnerable during times of economic 
recession, as their needs and rights are de-prioritized at different levels. While taking roles in 
shaping and expanding safety nets to protect their families and communities, women’s education, 
health, and employment were at more risk than those of men during the crisis (Aslanbeigui and 
Summerfield, 2001; Al-Ali, 2005 & 2007; Park, 2011; Amott, 1993; Moghadam 2011; Nikolic-
Ristanovic, 1994). The taxi drivers in my study were grasping an opportunity—alongside male 
taxi drivers—to gain more money for their families during a difficult time of economic 












instabilities. Under tight economic conditions and in a labor market that is not promising to 
women, especially to low-skilled and low-educated ones, these women bravely struggled with 
the challenges of arduous, culturally masculine, and socially unsettling job to survive difficult 
times. Chapter 5 delves into the narratives of these women and their ability to address the 
challenges of destabilizing the norms of a male-dominated labor market and segregated public 
spaces in the role of female taxi driver. Before moving on to this chapter, however, Chapter 4 


































As I mentioned in Chapter 3, labor codes and employment laws forbid discrimination 
against women in the workplace. Iran has also ratified 14 conventions of the International Labor 
Organization (five out of eight ILO fundamental conventions), including the equal remuneration 
convention, and the discrimination convention concerning employment and occupation. Iran has 
been a party to the International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
since 1976; it is an agreement that requires signees to “ensure the equal right of men and women 
to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights.” (ICESCR, article 6). Article 7 of 
ICESCR enforces “fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without 
distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to 
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work.” However, as specified by the Human 
Rights Watch Report, these nondiscrimination laws have not been enforced in different 
workplaces and women are not protected from severe inequality (Human rights watch, 2017). 
Based on the same report, jobs are heavily sex-typed on the employers’ end, and women have 
not been given the chance to apply for many positions.  
In 2008, I was one of the 13 female graduates, out of a cohort of 130, from the 
Department of Mechanical Engineering at one of the prestigious universities in Isfahan. 
Immediately after graduation, I found a job in the engineering department of a small family-
owned factory. I clearly remember my first job interview, when my manager looked me in the 
eyes and asked: “do you think you can work in the manufacturing salon among all the male 





work with men or women.” After 11 years now, I cannot forget his confident face when saying, 
“I cannot let you be a sheep amongst wolves; I should prepare you.” He told me, directly, in our 
first encounter that I would have to “man up” and be ready to deal with the “unavoidable” 
difficulties of a masculine profession. At that very moment, he placed the responsibility on me to 
deal with an environment which he knew was not going to be very friendly toward a young, 
recent graduate and female engineer.  
It did not take me a long time to learn my lesson. The excitement of stepping into the 
world of work soon gave its place to anxieties of dealing with the day-to-day struggles of fitting 
myself into a resistant atmosphere, with almost no institutional resources to rely on. My 
manager’s support in fact continued in the form of individual meetings to advise me on how to 
deal with male laborers, technicians, and engineers, and adjusting my performance in order to 
survive in the workplace. At the end of the first month though, I received a delayed paycheck 
below the minimum monthly wage set out by the Ministry of Work, which as I learned later, was 
given to male laborers and female workers who had family expenses. A whole set of challenges 
that I intend to discuss in this chapter, by drawing on the experiences of other women, convinced 
me that I was not the right fit for the job and did not have what it took to fight this battle.  
In the previous chapter I established that the Iranian labor market is overwhelmingly 
male, and women’s employment is mostly de-prioritized within the overarching policymaking 
structure. I also noted that occupational and spatial segregation have worked hand in hand to 
maintain a gender imbalance in the labor market. This chapter attempts to unpack the day-to-day 
conditions facing women by drawing on interview data with on-site engineers and drivers of 
women-only taxis. Because of the gender-atypical nature of their jobs, these women are exposed 





most severe ways compared to many other women. The current literature on women’s work in 
the Middle East, particularly Iran, is mostly focused on their low rates of participation (Soltani, 
2017; Haghighat-Sordellini, 2009). Not many studies, however, provide an on-the-ground picture 
of what women think about work environments and the nuances of their day-to-day struggles. In 
this chapter I first review the previous literature on studies of women in work, to provide an 
overview of the different elements and mechanisms that sustain the gendered structures of work 
according. I will then offer a criticism of the disjuncture between the literature of labor force 
participation among Middle Eastern women and the broader literature of women and work, 
mostly gleaned from a Western context. Finally, I will discuss the experiences of my participants 
to explore what, in their view and experiences, discourage women from pursuing jobs that fit 
their interests, background, and needs. I will present their day-to-day struggles in dealing with 
their hyper-masculine working environments in which patriarchal ideas of gender differences 
and hegemonic constructions of masculinity (Connell, 1995) are heavily prevalent.  
While the literature on women’s struggles in sex-atypical jobs and masculine domains in 
Western countries dates back to the 1970s (Perrucci, 1970; Shafer, 1974), the voices of women 
in the developing context, particularly in the Middle East, and in similar conditions, is 
underrepresented in the current literature. Women’s labor force participation and employment in 
the Middle East, including Iran, have been Primarily discussed under broader topics of economic 
development (Revenga & Shetty 2012; Olmsted 2013), poverty alleviation (Bahramitash 2013 & 
2014), women’s empowerment under Islamic culture and political economy, and women’s 
agency (Ghasemi 2013; Hoodfar 1997; Hoodfar 2010; Povey 2015; Charrad 2011, p. 427; Rezai-
Rashti and Moghadam 2011). While these studies are important, and crucial to resolving some of 





work, as has been and continues to be documented for women in the Western context (Tlaiss, 
2015). In this sense, my interview data with nearly 70 women in the masculine sectors of the 
Iranian labor market constitute a unique resource with which to fill in this gap in the literature. 
The voices of these women show the failure of the Islamic state to deliver its promises of safety 
and dignity to women in the public arena, as discussed in the second chapter. My findings in this 
chapter shed light on the different pathways through which the masculinization of work 
environments occurs, based on women’s perceptions. But more importantly, this in-depth 
depiction of the nuances of  women’s day-to-day struggles sheds light on the greatness and 
power of those women who manage to work, earn money for their families, and maintain their 
livelihoods under such discriminatory conditions.  
 
Women and Work 
The world of work has not been a friendly and easily accessible arena for women. There 
is a plethora of research, with a range of methodologies and in various social contexts that has 
documented the inequalities between men and women in the workplace. Since the 1970s feminist 
critiques of work called for attention to inequalities facing women at work. Scholars and activists 
such as Smith (1988), Ferguson (1984), Acker (1990), England (1982) and many others used the 
feminist perspective to problematize the patriarchy embedded in organizational structures, over-
representation of men in positions of power, and the systematic burdens to women’s access to 
equal status. Acker (1990) suggested that work organizations are gendered in a sense that 
“advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and 
identity, are patterned through and in terms of a distinction between men and women, masculine 





presence and the fulfillment of equal working conditions for them up to the present. Burdens to 
women’s advancement range from explicit forms of discriminations, such as misogynic 
stereotyping (Rosen, 1970; Latue et al., 2011; Hipple et al., 2015; Diamond, 2005), to more 
implicit inequalities rooted in gendered structures of work (Bird, 2011; Ridgeway and Correl, 
2004; Wilson et al., 2009; Sattari and Sandefur, forthcoming; Goetz, 1997).  
Sex segregation has been and continues to be a major explanation for the persistence of 
gender inequalities in the workplace (England et al., 1988; Moorhouse, 2017; Charles and 
Bradley, 2002). Various studies have examined the reasons why men and women end up in 
different sectors of the labor market. This is of interest to scholars because male-dominated 
occupations tend to be higher in status, income, and benefits compared to female-dominated jobs 
(Reskin, 1993; Cotter et al., 1997; Levanon et al., 2009; Duncan and Hoffman, 1979; Cech, 
2013). Scholars have suggested multiple explanations of why segregation happens and how it is 
maintained. One group of these studies focuses on the supply-side of work, examining why 
women make different career choices than men. Neo-classical economics, for example, focus on 
women’s rational occupational choices, considering their family responsibilities, especially child 
bearing and rearing (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). According to these approaches, women tend to 
choose jobs that best fit into their family obligations, and consequently often show interrupted 
work histories due to episodes of child bearing and rearing. Based on this framework, women are 
more prone to jobs that offer higher starting salaries and are penalized less for intermittency 
(England, 1974); these types of jobs are more easily found in female-dominated fields such as 
health and education. Human capital models attribute women’s over-representation in specific 
jobs to their educational and skill levels, arguing that female dominated jobs tend to require 





socialization approaches argue that women internalize traditional gender roles and gender-typical 
occupational interests through processes of socialization at different life stages and through 
various mechanisms (Marini, 1989). More recent scholarship on gender and occupational choices 
built upon this third approach by speculating that an entire set of institutional and structural 
settings enforce gendered self-expression in careers and act to encourage men and women to tend 
toward sex-typical occupations (Cech, 2013).  
The second group of studies go beyond individual career choices and focus on structural 
characteristics of labor markets and workplaces that enforce segregation. These demand-side 
studies cover a broad spectrum of analysis, ranging from national practices to individual biases. 
Moorhouse (2017), for example, uses a cross-national comparative analysis to show how, in 
addition to the rate of unemployment at national level, governmental policies that protect 
women’s economic rights result in different countries demonstrating varying levels of sex 
segregation in education and the labor market. She shows that offering policies supportive to 
women, plus the relative strength of labor markets in providing jobs for the entire population, 
help to reduce sex segregation. A large body of studies have explored how different 
organizational designs, workplace features, and recruitment styles facilitate or burden women’s 
transition into male-dominated sectors (Kmec, 2005; Reskin, 1993; Reskin and Bielby, 2005; 
Diamond, 2005). There is also extended research on the impact of employers’ biases and the 
resulting unequal treatment of women when they apply for work in traditionally male sectors 
(Glick, 1991; Glick et al., 1987; Heilman, 1995).  
Regardless of what causes men and women to end up in different types of occupations, 
many scholars find it more important to explore the experiences of those women who work. One 





burdens of balancing work and family Aisenbrey and Fasang, 2017; Geier, 2017; Young and 
Schieman, 2018; Grönlund and Öun, 2018; Levy, 2015; Williams, 2000). Arlie Hochschild 
(1989) used the term “second shift,” referring to unpaid domestic labor that working women are 
disproportionately in charge of following their paid work. Hochschild documents how women’s 
disproportionate role in childcare and household responsibilities cause work-life conflicts, 
tensions, and stress. Other studies have documented how women’s health and well-being are 
impacted by the double burdens of work and family (Väänänen et al., 2004), and how the quality 
of their work experiences, job satisfaction, and career decisions are impacted by domestic work 
(Buddhapria, 2009; Fox, 2005; Probert, 2005; Rosser, 2004). Data from industrially advanced 
countries show that while the number of hours men spend on household responsibilities has 
increased, women still spend considerably more time on household labor [R]. A plethora of  
studies in various social contexts document how traditional expectations from women cause 
many to leave their jobs or trade off promotions (Bespinar, 2010; Buddhapria, 2009; Younger et 
al., 2015; Papps, 1992; Tlaiss, 2015; Crompton and Lyonette, 2011). In the United States, Belkin 
(2003), used the term “opt-out revolution” to refer to a trend among college-educated, married, 
professional women of choosing to leave their jobs and becoming full-time mothers. Lovejoy 
and Stone (2012), show that these “opted-out” women do not return to their original careers, 
even if they decide to resume working. Instead, they seek new opportunities in care-oriented 
professions which offer more flexibility but lower income and status.  
In addition to work-family conflicts, women face other issues at work, particularly when 
they enter male-dominated professions. Female professionals are more likely to express 
dissatisfaction with respect to institutional culture and opportunities for advancement and 





more unfriendly and hostile interactions with their colleagues and more often feel isolated, 
compared to men (Tyson and Borman, 2010; Kantola, 2008; Buddhapria, 2011). Tokenism and 
hyper-visibility are other challenged facing women, factors which increase attention to their 
routine performances and therefore expose them to more stress (McKendall, 2006). Female 
professionals in masculine fields also feel more exclusion from formal and informal institutional 
networks and events than do their male counterparts (Kantola, 2008; Buddhapria, 2011; Prokos 
and Padavic, 2002; Yoder and Berendsen, 2001). Exclusion from informal networks in male-
dominated workplaces can be consequential, as these relationships entail opportunities such as 
conversations about work, involvement in institutional decision-making, mentoring and 
collaborative relationships, all of which women are more likely to miss due to their 
marginalization (Heilman, 1994).  
Female professionals in male-dominated fields are also disadvantaged when it comes to 
building mentorship relationships with supervisors and finding role models to look up to 
(Buddhapria, 2009; Neumark and Gardecki, 1998). Having proper mentorship and role models 
are essential to professional progress, as both factors tend to enhance general knowledge, skills, 
networks, and relationships, and eventually increase competency for advancement and upward 
mobility (Bruke and Mckeen, 1996; Ragins, 1989). Mentoring relationships in many cases 
reinforce or reproduce the uneven distribution of power, value, and credit in the workplace. In 
contexts in which stereotypes and gendered assumptions about women, such as less 
competitiveness and technical expertise are held by individuals, male mentors might establish 
less productive and meaningful relationships with their female mentees than is the case among 
males (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004). Mentoring relationships between male mentors and female 





prioritize family over work. For example, Dunham et al. (2012) have found that male mentors 
more often emphasize prioritizing family to career when they work with female junior faculty in 
STEM fields. Doerfiller and Kammer (1986) showed that women become the target of negative 
stereotypes when they demonstrate patterns of workaholism (i.e. devotion to work over family). 
Studies also show differences between men and women in the ways they benefit from 
mentorship relationships (Bruke and Mckeen, 1996).    
 
Women’s Work in the Middle East and the Notion of Patriarchy 
Most of the research in the area of women’s participation in masculine jobs is based in a 
Western context (See Natarjan, 2006; Prenzler and Sinclair, 2013 as examples of exceptions). 
With the urge coming from tenets of post-colonial and black feminism for recognizing the 
contextual specifies of women’s experiences (Patil, 2013; Collins, 2000; Mohanty, 1988), it is 
very problematic that the work of Middle Eastern women in masculine domains is overshadowed 
within the academic literature. While it is well established that patriarchy constitutes the main 
burden on women’s economic participation in general (Soltani, 2017; Goetz, 1997), there is a 
shortage of theoretical frameworks for understanding the complex ways in which “patriarchy” is 
manifested in the day-to-day lives of women in the workplace. Integrating the broader studies of 
women in work into the current research on women’s work and public participation in the 
Middle East helps us unpack the different ways that women understand and respond to 
incidences of patriarchy. We need to realize that patriarchy is not a homogenous institution, as 
problematically conceptualized within the liberal feminist and gender and development literature 
(Kandiyoti, 1988; Feldman, 2001). Patriarchy is intertwined with different social institutions, 





must be examined by taking into account the characteristics of those institutions, in addition to 
the social, economic, religious, cultural, and historical specifics of any context (Patil, 2013). 
Considering the large amount of research done in the Western context on the nuances of 
women’s experiences at work, and the multi-faceted nature of their disadvantages, it is 
unfortunate that the dominant perceptions of Islamic patriarchy in the Middle Eastern context 
overshadow the need for a deeper understanding of the various mechanisms of gender inequality 
in the workplace. An examination of women’s experiences in masculine jobs in the context of 
the Middle East in general and Iran in particular sheds light on the ways that the 
institutionalization of hegemonic masculinity, segregation, inefficient legislation, and economic 
burdens, as discussed in the previous chapters, intersect in shaping and sustaining systems of 
discrimination toward and marginalization of women. To homogenize all of these complex 
mechanisms of suppression and exclusion under the term “patriarchy” deprives us of analytical 
opportunities to understand how inequalities are sustained and, more importantly, what needs to 
be addressed for facilitating women’s empowerment in the labor market. Situating Iranian 
women’s experiences in the broader literature of women at work also prevents us from 
characterizing Middle Eastern women as silent victims of patriarchy.  
Furthermore, any account of patriarchy that overlooks women’s active negotiations with 
patriarchy’s contours of oppression is reductionist. As Feldman (2001) suggests, patriarchal 
relationships must be understood as “mediated processes of negotiation constituted by complex 
identities and practices rather than by an assumed universalized, unitary, dominating force of 
male power and authority and female subordination.” Re-structuring of patriarchal relationships 
does not necessarily happen through top-down adjustments, such as the developmental 





the day-to-day practices of women in dealing with incidences of inequality and oppression 
(Kandiyoti, 1988; Gatwiri and Mumbi, 2016). From this perspective, delving into the ways in 
which women engage with incidences of patriarchy, as well as how they interpret and respond to 
them, becomes crucial to any theoretical approach for understanding how patriarchy operates to 
maintain burdens on women’s participation in the male-dominated labor market. This chapter 
contributes to filling this gap by asking how Iranian women in the masculine jobs of on-site 
engineering and taxi driving perceive the masculine constructions of their jobs, and what, in their 
view, disempowers women within the formal labor market in Iran.  
In my data analysis I avoid placing women’s narratives of their struggles into the box of 
women’s victimization at the hands of the patriarchal structures of the Islamic state. Instead, 
following what the literature on women in work suggests, I view these jobs as unique contexts in 
which women encounter heightened forms of hegemonic masculinity (Rabe-Hemp, 2009), and 
therefore, provide unique cases for understanding how women interpret the masculine structures 
of work. Both taxi driving and on-site engineering are masculine in the sense that they are “seen 
as appropriate for workers with masculine characteristics” (Britton, 2000). The non-traditional 
and gender atypical nature of these jobs, in addition to their public visibility, evoke an entire set 
of controversies and discussions surrounding what work counts as suitable for women to do in a 
public space, as well as what are acceptable forms of exuding femininity. This places these 
women in a situation about which they can reflect and critically engage with a dominant 
discourse that produces definitions of masculinity and femininity and the different ways that 
patriarchal constructions disadvantage women. Therefore, these women are in a unique position 
to help us understand the nuances and complexities of how masculine constructions of work 





this chapter, the next chapter will delve into how female taxi drivers respond to these masculine 
constructions by performing femininity and their masculine jobs collaboratively (Ainsworth et 
al., 2014).  
 
Gendered and Sexualized Work Environments 
 
On the streets: 
In her well-known theory, Connell conceptualizes hegemonic masculinity as one among 
multiple forms of masculinities and “the pattern of practice (i.e. things done, not just a set of role 
expectations or an identity) that allows men’s dominance over women to continue.” (Connell & 
Messerschmidt, 2005). There is a rich body of literature that shows how hegemonic masculinity 
serves as a mechanism against women’s empowerment in different institutional contexts 
(Schrock & Schwalbe; Lampropoulou and Archacis, 2015; Irvine and Vermilya, 2010; Hearn, 
2012; Armato, 2013). These studies show how embeddedness of hegemonic masculinity into 
interactional practices and institutional logics can explain the subordination of women within 
different settings.  
Organizations, as Acker (1990) argued, are gendered in the same way as their workers, 
and the careers of my participants are decidedly masculine. The narratives of these women 
revealed how hegemonic constructions of masculinity are central to the substance and quality of 
their day-to-day experiences, and how the culture and logic of their job experience is grounded in 
hegemonic masculinity.  
Masculinity was reified in different forms in women’s experiences. Violence and sexual 
harassment are among the most pronounced manifestations of hegemonic masculinity, and in 





(Robinson, 2005; Lee, 1998; Anwary, 2015; Michalski, 2017; Clason, 2008). For women in my 
study, the incidences of harassment advanced by men or the possibility of being harassed 
constituted a central part of how they understood their jobs. Both taxi drivers and engineers were 
struggling with daily occurrences of verbal or physical sexual harassment, minus even a 
minimum of institutional support for protecting themselves against such outrages.  
For these female taxi drivers, sexual harassment was an integral part of working on the 
streets. While they felt protected within the segregated spaces of their taxis, the unavoidable 
exposure to male passersby or taxi drivers on the streets appeared to be intertwined with 
numerous unsettling experiences. For example, Ziba was a young, motivated taxi driver who was 
working to help her husband who, in her view, was suffering from drug addiction, which caused 
her to seek work to provide for their family. She shared one of her experiences:   
I have been in this job for one and half year now but thanks god I really like it and am not tired 
of it yet. I am almost happy with the income too [...] But sometimes somethings happen that you 
get disgusted with yourself. For example, two weeks ago, my back was aching badly, and I had 
to stretch outside the car. I was leaning against my co-worker’s taxi and talking to her. Another 
car stopped right behind my friend’s taxi for a couple of minutes, but we ignored him and kept 
chatting. Then he moved forward, hit the brake in front of me, and rolled down his window to ask 
me an address. I was giving him directions, but he was doing awkward things with his hands. I 
looked inside his car and saw he was nude below the waist...My head started aching and I just 
walked away [...] That day I was so disgusted with myself! So disgusted! I kept asking myself: 
why did I choose such a job that makes me be out on the streets and witness these things?    
 
In this account, Ziba questions her own decision to become a taxi driver rather than the 
behavior of her perpetrator. This shows that she perceived such incidences as inherent in the 
nature of navigating public space as a woman, a view which signals to the embeddedness of 
masculinity into how this job was constructed. Other drivers frequently expressed frustration 
with the abusive behaviors and languages that they were exposed to during the day. Badri, one of 





Just the other day [as I was waiting for riders on a street side], a random guy shouted dirty 
words at me and I got really really sad. Shortly after that, a male taxi driver cut in front of me 
and blocked my way. He was HUGE and old and was saying really dirty things to me! I was 
shaking and crying! The only thing I could do was to call my friend and ask her to send her 
husband over. Although the guy left before he arrives.  
 
Some women such as Saboor from Isfahan reported exposure to more extreme forms of violence:  
[it was a heavy traffic] the car in front of me suddenly stopped and I had to slam on brake. The 
bus behind me started flashing his lights [signaling to me to stop]; [after we passed the traffic] 
we both stopped. My son and sister were in the car with me. He got off his bus and said to me: ‘I 
do not know what kind of a fool has gave you a driver’s license!’ I calmly responded: ‘the same 
fool who has gave you one!’ I don’t know what happened that he grabbed my son  who was 
sitting in the front, by neck! I quickly unbuckled and got off the car! I was shorter than him and 
he was huge! I slapped him in face and grabbed his collar! [laughing] My sister was so shocked! 
she asked anxiously if I always do such things wile I am out on streets! I swore to god that it was 
only because the man attacked my son! But I said nothing to my older son or brother because 
they would think my work is always like this! 
Female drivers also brought up common examples of insulting phrases spoken by male 
drivers to undermine their driving skills as an integral part of the job. These included phrases 
such as “go drive the laundry machine,” “Stove [called gas in Persian] is in the kitchen [not on 
the streets]” or “Go home and bathe your baby [instead of driving].” I witnessed a number of 
these incidences while riding with these women in both cities. Belghies, one of the drivers in 
Isfahan, viewed constant exposure to abusive language and behaviors during the day as the main 
feature of the job that made it masculine and irreconcilable with what she described as the 
essence of femininity:   
A woman is very delicate and sensitive. A woman needs more attention and kindness than a man. 
Now, although we are ignoring this side of our feelings [laughing] but generally all women are 
like this. For example, I expect special attention from my brother; all girls expect this from their 
dads and after marrying from their husbands. Now you look at our conditions as women who 
drive in streets of this city filled with reckless drivers; anyone says something to you! Imagine 
how it impacts your emotions! I mean we have been super strong that we haven't gone out of our 
minds yet [laughing]. Not all men are gentle, God bless them! Some of them are really rude! 
Imagine! God forbids you make a tiny mistake! I wish they would only say you are driving like a 
cow! They use words that you cannot even think of. Really dirty words! These are the things that 





In many cases, a woman’s decision to become a taxi driver was undermined by others. 
Participants, reported facing unexpected statements, behaviors, or suggestions, in most cases 
from men in different positions, which revealed to them how their career choices and 
performances were “sexualized” by others. For example, when I reached out to Ziba, one of the 
taxi drivers in Isfahan, for an interview as she was waiting for riders on a street corner, she 
accepted with hesitation. The last time she and a number of her colleagues were reached for an 
interview had been by a man, who introduced himself as a film writer and director wanting to 
compile a documentary about drivers of women-only taxis, their life stories, and challenges.  The 
interview, however, had gone into an unexpected direction. As Ziba recited, his questions had 
turn out to be based on the premise that drivers of women-only taxis only do this job as a last 
resort for economic survival and thus must be open to casual inter-sex relations or temporary 
marriages as alternative and easier sources of income. In a similar incidence, Azar, a mother of 
two children and married to a man with physical disability at the time of interviews, had become 
alerted about public misperceptions of drivers of women-only taxis: 
A while ago, I had just dropped a passenger off in Sepahan Shahr when I noticed the car driving 
behind me was flashing his lights and honking. I pulled over and so did he. I said, “Is there 
anything wrong?” and he said “Excuse me, lady! I saw your face and felt you are lonely! I 
wanted to know if you are single or married and if you would like to become friends with me [go 
on a date with me.]” See! Just like this! Just like this! From his two-minute observation that I 
was a taxi driver and was dropping a passenger off, he had concluded that I was lonely and thus 
helpless! I said “No! I am, in fact, very happy and have no interest in such relations!”  
 
When asked what in her view caused such incidents, Azar responded:  
 
People think all drivers of women-only taxis are divorced and as you know, after divorce usually 
people go through depression. This person had such an assumption and wanted to see if there 
was anything like that was going on in my life. But I say even if a person is divorced and lonely, 







In a similar narrative, Parisa, one of the drivers in Tehran, divorced and mother of one, recounted  
an intimidating conversation with a bank teller while filling out a loan application: 
I was introduced to Sandogh E Mehr E Reza [a micro-finance institute for supporting female 
breadwinners] by our company to get a loan and finance my taxi. As he was giving me the 
paperwork to fill out, the guy told me: “Maam! Why do you want to finance a taxi? There are 
tons of men out there who are looking for temporary partners and will happily provide for you 
[…] I tore up all the papers right in his face, and left the place with tears in my eyes.  
 
These processes of sexualization were also reified in instances in which women’s decision to 
becoming taxi drivers were interpreted as their intention to covertly signal their sexual 
availability. Setareh, a driver of a mixed-gender van in Tehran, for example, recounted: 
I never get off my van because they will talk behind my back that her mantox [the long shirt and 
a standard part of women’s dress code] is too tight or short or she wants to present herself to 
men. 
 
In one of the focus groups held in Tehran, women discussed among themselves whether or not 
permission to pick up male passengers would benefit them. One of the women remarked: 
Of course we would make a better income if we were allowed to pick up male riders. But I still 
prefer not to do it because the perception in our society is that all female taxi drivers are bread 
winners of their families and thus single. Some of the men ask for your phone number or if you 
can be their personal driver [getting into a casual relationship] the moment they sit in your car. 
 
Zhaleh, my other participant, who had quit this job at the time of the interview, shared 
with me, with ineffable enthusiasm and pride, her stories of years of working from sunrise to 
midnight to provide for herself and her only son. She had enjoyed all the experiences, networks, 
and economic independence she had obtained despite all of its challenges. However, she had 
promised her son to quit the job as soon as he graduated from law school and had done so. When 
I asked about the reasons for her son’s disagreement with this job, she responded: 
He did not like the public judgment about drivers of women-only taxis. For example, one day he 
said: “Mom! I was coming back from the university with one of the guys in our department who 
is actually smart but a yob (lat o loot), and he bluntly said [about the drivers of women only 
taxis]: they are all perverts (khanom Raees).”   






It is getting better but the public perception of us is that we are perverted and promiscuous 
women. Women who have no family honor and anyone to look after them […] Sometimes I worry 
that my own son or relatives judge me the same way. This is not fair! I just get 4 hours of sleep 
every night and work 2 shifts. Now those people who judge our morals, manners, and skills… 
how would they want to make it up to us? A person like me who is pulling her own weight and 
works day and night…,who has got the right to overlook her abilities and morals?”    
 
This pattern is also reported by other studies on women’s experiences in male jobs in 
which men in similar or superior positions express their dominance by devaluing women’s 
professionalism and career choices (Pogrebin and Poole, 1997 & 1998; Benya, 2017; Yoder and 
Aniakudo, 1996; Rosell et al., 1995; Woodfield, 2016). In a context such as Iran, where work as 
a whole is predominantly masculine, women experience such encounters in many jobs. For 
example, Fatemeh, who was working as a truck driver at the time of the interview, recounted an 
experience from the time she had been trying to open her own women-only taxi firm:  
I went after the paperwork to register a women-only taxi firm in my town [...] after a while, I was 
told that I should meet with the deputy of [my county]. When I went to his office, he said: 
“Maam! A taxi service company with drivers being women will cause moral pervertedness in the 
town!” I said: How?! Why?! He responded, “It is not that you are the one who wants to cause 
corruption or immorality! You hire some women as drivers and they may do something wrong.” 
Then he brought up the case of a lady who had opened an indoor swimming pool for women and 
then a video of women swimming was leaked and circulated in the city which had caused a 
couple of those women to commit suicide […] I was like, “How this could be related to women’s 
taxi service company?!” I was very heartbroken and disappointed after that meeting; I almost 
blacked out! 
Fatemeh’s experience was particularly noteworthy because she was a self-identified religious 
woman, volunteering for religious community events, and pronouncing her religious identity by 
wearing chaador, the most conservative form of hejab in Iran’s context. Following all the codes 
of dignity, the vice governor’s statement had come as a shock to her. 
Taxi drivers also reported other difficulties such as discriminatory behaviors of different 
institutions, police officers and, in many cases, passengers. In Esfahan, women had been trying 





taxis. However, by the time of my interviews they only had achieved one official taxi stop. 
Having designated stops was an important issue for them since it could save them a tremendous 
amount of time and energy during the day. Without stops they had serious challenges in finding 
suitable parking spots for their waiting time until they were hailed. The population density in 
Esfahan is 8,992 persons per square mile, and as one would expect, the parking situation is not 
generally good. Therefore, stops could help women tremendously by allowing them to claim 
exclusive access to certain spaces on crowded street sides. This is how Azar, the representative 
of drivers in Esfahan described the stops issue: 
After a decade we only have one official stop for women’s taxis, and this one stop is the fruit of 
our 8 years of attempts and negotiations with the city administration. Why don’t they give us 
official stops? Isn’t 8 years of waiting enough? Most of the time we have to double park, or stop 
in front of some one’s driveway... While unintended, it is distracting to other people, and the 
police officers insult us for causing trouble. A while ago, when a couple of my co-workers were 
waiting to be called on, a police officer reached and condemned them in a very brutal way for 
making that street corner their “hangout.” This is very interesting, isn’t it?! We are out on the 
streets to work and this country’s police officer says we are just hanging out!  
A noteworthy issue is that even that the one granted stop area was working against rather 
than serving women’s interests. The stop was located close to a major intersection across from 
the spot women used to wait for riders prior to the installation of the official women-only taxi 
stop sign. However, the old spot was in the vicinity of the most famous hotel in the city and a 
number of shopping malls, where many tourists and ride hailers would wait for a ride. With the 
installment of the official stop sign on the other side of the intersection, women were practically 
relocated to a semi-secluded side—a very unlikely area in which for passengers to look for rides. 
Many of my participants still stopped in their old spots to pick up passengers, but almost all had 
received tickets at least once and were verbally harassed by police officers. One of the scenes I 
witnessed included a number of drivers stopping in their old spots and taking turns watching for 





Women also believed that police officers scrutinize them more strictly than they do male 
taxi drivers or regular drivers. For example, Soraya, one of the drivers in Isfahan, widowed, and 
mother of one young girl, recounted: 
I remember in my first work day I had double parked on the street side, waiting to be called on. 
There were 10 something other cars parking behind and in front of me. The officer simply told 
them to move: Sir! Move your car! Madam! Move your car! But as he was reaching me, he was 
already stamping a ticket for me. I said: I am leaving! He replied sarcastically: “No worries! 
You can stay if you want!” and then he put the ticket under my wiper… I told him: “How nice 
would it be if people understood others situations a bit more.” The law must apply to everyone 
equally! There is nowhere in our law that says others can park here but I must not! Everyone is 
equal! This is one example of how our society treats women.  
Such discrimination, in many drivers’ views, was used to intimidate them to the extent that they 
gave up doing this job. Shohreh, another driver in Esfahan, divorced and a mother of one, was 
very frustrated with police behavior, saying: 
Why should they be so hard on us? Because we have had to choose this job to survive? If they 
don't like it they should provide us with resources so we do not (have to) do this job. 
 
But the discriminatory behaviors did not come solely from the authority figures. In many cases 
taxi drivers brought up examples of passengers who avoided riding with them. For example, 
Setareh, who worked on a mixed gender van in Tehran, said she believed: 
People do not have that level of awareness and culture [to accept a female van driver]. I stop in 
front of many female ride hailers with an empty van and many of them don’t get in.  
 
Malmal from Tehran recalled: 
 
It has happened to me so many times that I stop in front of women and they just ignore me! I 
have seen them hailing for cabs in front of me but when I hunk the horn for them, they don’t even 
look at me. In the beginning it was very hard for me to be ignored but now I am used to it.  
 
While many drivers thought that such behavior come from low-educated and traditional-
minded people, Zari, a driver of women-only taxis who worked at the international airport of 
Tehran, recounted an experience which suggests otherwise: 
One time in the airport, it was my turn to be called on. A lady had requested taxi from our center 





rather go with a man, I don't think you can find my address. I said: how do you know I cannot 
find it? she said: I want to go to the bar association. I said: I know where it is, it is on vozara’s 
street. She accepted and came with me. In the car, as we were going to the bar association, I 
asked her: “Excuse me ma’am! Are you a lawyer”? She responded, “Yes!” I said: “I am sorry, 
but I feel so bad for your clients!” She was shocked! I said, “When you, as a female lawyer, 
overlook my rights as a female taxi driver, what can I expect from others? Imagine you are 
sitting in an office next to a male lawyer and the clients say they prefer to hire your male 
colleague. Frankly, wouldn't it break your heart?” She said, “Truthfully, you are right!” 
 
Drawing on stereotypical accounts of women’s driving and navigations skills, many riders, based 
on my participants’ statements, refuse female drivers’ service, thereby perpetuating an unfriendly 
and not very promising market for their work.  
The narratives of these women reveal deeply-rooted processes that masculinize the work 
of taxi driving and render these women’s engagement in the job an unfit line of work. The 
mechanisms of gendering and sexualization were manifested in women’s institutional and 
interpersonal encounters, thus marking the day-to-day life of working as a female taxi driver as 
one with struggles of negotiating irreconcilable identities and bargaining with discrimination and 
inequality. As scholars have long argued, space is a social construct which intersects with social 
constructs of gender, sexuality, race, etc., in shaping individual spatial experiences (Massey 
1991; Smith 1993; McDowell 1997; Rose, 1993). Depending on how they are situated within 
social hierarchies, individuals expand different levels of understanding and experiences with the 
same Cartesian locations. For many of these women, a taxi was revealed to be a medium that had 
transformed their spatial navigation and negotiations. While driving taxis, these women were 
experiencing the same physical spaces in substantially different ways than before they became 
drivers. For example, Mojdeh, one of the drivers in Tehran, commented: 
We have all manned up and are doing this masculine job! But we still break down! Still get 
harassed in the streets! We still break down when a driver cuts in front of us and says “gas”4 is 
in kitchen. I used to drive a nice, brand new car before I had to take this taxi; even when I was 
                                                             





driving opposite traffic on a one-way alley, male drivers would respectfully let me pass because I 
was a lady driving a nice car. But now with the taxi, even when I am driving the right way, the 
other car pulls over and trash talks me because they think we are bunch of respect less, homeless 
women who drive taxis. But if you go and talk to each one of our co-workers you see they are all 
dignified, and respectable women.  
In face of these difficulties, many of these women were finding it unavoidable to adjust 
their behaviors and the image they were presenting in the public sphere as strategies necessary 
for overcoming the difficulties of working in a sex-atypical job. For example, in one of the focus 
groups in Tehran, Yasi, a divorced woman and mother of two, recited her story of riding with 
another female driver before she received her own taxi:  
As we were driving, a car cut in front of her car and she shouted: “Hoshshshsh!”  I was like! 
[Shocked!]. I was a super gentle and intricate lady back then and was almost having a heart 
attack in her car! I was like, “Holy moly! Why is this woman so rude?! I was cringing the whole 
time. When we got to the inspection store, there was a line of cars at the entrance; she took her 
hand out of the window and shouted [addressing the car in front of us], “Hey you! Move your 
ass!” Look! Hands out of car windows was not even defined for me at that time! It was not 
digestible! But now! I am always out of the window from here [pointing to her waist]. 
 
Describing her colleague’s behavior as irreconcilable with her original sense of what it meant to 
be feminine, Yasi viewed the changes she witnessed in her own style as an inevitable response to 
her working conditions. There were adjustments that she had to make in order to survive the 
atmosphere facing her as a taxi driver. Along the same lines, Mehri, one of the drivers in Isfahan 
said: 
We are male! Because our behavior has changed, we are more rough now. Even our behavior 
towards our husbands and kids have changed. We have become masculine [...] We have become 
disobedient and recalcitrant. This is a reality! Look! When a lady like you drives, she never can 
behave towards men the same way I do if they want to overpower me. My behavior is masculine, 
but you cannot be like me. I have been in this job for 6 years.  
The comparison she made between herself as a taxi driver in dealing with a male driver 





clean (feminine) job of studying and researching, demonstrates how taxi driving, in her view, 
was transforming her gender performances in the public arena.  
On the engineering sites: 
 
While working in substantially different conditions, my engineer participants too were 
struggling with the institutionalized masculinity in their work sphere and intensively “gendered” 
and “sexualized” work environment. For my engineer participants too, threats of sexual 
harassment and sexualization of the work atmosphere were central to their understanding and 
interpretations of on-site engineering. In many cases, they viewed the predominance of these 
incidences at construction or industrial sites as the main impediment to their advancement. 
Azadeh, a young, passionate architect with a long and successful work history, emphasized the 
importance for architects to have an active presence at construction sites, and how the issue of 
safety particularly disadvantages women:  
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Here Azadeh views the potential of being harassed as an integral feature of visiting the 
sites as a woman. However, the issue was not limited to sites: Azadeh, like many other women in 
the study, found the environment of companies an unsafe one for women. At the time of the 
interview, she was teaching part time at a private college while running her own start-up 
company. She emphasized her conscious efforts to warn her female students about what she 





At most, ten to twenty percent of girls and women have the right perception of how to perform in 
workplaces: what to wear and how to behave. There are things that no one prepares you for in 
college. For example, in many large and famous companies, male managers and CEOs have no 
shame in reaching out to their female employees for sexual relationships. Many of them are well-
known in Isfahan for this. I always tell my female students to be cautious about such threats 
when they do internships. I want them to at least have this in mind because when I was in their 
stage, I did not realize the meaning behind certain behaviors.  
  
This is the type of atmosphere that other studies, especially about male-dominated and 
masculine environments, have reported (Ainsworth et al., 2016; Hannagan, 2016; Benya, 2017; 
Pogrebin and Poole, 1997 & 1998). Women in my study viewed their working environments, 
whether it was on the street or at engineering sites, as imbued with masculine practices of sexual 
advances and misconduct. Anahita, a chemical engineer in Terhran who was working at an 
international corporation, remembered:  
All of my three supervisors are married but as a woman, if you accept to become more intimate 
with them [referring to sexual relation] they help you more in work. Even male employees know 
this about one of them and make jokes. This is why I do everything I can so I do not have to deal 
with him (one particular male supervisor).  
 
In some instances engineers reported being intimidated by witnessing men playing 
pornographic videos on their cellphones or hearing their over-sexualized language. In one of the 
focus groups, Nasim, a civil engineer who was the executive manager of a construction project in 
Isfahan, said: 
The other day I was checking out some stuff on one of the floors and noticed a couple of workers 
were watching a porn video and saying disgusting things! They stopped it when they noticed me, 
but I felt so disgusted! 
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In such situations, women did not feel protected with regard to reporting such concerns to 
anyone at work, as it could be used against them, as we can infer from Saghar’s experience 
below: 
I had a telephone stalker for a two or three months. He knew exactly what I was doing at any 
moment in the field and would text me; you just arrived with your mom, you are wearing this; 
you just ate this! Everything! Everything! I consulted some of my friends and they recommended 
that I tell my boss. But I did not want to do this because I knew he would simply eliminate me 
rather than catching the stalker! He would say if I substitute her with a man, I won’t have to deal 
with these side stories. So I hired a lawyer and filed a case and eventually the issue was 
resolved.  
 
Without formalized pathways for women to report practices of harassment, they were left 
with their own personal resources, undergoing much pressure to resolve such issues and still 
perform perfectly in their own work duties. This placed employers in a privileged position if they 
were to replace women with male engineers. About this issue, Raha, a mechanical engineer in 
Isfahan who was working as the executive manager of an international company, pointed out:  
From the smallest thing, which is getting the permit to enter Mojtama E Foulad [Iran’s largest 
steel production factory] for site visits, being a woman causes troubles for you and your 
manager. Many people have problem with my manager that why your executive engineer is a 
woman? There is no doubt that this creates a dilemma in my boss’s mind that should I keep her 
because of her credentials or should I replace her with a man to get rid of unnecessary 
problems?  
 
In some cases, women believed that employers did not bother to assign women to 
executive positions which require constant on-site activities to avoid such “side” troubles. This 
was a disappointment to many women like Saghar who were particularly interested in on-site 
activities:  
The reason I chose civil engineering as my major was to end up in executive (on-site) type of 
jobs. When I got my first job in a company, I did not have the guts to tell them that I wanted to 
work in the executive branch [rather than design]. I knew they would not accept it because they 
were a couple of men in the company and it was easier for them to send men to the field. 
Workers do not easily accept female supervisors and it causes troubles for manager. It took me a 






Not only women viewed the threats of sexual misconduct as a prevalent issue in their 
working environments: in some cases, they reported being accused of engaging in casual 
relations, as means used by colleagues or supervisors to denigrate them. Andisheh, a highly 
achieved chemical engineer recounted one of these experiences: 
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 gendered the destabilize to acted which and witnessing, were women that behaviors and
 Isfahan) in architect (an experience Sooreh’s In form. any in work in women of expectations
men: to apply not did that prices specific with came women for work at late staying 
Many times you have to stay in the field by 11 p.m. or later. This is not defined for Iranian 
families to see their daughters return home that late at night. They ask why do you have to stay 
so late?! Residents of the neighborhoods where are construction fields are located many times 
complain about the fact that a bunch of young boys and girls stay late at night in a half-built 
building. But even worse, we have to respond to our own bosses for staying late. Some of them 
simply say you waste your time during the day so you stay late. You have to respond to everyone 
as a woman for doing your work!  
 
In some organizations, such as Mojtame E Foulad in Isafahan, the largest steel producer 
in the MENA region, there were regulations for limiting the time and frequency that female 





official female employee in the engineering and technical sectors. Women such as Neda, 
Najmeh, and Raha, all part of my sample, shared experiences about working at private contractor 
companies, doing particular projects for Mojtam E Foulad. Regarding work permits for women, 
Neda recounted:  
Like Cinderella, who could only stay so long in that party [otherwise her magical clothing would 
disappear], our work permits only were valid only until 3 or 4 p.m. There were times that we had 
so much to do that we would lose track of time. The doormen and guards would treat us like they 
had caught a thief: ‘Why are you here?’ ‘What have you been doing until so late?’ They would 
contact our managers in the company, causing another headache for them to justify that we had 
had to be there for work.          
Women also talked about incidents that were featured by “heightened practices of 
masculinity” (Prokos and padavic, 2002). Such practices involved languages and behaviors that 
deemed women (and their femininity) unfit for those particular working conditions. For example, 
in construction projects, reaching the top floors of the building under construction using tower 
cranes was constructed as a masculine practice based on women’s narratives. This limited their 
mobility and served as a mechanism for marginalization. As Saghar described: 
Many men wanted to make an impression that I was not well suited for the executive job. It was 
easy for to jump on the crane, visit the top floors, and then come down and discuss the details. I 
could not participate in their discussions without seeing the details for myself; I could not have 
my opinion heard. Then I thought, “Iif I climb the mountain I can ride the crane too,” and I 
started doing it. Then they saw I do everything and started accepting me.        
 
In other cases, women struggled to obtain information from male workers, technicians, 
contractors, etc. — an essential part of their job as on-site engineers. For example, Najmeh, who 
was working as a gas inspector for various construction projects in Isfahan, recounted a story in 
which a man avoided providing her full access to the building she was scheduled to inspect:     
Once I was to inspect a building in the suburb. The executive manager appeared to be a 
gentleman based on his style and manners at the first glance. But, he took me inside the building 
from a back door rather than the main entrance and did not give me time to inspect the whole 
building the way I wanted. He wanted to rush things and have me out. I noticed a couple of 
technical issues and warned him but he was insulted that I was giving him technical advice. I 





Heightened performances of masculinity were also manifested in actions or behaviors 
from men to intimidate or explicitly denigrate women. Scholars have argued that masculinity 
becomes most bold when it is challenged in some form, such as when men lose their jobs, enter 
feminine contexts, or when women enter masculine domains (Prokos and padavic, 2002; 
Ainsworth et al., 2014). When the contextual regularities and norms that maintain the scene for 
men’s performances of masculinity are unsettled in some way, heightened practices of 
masculinity serve as a way for them to re-establish and enforce boundaries with femininity. My 
participants’ stories of being teased or intimated by men provide examples of how their working 
environments were constructed as men’s domains and how women were pushed outside 
symbolic boundaries of belonging. According to these accounts, women became tools of 
construction and practices of masculinity, as in the following quote:   
I was doing my tests in the lab and suddenly the instrument went off […] I thought there was 
power outage but [from the lab window facing the manufacturing salon] saw that all machines 
were working. [I walked down to the salon] and checked the fuse box. One fuse had cut off and I 
switched it back on. I noticed a couple of male laborers were whispering. I did not say anything 
and went back to my work. After 2 or 3 minutes the power went off again and the same persons 
were whispering [but they denied doing anything]. I told their supervisors later and he 
pretended to be surprised; he assured that the laborers will be punished […] Later, when I got to 
know the laborers and made a better relationship with them, I learned that it was the supervisor, 
an engineer with a master’s degree, behind the whole story.” [Andisheh, chmical engineer form 
Isfahan] 
 
 and belongings including lives, personal their how of examples provided also Women
    masculinity: of practices heightened men’s by targeted were emotions, 
Sometimes to scare or threaten you, men do things as crazy as flattening your tire or scratching 
your car. I have seen all of these with my own eyes. To push you out of the competition, 
deteriorate your status and take your place they do everything. So, for women it is extremely 
hard to remain in these jobs [Sooreh, architect, from Isfahan] 
 
There were many times that workers or technicians tried to intimidate me by things as silly as 
lizard or roach. I am scared of insects to death, but I had to hold my breath while shaking inside 






These incidences went hand in hand with questioning women’s credibility. Most women 
reported putting extra effort into convincing others of being the right person for the job. In 
addition to the added time and energy this took from women, the emotional and mental pressures 
impacted their daily lives and livelihoods. Raha, the head of the engineering department of a 
large company in Isfahan, for example, remarked: 
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In our job, being a woman shows itself. There are differences in the ways men and women are 
treated and in wage. Most often in the field, they do not accept you or look down on you. You 
should prove that you can do the job and then they will treat you better. In our working 
environments when they see a woman is making a good progress, they somehow burden her 
progress. I still love this major and job, but it takes a lot of energy and time of your life that one 
day you open your eyes and see your life is gone [Sogand]. 
I was the only female in our engineering team for a project and it was difficult, especially in the 
beginning. They would not share information with me easily or would whisper things and laugh. 
In the meetings with other engineers, too, it was very tough for me to be the only woman. I could 
not make my opinion heard. At times I had to go to the bathroom, cry a bit, release myself 
emotionally and then get back to the meetings [Neda]. 
 
While engineers were secured from some consequences of stereotypical assumptions 
about women in gender-atypical jobs, as reported by taxi drivers, they too reflected on numerous 
experiences and encounters in which their career choices were downgraded. As Aker (1990) 
noted, gendering of work and organizations occurs through complex mechanisms which 
segregate men and women into different careers. Gender stereotypes and cultural beliefs about 
gender serve as supporting mechanisms for sex segregation in work, while also putting forward 
predominant beliefs about segregation as a natural and functional phenomenon. When men and 





of logic. For engineers this process of gendering was manifested in different forms. Some of the 
women in the study reported encounters and conversations both inside and outside the workplace 
which were aimed at discouraging them from choosing or remaining in their jobs. Sogand, a 
highly successful electrical engineer in Esfahan, for example, remarked:  
My friend’s brother lives in Australia and every time he sees me he shakes head at me for doing 
this job. He says, “What kind of a job is this? One week you are in Bandar Abbas (south of Iran), 
one week, somewhere else. What do you want to prove after all? Even in Australia where girls 
are free to do everything, they don’t choose these jobs.”  
 
In one of the focus groups in Isfahan, Sarah, an industrial engineer, said: 
 
The other day I was overworked and super tired. One of our technicians said to me, “Why do 
you insist to work?! You are a feminist and are trying to prove that women can do this work! 
[Uou hurt yourself for this].” I said to him, “Why should not I work?! Have I studied all these 
years to stay at home?!”  
 
Other participants reported receiving similar comments from family members, friends, 
and co-workers, questioning the fit between their conditions and characteristics as women and 
their working conditions. Marriage and starting a family in particular were depicted as 
irreconcilable with on-site engineering. For example, Soolmaz, another motivated and self-
perceived successful electrical engineer in Esfahan, recounted a conversation she had with a 
visiting male engineer who came to her factory:  
He suggested to me to change my job. He said: “Ma’am! So far as you are working here, you 
won’t accept to marry any of these workers because they are lower than you in status. There is 
no male engineer in your age range in this factory to see you either. You are spending most of 
your time during the day here and you won’t have a chance to meet someone.”   
 
Drawing on a paradigm that views marriage as a priority over work for women, such 
accounts viewed on-site engineering as a mismatch with the entire spectrum of what is viewed as 
being a woman. This paradigm is marked by traditional gender beliefs and essentialist views that 





responsibility to adjust their expectations and attitudes based on women’s particular conditions. 
Nasim, a single civil engineer, said she was told by her boss: 
This job limits your options for marriage! When you supervise a bunch of men during the day as 
a female engineer, no man has the guts to ask you to cook for them or do their laundry at home. 
When girls get their high school diploma, they eliminate low educated, low skilled men from 
their marriage pool. When they get their bachelor’s (degree), they cut out men like 
merchandisers. When they get graduate degrees, a large percentage of engineers are out of their 
pool and with these types of jobs, another large portion of men escape them. 
         
In this account, women like Nasim are de-feminized based on a logic that places engineering 
education and work style at odds with one’s capacity to perform womanhood. This logic, in the 
narratives of many women such as Andiesheh, was translated into discouragement or warnings 
against pursuing jobs in their field: 
I was in a condition that I had to work; both professionally and financially. I met with one of my 
professors in college and told him I am looking for jobs. I clearly remember his sentence when 
he asked: “Do you really want to work? Open a childcare center!” I was shocked! Had I studied 
so hard to get admitted into a prestigious engineering program to end up opening a child care 
center?! 
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When I started looking for jobs, the first person I reached out for help said to me, “What do you 
want to do with this major? If you were a man, at least you could get into the manufacturing 
business. Now what do you want to do?” This is how they disappoint you from the beginning. 
 
In many cases, female engineers decide to turn their backs on the years spent on 
education and subsequently seeking jobs in fields irrelevant to their background. For example, 
Saghar, the executive manager of a major construction project in Isfahan, was planning to leave 
her job and start her own catering business at the time of our interview. Sogand, who was tired of 
all the struggles pertaining to her job, was hopping to become a certified trainer and open a gym 
with her friends. While individuals are free to make decisions, and, changing jobs can be helpful 
to one’s health and well-being, Andisheh lamented the hostile environments that, in her view, 





My chemist friend is working as a yoga trainer now. Why did she leave her job as a chemist? 
Because of all the harassment in the factory she worked for […] I do not mean to undermine her 
current job, but it is a shame that all those years she spent in college to get her master’s are 
useless now. Why should men make conditions so hard for women so they eventually leave their 
jobs? Nobody told us that these majors are just for men so why do they make the working 
conditions so bad for women so they voluntarily leave their jobs? 
   
Women who were more advanced in their careers believed that their family lives were 
targeted by those who were looking to weaken their status. For example, Senobar a senior civil 
engineer, who was co-managing a construction firm with her husband, recounted a situation in 
which she had decided to fire their executive director after witnessing a number of technical 
misdoings:  
When he came to the company for his final paycheck, he told me, “You put your family life in 
jeopardy with this job.” I want to tell you the extent to which, men in the workplace target the 
sensitive issues in your personal life and my family life was impacted by issues like this so many 
times.     
 
In many cases the impact of this gendering was so strong that women, themselves, were 
convinced that the job contradicted their own sense of femininity. Sorour, for example, a 
mechanical engineer in her late twenties who was single at the time of the interview, believed 
that working in a masculine domain has impacted her emotions:  
I feel great about my job. But at the end of the day, I feel like men are not attracted to women 
who miss the feminine delicacies. Very often I ask myself, ‘If you were a man would you be fine 
with a woman like yourself?’ And I think, ‘No!’ As a man I would want my wife to act feminine 
and have feminine emotions […] I even feel that mothers who have masculine manners cannot be 
successful moms. I always fear that I won’t be a good mother [because of the ways my manners 
have changed by my job]. 
 
Nasim, a civil engineer from Isfahan, believed that the struggles of her work do not leave women 
like her the energy needed for a family life: 
At the end of the day, you are so tired that you cannot go do feminine stuff like shopping, or 
going to a beauty salon […] When you get home sometimes you are so mentally occupied or 
angry with work stuff, that you simply cannot deal with anyone, let alone a husband who has 






Masculinity was so imbedded in the construction of engineering in women’s narratives 
that they found it irreconcilable with what they viewed as demands and necessities of performing 
their identities as a woman. Based on West and Zimmerman’s (1987) account, gender constantly 
is “done” at the interpersonal level; the “doing” is integrated into every-day practices, even in 
seemingly gender-neutral contexts such work organizations. In many ways, doing one’s job is 
interwoven into the “doing” of gender. In my participants’ experiences, however, their jobs were 
masculinized in a way that their “doings” of femininity outside work were interrupted. As Ahoo, 
a mechanical engineer in Isfahan, put it: 
I would not recommend my major to other girls. I think I would guide them to art or humanities. 
At the end of the day, in engineering atmospheres you suppress your feminine feelings as a 
woman. You lose your mental energy and time to take care of yourself, dress up, wear make-up, 
do your hair etc.... Those girls in other majors (more feminine) are happier, spend enough time 
with their families, travel, workout, and sometimes make more money than us.  
 
She continued: “I will leave this job consciously and voluntarily if I want to become a mother. 
This job is not compatible with motherhood.” Sharareh, a single agricultural engineer, who 
revealed during the interview that she extremely passionate about her job, argued: 
[Married] women cannot survive in masculine environments. After a while they give up because 
it impacts their family lives. For example, they may lose the emotions they are supposed to have 
towards their husbands.   
 
On a similar topic, Saghar believed that masculine nature of the job impacts women’s 
opportunities in the marriage market: 
One of the problems we have for marriage is that once they learn that we are dealing with men 
from morning to the evening, half of the people who approach us leave.  
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historically masculine fields such as medicine, law, engineering and masculine blue collar jobs 
such as military, law enforcement, and firefighting. These studies address a broad range of 
issues, including women’s identity work and different in which they navigate feminine identities 
and masculine working conditions (Ainsworth, 2014; Sasson-Levy, 2013; Baaz and Stern, 2013; 
Garcia, 2003), challenges facing them to find their way into these careers and in workplace 
environments (Yoder and Aniakudo, 1996; Rosell et al., 1995; Yoder and Berendsen, 2001) and 
structural inefficiencies for assisting women to obtain equal status to men in these career fields 
(Melchionne, 1967).  
Studies on women’s work in non-traditional service sector careers provide unique 
insights on how women construct identities as they negotiate their way into masculine domains, 
and how masculinities and femininities are accomplished in work (Ainsworth et al., 2014). In 
particular, many scholars have found it crucial to examine the types of femininities that are 
constructed in such contexts by women. In some cases, scholars have observed that women 
participate in the gender hierarchy by adopting masculine traits of performance; in others it has 
been shown that performances of femininity become more pronounced among women in order to 
maintain their differences with men. A large body of studies has explored women in the military, 
for example (Diamond, 2005; Harel-Shalev et al., 2017; Hannagan, 2016; Rosellini et al., 2017; 
Doan and Portillo, 2016). In her work on military women in Israel, Sasson-Levy (2003) argues 
that female soldiers actually participate in the hegemonic gender regime of military through 
negotiating identities distanced from “traditional femininity,” “emulating” masculine military 
performance, and through the “trivialization of sexual harassment.” Baaz and Stern (2013), 
however, show that female soldiers in the Republic of Congo uniquely integrate the “masculine” 





context, Silva (2008) shows how women in her sample construct the military as a space for 
resisting traditional gender norms, while at the same time aspiring to maintain feminine traits, 
especially those associated with motherhood.  
Studies on women in other blue-collar jobs provide valuable insights for understanding 
women’s gender performance and constructions of femininity. Lawson (2004) discussed the 
difficulties women face in attracting customers’ trust, building relationships with supervisors, 
opening ways into the network of male colleagues, and navigating their feminine identities in 
careers that are highly associated with masculinity. She further explores different strategies that 
women pursue to overturn these difficulties, observing a spectrum of strategies ranging from 
adopting stereotypically masculine working styles to applying feminine traits to advance in a 
dealership career. Law enforcement and policing are other masculine jobs, where women’s 
participation is explored (Melchionne, 1967; Rabe-Hemp and Beichner, 2011; Sherman, 1975; 
Wexler, 1985; Schulze, 2010; Rabe-Hemp, 2009; Garcia, 2003). Some studies, for another 
example, observe a binary among women in how they construct and negotiate identities as 
policewomen. Martin (1980) explored conflicts between gender and occupational roles as 
experienced by women. She observed that in reaction to incompatibilities between being a 
woman and a police officer (as a heavily masculine job), some women stress their gender 
identities by adopting the role of the policeWOMAN and some distancing themselves from 
feminine gender traits by adopting the identity of the POLICEwoman. As some studies have 
shown, those women who attempt to accomplish the masculine ideal of policing are at the risk of 
being targeted by mysoginic labeling, while those who try to embolden their feminine identities 
are undermined as weak and not fitting into the job, given that public perceptions toward 





there are studies that shed light on unique ways that policewomen do approach gender and 
policing simultaneously and “collaboratively” (Rabe-Hemp, 2009).  
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This is Iran. No one cares to keep you in your job because you are an educated and experienced 
woman. If I don’t stay, there are tens of jobless men that can take my place. No one takes your 
back or offer you particular supports because you are doing a masculine job. It is you who must 
establish your position and show that you are there to stay. 
 
     While the issues facing my participants are not unique to them or to Iranian women, 
with a lack of institutional and discursive interventions for improving women’s conditions, these 
women had to creatively carve out empowering spaces for themselves in their workplaces to 
maintain their jobs. In the face of working environments in which practices of masculinity were 
normalized and constructions of work and masculinity were intertwined, many of these women 
managed to maintain their optimism, do their jobs, and feel good about making good use of their 
skills and education. This mechanism of empowerment involved intense identity work and 
negotiations by women to define and defend their career choices and capabilities.  
In some ways, these women’s discourses about and strategies for empowerment were not 
consistent with liberal blue-prints for achieving equality. For example, most often, interventions 
for empowering women aim to create spaces for them to speak up, to be expressive about their 





participants, however, the strategic use of silence (Gatwiri and Mubi, 2016) turned out to be 
more efficient in establishing their positions in their workplace and in protecting their status than 
was the case for the strategic use of voice. Working in male-dominant professions had taught 
them that being outspoken does not always serve their best interest, and many of them had 
learned to express their agency through employing silence when necessary. For example, 
Safoora, a woman in her 40s and a civil engineer and CEO of a construction company, said that 
women who enter the world of business must be very cautious about what they say and must 
avoid having too much visibility:  
Just like a brain that is covered by skull and skin, women sometimes must veil their ideas and 
attitudes to avoid being burdened. 
 
Safoora was a well-known engineer in her professional community; she was introduced 
to me by several male members of the construction engineering organization in Isfahan as a well-
established female engineer. Despite her high-level position, she believed that it is women’s 
ability to strategically and subtly apply silence when necessary, rather than overtly expressing 
their ideas to gain attention, that eventually secures their positions in male-dominated 
professions. In the same way, Salma, a young electrical engineer in her 20s, who had a 
supervisory-level job in an LED lamp factory in Isfahan, observed: 
 When working with men, silence does a better job in most cases, even if you believe what they 
say is wrong […] or they think you don’t have anything to say! 
 
Salma saw herself as a successful electrical engineer as compared to many of her female 
fellows. While, she argued, many female engineers become frustrated in male-dominated 
environments and leave their jobs, she had been able to employ strategic silence for creating an 





their attitudes on you […] It is better to say ‘Okay’ and move on. You will prove that you were 
right with your actions, and they will see it!” 
In dealing with unfriendly environments that featured heightened practices of 
masculinity, denigration of women, and sexualization and gendering of their work choices, as 
previously discussed, these women constructed forms of femininity that relied on feminine traits 
of patience, modesty, and care to overturn these difficulties. For example, Neda discussed how a 
change in her strategy as the supervisor of a group of men granted her success in one of her 
projects:  
It was tough. At some point, I figured I could not order men directly and had to change my tone. 
For example, instead of telling them to do something I would say, “Don’t you think it would be 
better to do it this way?” Or, “What do you think we should do?” I learned that arguing with 
men does not work! They resist your authority as a woman. At the end of the day, they have those 
patriarchal perceptions toward women in the back of their minds.  
 
Even in dealing with incidences of verbal harassment and abusive behaviors, women 
found avoiding conflict as more empowering and fruitful than fighting back directly. We must 
bear in mind that almost all of these women were working in organizations with no recognition 
of or protection against sexual misconduct, at least at the time the fieldwork was done. In almost 
all workplaces, women as victims of the sexual misconduct would carry the blame for such 
incidents, with their manners and ethics being questioned. In this context, women like Nafiseh, 
from Isfahan, preferred to feign ignorance and let abusive behavior or language go:         
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For women, it is very important to survive in masculine environments. Many women get these 
jobs, but they don’t survive. You need to keep calm and ignore even if people make fun of you, 





own business. Those women who get angry and try to fight back, they won’t survive and leave 
these jobs eventually. My dad always says in a battle, the loser is the one who loses his nerve.  
  
Those women who insisted on doing all sorts of site activities, even in the hazardous 
environments, were also relying on their individual social capital to create conditions in which 
they felt comfortable and safe in carrying out assigned tasks. Najmeh was one those women who 
did not want to miss any opportunity to learn at industrial sites. She recounted how she used to 
deal with unsafe environments, as an on-site engineer in her previous job:  
I really liked to work at Mojtam E Foulad and learn the new technologies and did not want to 
miss any opportunity there. There are tunnels there with very dangerous environments. In 
addition to physical hazards, the tunnels are really nice places for male workers to smoke 
[tobacco or other things] or secretly take a break. So it is very dangerous for a woman to inspect 
these tunnels by herself. There are no security cameras or guards. As an executive engineer, 
there were times that I had to get into those tunnels to see what was happening. What I did was 
to somehow make one of my male coworkers to come with me without directly, saying that I did 
feel safe to go by myself. I would say, “Mr. So-and-So, I do not think you have ever visited that 
tunnel. Let’s take a look together today. It will be good for you, too.” Worse-case scenario, if no 
engineer was available, I would take my husband, who was my coworker at the time, with me.  
 
Najmeh emphasized that asking directly for men’s support as a woman reduces one’s 
credibility in their eyes and one needs to be politically precise in how to ask for help. When 
structural adjustments for protecting individual safety, comfort, and well-being do not exist, 
individuals’ creativity in navigating available possibilities to achieve their goals becomes crucial. 
Some women even described being strategic in the amount of information they released to their 
families regarding their working environments. Andisheh, a chemical engineer in Isfahan, for 
example, revealed: 
I never talked much about my working conditions at home; maybe I even pretended to be in a 
better condition than what I had. The second day of work in my first job, my dad came to the 
factory to see where his girl worked. He was shocked! I clearly remember his face when he 
asked, “Do you really want to work here?!” I did not show him my actual office, which was 
inside the manufacturing salon. I took him to the administration building in one of the 
accounting offices where a female accountant was working. I told him that I am here from 





the only woman inside the manufacturing salon. I think the reason was that I did not want him to 
feel dishonored and say, “I do not want you to work!” 
 
While some scholars have argued that such individual strategies of empowerment lack 
the potential to make lasting changes for the collective empowerment of women (Bespinar, 
2010), they are important for understanding alternative forms of empowerment that have been 
developed by women under different living conditions. In his book, Life as Politics, Bayat 
(2009) helps us understand how “quiet and unassuming daily struggles” in the “very zones of 
exclusion” in the public domain create conditions for social transformations. About women in 
post-revolutionary Iran, he observes that through “fragmented actions” women “push for their 
claims, not as deliberate acts of defiance, but as logical and natural venues to express 
individuality and better their life chances.” These seemingly fragmented practices in Bayat’s 
view deliver unavoidable changes for the collective good. Bayat’s framework urges us to go 
beyond conventional accounts of change and empowerment, particularly when thinking about 
women in the Middle East. Those include using approaches that envision change only through 
institutional adjustments pressed by collective and coherent movements with strong leadership, 
strategic mobilization, and clear framing. In the absence of a material and discursive context for 
such movements to emerge and burgeon under patriarchal, authoritarian regimes, it is crucial, 
both analytically and politically, to pay attention to the nuances of how women empower 
themselves in the face of intense discrimination. What discourses do they draw on to defend their 
right to public participation, including work places? And what strategies do they find most 
realistically fruitful for overturning day-to-day struggles?                   
My data must be interpreted by considering the fact that the fieldwork was conducted 
during the time of what many inside scholars call “collective hopelessness,” toward the 





education, many of my engineering participants were in positions and on a path to leave the 
country on student or work visas. They were hoping to find social destinations where they could 
enjoy more protection for women, in addition to living under laws and regulations that release 
them from the pressures of employing individual strategies that were more necessary in Iran. In 
short, they sought destinations that promised respect and equality for women. Belonging to 
underprivileged backgrounds, emigration was not a realistic prospect for taxi drivers, however. 
These were women dealing with the harsh realities of economic survival during a time of 
economic recession. They did not enjoy the privilege of becoming entirely exasperated with their 
current status and leave the country behind; they could not afford to not invest in available 
possibilities for improving their life chances and maintaining their livelihoods. I devote the next 
chapter to delve into these women’s discourses and strategies of empowerment, contextualizing 
their narratives within a state-promoted discourse of femininity, segregation, and difference, as I 
































As I discussed in previous chapters, the state’s gender politics after the revolution have 
been formed with particular caution against the adaptation of what is seen as Western values, 
including feminist conceptualizations of equality. Underneath the state’s approach to gender lies 
the ideology of difference, based on an Islamic discourse, which assigns men and women to 
complementary roles in both the public and private arenas. The difference versus equality debate 
and the controversies arising from the state’s gender politics, including segregation, constitutes 
the core of the struggles over ideals of femininity and womanhood. Chapter 3 depicted a broad 
picture of conditions facing women in the male-dominated labor market of the country, and 
Chapter 4 used interview data to depict a detailed picture of day-to-day challenges facing women 
by using the case of two gender atypical jobs: on-site engineering and taxi driving. In this 
chapter I will explore women’s discourse and strategies of empowerment in the face of their 
masculinized work. Given a context in which gender equality lacks the institutional setting for 
enforcement, and the differences in treatment of the respective sexes, coupled with the ideology 
of segregation that so persistently remains at the core of the formal discourse of womanhood, 
how do women in gender-atypical jobs manage to overturn discriminatory practices on a day-to-
day basis? 
Chapter 4 ended with a brief discussion of engineers’ discourses of and strategies for 
empowerment. This chapter focuses on the same issue by drawing on experiences and narratives 
of taxi drivers. I devote one complete chapter to taxi drivers because the job has such interesting 





discourse of empowerment in the context of post-revolutionary Iran. Women’s access to taxi 
driving was justified through the state-promoted discourse of difference and segregation, which 
are understood as the most important manifestations of state-based patriarchy. The segregation 
ideology in the case of taxis facilitated occupational desegregation, causing women to experience 
segregation in paradoxical ways. Through their labor, these women create segregated spaces that 
promise safety and comfort to other women. They drive their green taxis on urban streets as an 
alternative form of public transportation for mixed-gender taxis and public buses, reinforcing, 
intentionally or unintentionally, the legitimacy of the segregation ideology as a response to 
women’s needs in the public space. At the same time, they step into the masculine domain of 
taxi-driving, undermining the gender division in the labor market and its underlying value 
system, which discourages women from working in male sectors in general. How is this non-
traditional occupational opportunity, created on the basis of the state’s discourse of segregation 
and difference, navigated by women? How do these women empower themselves in the face of 
challenges discussed in the previous chapter? In what ways do women’s discourses and 
strategies of empowerment intersect with discourses of difference and segregation, as manifested 
in the post-revolutionary context?  
 
Segregation and Women’s Empowerment in Iran’ Context 
In her analysis of segregation in post-revolutionary Iran, Shahrokini (2014) argues that 
segregation should not be reduced to a tool used by the state for eradicating women’s 
participation in public life. Segregation, for years after the revolution, she argues, has gone 
beyond a top-down imposition of an Islamic order and has instead served as a venue for 





segregation as a manifestation of state’s productive mode of governmentality (Foucault, 1982) 
for channeling women’s public life into its desired forms through “a discourse that permeates 
both the state and society” and justifies segregation as response to women’s needs and their right 
to public mobility. Drawing on difference ideology and the idea that women have gender-
specific needs that require particular accommodations, the state has continued its projects of 
segregation to the present. Segregation is framed as a right rather than an obligation for 
Islamization within the state’s overarching discourse, and as a right it cannot and will not be 
taken away from women.  
On the ground and in the day-to-day life of women, though, segregation has been a 
double-edged sword. On one hand, it has religious and cultural roots that have remained intact 
regardless of the political environment. The best example is Reza Shah’s failure to force 
religious women to remove their hejab during his time in office. There is a large body of research 
on Muslim women who live in Western countries and yet practice hejab as an important part of 
their identity (Burke, 2012; Rinaldo, 2014; Mahmood, 2009; Avishai, 2008).  Muslim women 
cover their hair and parts of their bodies in front of non-related (namahram) men and expectedly, 
in many occasions, feel more comfortable in women-only spaces. In many ways segregation 
creates culturally integrative spaces that respond to the very organic needs and demands of 
women. For example, women-only hair salons, recreational or health centers, and segregation 
within mosques or hospitals are appreciated by many women, even the non-religious, in Iran.  
On the other hand, segregation has served as a ground for conservative political trends 
meant to deny women’s access to certain sites such as sport stadiums or opportunities in the job 
market. Rather than a possibility based on a shared system of values in a Durkheimian sense, the 





leading to resistance among groups of women and progressive institutions within the state itself. 
Segregation, therefore, cannot be homogenized to become a coherent institution with clearly 
defined positive or negative outputs. In some instances, it serves as a burden and in others as an 
accommodation to women’s mobility. To reduce it to one of these tells us little about its nuances 
with respect to the state and women. The former overlooks its cultural aspects, and the latter its 
political implications. Complexities aside however, segregation provides a unique structural 
setting to which women respond in unique ways, as I intend to demonstrate in this chapter. 
Women’s agency in giving meaning to segregation as a culturally integrative accommodation, or 
challenging it as a politicized tool for subordinating women, urge us to extend the theoretical 
approaches to segregation beyond the dichotomies of burden versus accommodation, or, in a 
more simple sense, bad versus good. 
I draw on 41 interviews with female taxi drivers in Esfahan and Tehran, in addition to my 
systematic observations from their working conditions while riding their taxis, to address the 
questions raised in this chapter. My analysis sheds light on the unique ways these women 
appropriate segregation as a culturally defined and institutionally enforced possibility to turn the 
conservative implications of segregation on their head and undermine the discriminative 
implications of difference ideology. The narratives of female taxi drivers show how cultural 
ideals of women’s empowerment are produced and how the discursive formations of difference, 
equality, and segregation are represented in these accounts. While difference and equality are 
constructed as counterparts within the state’s gender discourse, and segregation has gained 
legitimacy as a response to women’s specific needs and rights in the public space, my findings in 
this chapter show how women creatively borrow from difference, equality, and segregation 





In what follows, I first contextualize the emergence of women-only taxis in Iran and its 
embedded complexities. I then conceptualize women-only taxis as a resource made available to 
women through the very ideology of segregation—a resource previously exclusive to men. In the 
ensuing sections I will discuss how women give meaning to their segregated taxis as venues for 
women’s empowerment, and how their ability to transgress gender boundaries in the labor 
market eventually undermines the very ideology of segregation. I will, in particular, discuss how 
the ideas of difference and equality are integrated into women’s understanding of segregation, 
and how working in a masculine job, ironically, serves as a site for accentuating a construction of 
femininity that is heavily centered on women’s family roles, especially motherhood.  
 
Women-Only Taxis and Paradoxes of Segregation 
In 2006 the Women-Only Taxi Service, a private sector company, was established for the 
first time in Tehran, and later expanded to other major cities. The idea was to create taxis for 
women, driven by women. The vastly publicized anecdotes about male drivers who had 
kidnapped their female riders in large cities provided a legitimate rational for creating women-
only taxis. From its inception,  revolutionary discourse promised to protect women’s safety and 
dignity in public spaces through the enforcement of hejab and segregation, and prevent what was 
seen as the over-sexualization of women’s bodies in the West and under Pahlavi’s regime. With 
high rates of sexual assault and harassment in mixed-gender taxis, and even on public buses 
where women and men are segregated into front and back sections, women-only taxis would not 
only appeal to the needs of women but also well fit the state’s approach to women’s public 





The threats of sexual harassment and assault are common struggles facing women 
globally and there have been a plethora of initiatives put forward in different countries, both 
developing and developed, for making the public sphere a safer domain for women. 
Municipalities, governments, police departments, NGOs, private businesses, and a handful of 
other organizations have been involved in advancing programs for reducing threats of 
harassment. Segregation of spaces, however, may not be viewed as a suitable solution 
everywhere. When Uber aimed to launch its “Uber for women” initiative in 2017 in the U.S. as 
an option offered to its female drivers who were concerned about their safety, it raised 
controversies about the legality of a business model that denies service to a part of the 
population, namely, men. Safr, another ride-sharing app recently launched in Boston, only 
encompasses female drivers, but provides service to both men and women. In Iran, however, the 
idea fit well into how public space was constructed after the revolution and there were no 
constitutional, legal, political, or socio-cultural burdens for creating segregated taxis for women. 
Actually many spaces were segregated after the revolution, so why not having women-only 
taxis? Iran was among the first countries to implement the idea of women driving women, with 
many other countries, including India, Mexico, Lebanon, and UAE to follow.  
The start-up in Tehran framed its service as a response to women’s need to have a safe 
means of public transport, as well as their right to have mobility in the public space in the same 
way that other segregated spaces were framed (Shahrokni, 2014). In his speech on the opening 
day of the first women-only taxi service, the CEO of the transportation and traffic office stated:  
Women make (up) 50% of the population of our city and we need to pay special attention to their 
rights and needs in different regards (Seyed Jafar Hashemi, 2006). 
Recruitment ads were sent out in daily papers, inviting women to become drivers of 





recruited in Tehran. In the following years, the model was expanded to other cities, including 
Esfahan, Mashhad, and Shiraz. In Esfahan, the second site of this fieldwork, 120 women were 
registered as drivers at the time of the research.  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the success of these companies. In 
Tehran, women were more satisfied with their incomes than were women in Isfahan, although 
women in Tehran also believed that their market was deteriorating. Shortly before the fieldwork, 
drivers in Tehran were transferred into a mixed-gender taxi firm. The original women-only 
company had announced bankruptcy, and women were uncertain about how the new firm would 
regulate their services. I visited the new host company once and talked briefly with a number of 
their representatives about female drivers. While there were no new regulations stipulated by the 
company for female drivers at the time of interviews, they mentioned that female drivers were 
bounded by the same laws as they were in the women-only taxi firm. Drivers, in contrast, 
reported driving male and female passengers. During the fieldwork I saw a number of these taxis 
with solo male passengers. After the fieldwork, two mobile-based ride-sharing applications 
developed a successful market by providing cheaper alternatives to traditional taxis. In 2017, in 
Tehran, one of these companies launched its female ride-share app and recruited female drivers 
for giving service to women and families. This surely has impacted the market for women-only 
taxis, and follow-up research should be done to explore how drivers of the original women-only 
taxis have been affected by these changes.  
One important difference between women-only taxis with other segregated spaces is the 
fact that this job requires women to step into the masculine domain of taxi-driving. Rather than 
diminishing women’s public visibility by channeling their activities into closed spaces — as in 





facilitate women’s presence at the heart of urban streets and in a non-traditional and destabilizing 
form. The segregation ideology facilitates occupational desegregation in a context in which the 
labor market is highly male-dominated and women are systematically discouraged participating 
in male sectors.  
Women-only taxis, therefore, can be viewed as paradoxical spaces that simultaneously 
host segregation and desegregation. While they are created in accordance with the state-
promoted project of spatial segregation, this has inevitable consequences for how public space, 
as a social and gendered domain (Massey, 1994), is constructed and the ways in which women’s 
position in the public arena is imagined. When women demonstrate their ability to take on a 
historically masculine job, they demonstrate their power in overturning patriarchal structures of 
the labor market and debunk the very rhetoric of gender differences that justify gender 
segregation in the first place. To drive a taxi simply means to be constantly in a public space, and 
to come out of the domestic sphere—not remain in the closed sphere of an office, classroom, or 
hospital, but into the heart of urban streets while occupying spots in public space that were 
traditionally exclusive to men.  
The current literature on women’s public life in post-revolutionary Iran creates a binary 
between Iranian women as either beneficiaries or destabilizers of gender segregation. Some 
scholars have studied cases in which women are consumers of gender segregation (e.g. those 
who enjoy segregated green parks for leisure or sell their products in women-only sectors of 
mosques, subways, and buses) (Bahramitash, 2013; Shahrokni, 2014). Others have focused on 
women who challenge segregation in more radical ways by, for example, secretly entering sport 
stadiums or playing sports in public places. Such binaries often intertwine with issues of 





destabilizers and lower-class, or, religious, as supporters and beneficiaries of gender segregation. 
My analysis in this chapter complicates this binary. Women-only taxis are paradoxical spaces in 
which segregation and de-segregation occur simultaneously and, therefore, drivers of these taxis 
simultaneously benefit from and destabilize segregation.  
This has important implications for the ways in which women’s public life in post-
revolutionary Iran is understood in the academic literature. The liberal rhetoric of gender equality 
and women’s rights condemn gender segregation of all types as a sign of discrimination against 
women. Post-colonial feminist approaches urge scholars to pay attention to cultural specificities 
of non-Western contexts when evaluating women’s conditions. Many scholars have shed light on 
the empowering implications of segregation for Muslim women (Shahrokni, 2014; Bahramitash, 
2013; Povery, 2015). The experiences of drivers of women-only taxis, however, shows that far 
from feeding into an empowering/disempowering dichotomy, gender segregation can serve as a 
mechanism to destabilize its own legitimacy in women’s eyes while, at the same time, benefiting 
them in unique ways.  
While gender-segregation has been at the center of the state’s approach to women’s 
public life and the technology of subject-making after the revolution (Moallem, 2005; Shahrokni, 
2014), my analysis shows that women do not simply accept or reject it as a religion-based 
ideology or structural restriction. They instead incorporate segregation as a cultural and 
structural possibility as a part of their efforts to expand their public presence and livelihood. 
Segregation lays out particular conditions, containing both opportunities and limitations, for 
women to experience and navigate the public space. In the case of women-only taxis, my 
analysis shows that segregation transforms how women imagine their position in the labor 





segregation. The narratives of women presented in this chapter demonstrate how the state-
promoted discourse of femininity and the tensions it has raised between the ideas of gender 
difference and equality are represented in women’s day-to-day experiences. These narratives also 
show how they have adopted different elements of difference, segregation, and equality to carve 
out empowering spaces in the public and within a traditionally masculine job.  
 
Segregated Taxis, Unique Resources for Women in a Tight Labor Market 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the issue of unemployment in Iran is one of the most serious 
concerns of the government. The unemployment rate in 2016 was reported to be as high as 
12.7% . In the same year, 10% of the employed population worked in insufficient, part-time jobs 
that failed to meet the minimum living costs. The labor force participation rate has also been low 
in the decades since the revolution, with a rate of 39.4% in 2016. In 2005, more than 70% of 
Iranians believed that economic growth must be the first priority of the government according to 
the last released data on Iran (Statistical center of Iran). These economic concerns have been at 
the center of the state’s attention, and post-revolutionary governments have failed to stabilize the 
labor market. For the second year in a row, the supreme leader named the year as the year of 
economic resistance, with a particular focus on production and employment opportunities in 
2017. In the most recent presidential election debates, in 2017, the high rate of unemployment 
and job creation was the main venue through which candidates could mobilize voters. An 
expansive round of street protests emerged in the final days of 2017, as I was writing this 
dissertation, in protest of the government’s inability to address issues of inflation and the high 





When it comes to women’s employment, breadwinners and the poor are the most 
recognized groups of women in policymaking (Shaditalab & Nakhaei, 2015). In the six 
developmental prospects that were developed over the course of four decades after the 
revolution, the issue of women’s employment is only recognized as a priority for the poor and 
heads of households, with a particular emphasis on home-based jobs. In 2015, 12.5% of the 
households were headed by female. Eighty-four percent of female breadwinners were 
unemployed, 75% had no education or less than high school diploma, and only 46% were 
supported by charitable organizations and foundations. The percentage of the families headed by 
females have been constantly increasing during the last five decades, based on the available data 
from the Statistical Center of Iran. Based on the last census, conducted in 2017, in Urban Isfahan 
(a province of Isfahan) 12.3% of the households were headed by females, and in urban Tehran, 
14.1%. The increasing rate of divorce and the subsequent increase in female-headed households 
has been among the state’s chief concerns.  Between 1996 and 2006, the percentage of divorced 
women among female breadwinners rose from 34.5% to 42.3% (Shaditalab and Nakhaei, 2015). 
Between 1995 and 2015, the divorce rate increased by 74%. In 2015, 9,672 divorces were 
recorded in Urban Isfahan and 30,385 in urban Tehran. Country-wide, the overall rate of 
marriage has been decreasing since 2011 while the divorce rate has increased. 
The idea of allowing women into the business of taxi-driving could potentially face 
resistance from the conservative segments of the state, both religious leaders and conservative 
men. However, the specific attention paid to the economic needs of female-headed households 
within the formal discourse of the state provided a source of legitimacy for allowing women to 





women in financial need, especially those who became breadwinners. In the case of Isfahan,  one 
of the drivers, Azar, noted: 
There was resistance among the religious community of the city, especially the Friday prayer 
Imam. But eventually two war veterans were able to start the company because of their religious 
and [revolutionary] reputation. [They assured the religious community that their intention is to 
benefit those women who really need jobs to provide for their families]. 
 
In both Isfahan and Tehran, the majority of drivers whom I interviewed were asked to 
provide evidence of being the primary breadwinner, such as divorce documentations or medical 
records of disabled husbands. As Shaditalab and Nakhaei (2015) argue, all the public policies 
and social security programs available to these women are embedded in broader projects for 
poverty reduction and enforce these women to adopt the label of “zanan e bi sarparast” (women 
with no guardian) to access social security. The Khomeini Relief Foundation, the main state-run 
charitable organization, which as of 2012 provided aid to some 1.5 million female-headed 
households, allocated specific loans for these women to finance taxis. Table 7 provides some 
statistical information about the marital and poverty status of female breadwinners in urban areas 
in 2011: 
Table 7: Marital status of female breadwinners in urban areas, 2015 (Shaditalab and 
Nakhaei, 2015) 
Marital Status Percent of female 
bread winners 
Percent in Poverty 
Married 12.3 38 
Widowed  70.7 23.7 
Divorced 11.7 35.3 





Taxi driving is globally a suitable source of income for vulnerable and low-skill groups, 
especially in large cities where the demand for public transport is high. In Iran, taxis are an 
important part of public transportation. In addition to official rotating taxis, which are registered 
within the cities’ taxi-driving sphere, there are many regular-commercial cars rotating on the 
streets and picking up passengers. During my fieldwork I engaged in informal conversations with 
male drivers of official and unofficial taxis as I was navigating the two cities. A considerable 
number of them were prior laborers, technicians, or factory workers who had been laid off during 
Ahmadi Nejad’s presidency. Due to the impact of international economic sanctions on industries, 
without this job their families could not survive economically.  
Taxi comes with a day-to-day-based income and can be a great job for those in 
immediate need. It also does not require advanced educational background or high-grade skills. 
Women-only taxis, as my participants discussed, opened a door for many women in need to 
prevent their families from suffering economic collapse. As Malmal, a divorced woman with 
four children in Tehran stated:  
How would I have been able to afford my and my children’s life if the Khomeini Relief 
Foundation had not given us these loans for taxis? Four children, rent, utilities? I would 
have had to send them to their [drug addicted] dad who would have spread them among 
his relatives. 
 
Belgheis, a mother of two children, and divorced said: 
I used to be a dentistry assistant but quit my job to take care of my sick mom. My older 
brother used to pay me for that. But he passed away and our economic condition became 
tough. I contacted the Khomeini Relief Foundation to see if they provide loans for women 
in my condition. They said that loans are available for taxis and this is how I got to know 
this job and started it. 
 
Women with no work experience are at risk of becoming financially dependent on other 
family members such as parents or siblings, should they experience a divorce or the death of a 





members are less likely to be able to support them after such an occurrence. As Ameneh, a 
divorced woman and mother of two children said: 
Everyone has his/her own issues. Maybe your brother or father helps you for a while but then 
they expect you to find another way because they cannot afford to do it forever. 
 
About the same issue, Sormeh from Isfahan stated: 
Some of our colleagues had drug-addicted husbands and could not do anything to take control 
over their lives. But with these taxis they were empowered to [get a divorce]. 
 
For many of these women, taxi-driving served as not only an income resource but also a 
way to maintain their personal honor. Soodabeh, in her 50s, and a single mom of three children, 
had started this job five years after her divorce; she was managing her own and her children’s 
lives:  
[With this job] we were able to pull our own weight without having to beg others for help. Those 
times that we did not even have a penny in our pockets, we were able to hop into our taxis, drive 
around, pick up some riders and earn some cash. 
 
Soraya, whose husband had passed away and had one daughter who had graduated from college, 
remarked: 
When my husband passed away, I was helpless. He was not insured and [did not leave me 
anything else]. With this job I was able to run my life by myself. This really improved my 
status in my family and I felt very successful. 
 
For Sedigheh, a woman from Tehran and the breadwinner for two children, the job was 
economically and socially enabling, providing her with a condition to get a divorce: 
I was married for 19 years and my husband worked no more than a sum of 8 years during our 
marriage. When I saw women-only taxis on streets I immediately went after the paperwork and 
got my taxi. Now I am [divorced], paying my daughter’s college tuition by myself and was able 
to buy a house after three years with this job. 
 
Married women benefited from women-only taxis to handle the unexpected conditions 





this job after her husband, a merchant in Persian carpet industry, went bankrupt after new round 
of international economic sanctions were imposed against Iran in 2006: 
My husband had a good business and we were wealthy. But the export of carpets stopped and he 
went out of business. We had two young kids at home and I had to do something. I saw the ad for 
these taxis on the paper in 2007 and showed to my husband and he said it is a good job because 
you only deal with women. I have been supporting my family ever since. 
 
Azar, a former housewife, married, and the mother of two children, recalled: 
My husband was injured in an accident and could not work as much as he used to. To help 
him and to maintain our family life, I had to work. First, I did not think I would survive in 
this job but since it enabled me to bring home some money, I stayed. 
 
Similar to Azar, Aghdas, a former math teacher and the mother of one daughter, had 
become a taxi driver after her husband was unemployed due to health problems: 
I developed a sort of lung allergy to chuck dust. My husband [a laborer], told me to quit 
and that he would provide for all of us. His income was in fact enough but then he got 
cancer and could not work as much as he used to. He was a contract worker and their 
factory laid him off. So I had to work again. 
 
Even for those who enjoyed more family support or had additional sources of 
income, the job served as a great resource for improving their social status and 
maintaining their livelihoods. Parisa who was divorced and the mother of one son, stated: 
My siblings are all rich and could support me, but I wanted to pull my own weight. I was 
enjoying the fact that I am the one who is putting food on the table [for myself and my 
son]; that I do not have to reach others for help. This gave meaning to my life. 
 
Faezeh a van driver in Esfahan, widowed, and the mother of three sons, had started this job after 
the unexpected death of his youngest son to maintain a social life:  
I receive my husband’s retirement and it is good amount of money. We are also wealthy from my 
dad’s side. But I wanted to somehow scape loneliness […] I spend half of my income on charity 
purposes. My children also get benefit from my work. I have been able to support them further. I 
paid to build a warehouse for my son, bought him a house and car and a car for my daughter. 
 
Considering the high rate of female unemployment, and a lack of competitive educational 





sector; an entry-level administration position; or informal, home-based jobs. Taxi-driving came 
with many advantages compared to the other alternative jobs, as participants in my research 
discussed. Zahra, married and the mother of two children, compared taxi driving with her 
previous job in the garment industry: 
Before this I was working in a garment factory, but I did not like to work for someone else. I 
wanted to be free to work for myself […] In terms of income, this is a much better job than the 
garment industry or sewing, or jobs like that. 
 
Sima preferred taxi driving to her previous home-based job for two reasons:  
I used to take sewing orders for a while and work from home, but did not really like it. The 
income was not that good. But this job has a good income and it is more fun; you get out of the 
house, you are more in the society and get to know people. 
 
Carpet weaving in Iran has historically been heavily dependent on a female workforce. 
The market for the handwoven carpet industry began shrinking after the revolution and the 
deterioration of political and economic relations with the United States, the main market for 
Persian carpets.  Competitiveness in the global market, and the production of machine-made 
carpets at lower prices also declined the share of carpet in non-oil exports: from 44.2% in 1994, 
to 4.4% in 2005. The deterioration of the carpet market disproportionately impacted rural and 
working class women for whom carpet weaving was the main source of income (Karimi, 2011; 
Velayati, 2011). A number of my participants were previously carpet weavers who had not been 
able to handle their lives with the low income associated with that line of work. Samaneh from 
Isfahan, divorced, and the mother of two children, was one of those women:  
I was a carpet weaver before but could not continue. Considering the inflation, and high 
costs of day-to-day life, I figured I have to find another job […] the income of carpet 
weaving was very low compared to this and I could not run our life with that. 
 
In addition to being a better a source of income compared to other alternatives, taxi 





construction. As Laleh, a single mother of two children remarked: “This is a good job for women 
because we have full control over our work hours; we can both work and do the household 
chores.” In a similar way, Yasi preferred taxi driving to her previous office-based job:  
[This job] better fitted my conditions because when I was an employee [in a company] and my 
kid was sick, I could not easily take time off and go home. I did not belong to my children, while 
they were the reason I was working in the first place. 
 
Women-only taxis also constituted safe and friendly spaces for drivers to merge their 
motherhood and career responsibilities. For example, Shokooh, whose husband was permanently 
injured in a workplace accident, had to start this job soon after giving birth to her only child: 
When l learned about this job, I felt God really loves us because she had opened this door 
to us under that troubling condition. I had a newborn and I could not take her with me to 
[office-based] jobs. With this job, I could do this. Many of my riders knew me and would 
let me to pull over for a couple of minutes and breast feed my baby. 
 
Shokooh was able to adopt her work into her daughter’s needs as she grew up:  
 
For a couple of years, I only gave service to school kids because my daughter was with me and I 
wanted her to be around kids in her age range [rather than random riders] […] Many of them 
were older than my daughter; when I did not have time to help her with her homework, I would 
ask those kids to tutor her during the ride and they would do it as she was their sister. We all felt 
like a family. 
 
Like Shokooh, Yasi found taxi-driving suitable for her children’s needs: 
The fact that I was earning some good cash and becoming independent while having a car for 
myself made it enjoyable for me. I had two daughters and I could take them to schools and other 
classes with my taxi without having to pay for school buses. 
 
Participants also viewed women-only taxis as more secure working environments than 
many other workplaces as regards issues of discrimination and harassment, although as I 
discussed in the previous chapter, women were not safe from these incidents while on the streets. 
Sexual harassment is one of the most prominent difficulties facing women in different 
occupational positions. The country’s labor laws do not provide protection against sexual 





issue. One of the reasons many women leave their jobs, as my fieldwork as a whole revealed, are 
incidences of harassment conducted by managers, supervisors, or other co-workers.  
The majority of taxi drivers expressed relative satisfaction with the safety and autonomy 
they could enjoy inside the space of their taxis. As some of them mentioned, they felt as though 
they were their “own laborers and bosses.” When I asked Azar, if an office-based job would not 
be a better suit for her conditions as a woman, she responded: 
The labor market in our country is not very promising so I did not have a high chance to find an 
office-based job [in public sector].  Plus I did not feel safe to work for a private company. [This 
job has a better condition because] all of my passengers are women so I prefer to keep this job. 
 
Mina, another driver from Isfahan, married to an unemployed man, and the mother of two 
children, recited her job search experiences before becoming a driver: 
I was looking for jobs for a couple of months, but all the places I went for an interview 
for secretary positions, the manager expected other [sexual] services, too! One of them directly 
told me, “Do you see that room over there? You need to come with me to that room once in a 
while!” All I could do was to leave and cry on my way back. With this job, I was at least safe 
from these issues. 
 
To sum up, as new job opportunities women-only taxis opened windows to many women 
who otherwise would have been challenged to deal with situations facing them and their 
families. These women were afforded food, housing, and clothing of their families, education of 
their children, medical expenses of their disabled spouses, and many other living costs by 
working on their taxis from morning to evening. Besides fulfilling their financial needs, many of 
them enjoyed the public mobility that came with this job and their ability to break gender 
stereotypes that undermine women’s driving skills. They further viewed their work as serving the 
needs of other women by providing a safe means of public transport for them. At the same time, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, the job came with intense challenges caused by masculine 





experiences and narratives of these women to address the main questions of this chapter. That is, 
what are the features and elements of these women’s discourse of empowerment? And in what 
ways does this discourse intersect with the post-revolutionary discourse of womanhood and its 
emphasis on ideologies of difference and segregation? I will discuss how these women creatively 
borrow from these ideologies of difference and segregation, in addition to their imbedded focus 
on women’s motherhood and family roles, to ironically highlight the necessity of letting women 
into not only taxi driving, but also other exclusively masculine domains. 
 
Driving Taxis, Producing Segregation, Doing Difference 
Many women were happy with women-only taxis. The majority of them belonged to religious 
neighborhoods. They were our loyal customers. I had some riders who told me their husbands 
would not allow them go anywhere with public transport but now they are happy to have us. 
[Sima from Tehran] 
 
I have many riders who thank me for doing this job so they have peace of mind […] Just the 
other day, I had a passenger who told me thank God that we have female drivers in the city. My 
husband does not allow me to ride with male taxi drivers to return home from a beauty salon. 
Because they stare at you or try to flirt with you. [Belgheis from Isfahan] 
 
While from a secular-liberal perspective, statements like these are read as patriarchal 
bargains (Kandioti, 1988) and women’s internalization of patriarchal values (Bespinar, 2010), 
my analysis shows how drivers of women-only taxis turn these values on their head by 
cultivating them toward empowering ends for themselves and other women as well. As scholars 
such as Mohanty, Mahmood, Bahramitash, have long argued, women’s agency can be 
manifested in different forms depending on the specifics of their social context. Women’s 
“modalities of agency” extend beyond the so-called emancipatory practices that explicitly fight 
against whatever is perceived as incidences of patriarchy, including segregation and essentialism 





segregated taxi firms did not mean feeding the ideology of segregation as a patriarchal structure. 
They instead viewed their job as enabling for other women and a way to facilitate their public 
mobility and livelihoods. These views among women were informed by a discourse of 
difference, one that conceptualizes men as essentially different from women (Lewis, 2013) and 
thus insufficient to serve them in the public domain. Shohreh, a woman from Isfahan, asserted: 
Our job is very beneficial to the society. Imagine you as a woman are heading to a party, with 
make-up and dress. If you ride with a male driver you won’t feel comfortable because he might 
ogle you or say something inappropriate. But with me, you feel much safer because I am a 
woman like you. I warrant your safety […]. 
 
Along a similar line, Badri from Tehran stated:  
 
Many women welcomed our service when we started. Religious women were more comfortable 
with us. Non-religious ones also were more comfortable with us to ride back from beauty salons, 
or those who had to breast feed. 
 
Drawing on a discourse that justifies segregation as a way to avoid unwanted 
disturbances from men in the public space, participants viewed their taxis as a necessary service 
for women. Mixed-gender taxis were depicted as spaces with risks of assault for participants and 
for many other women whom I spoke to during the course of my fieldwork. As Mahvash, from 
Isfahan, recounted:  
Before becoming a taxi driver myself, I did not feel comfortable with male taxi drivers because 
they look for excuses to start mingling with you or staring at you from the mirror. But now 
sometimes I have riders who breastfeed their kids in my car and pray for me for doing this job. 
 
Participants also viewed their job as particularly beneficial to families with young daughters. I 
rode with Azar in Isfahan to pick up a girl from summer school and drive her home. She was a 
high school girl wearing Chador. On the way back, Azar said: 
When I feel [women-only taxis] give families the peace of mind to let their young daughters use 
taxis, I become inspired to continue. I have a teenage girl myself and this gives me great joy that 
I can provide safety for girls of other families. I thank God that families trust us. I, as a mother, 
have this peace of mind that if I sell my taxi one day, we have women-only taxis in the city that 





Women further commented on how their female riders appreciate the feminized 
environment of their taxis as opposed to the mixed gender ones. Not only were male drivers 
depicted as a threat to women’s safety, the mixed-gender taxis were seen as masculine domains, 
not friendly to women’s needs and tastes. For example, Zahra, from Isfahan, stated:   
I get my energy from my passengers and the fact that they sit in my taxi and give me 
complements on my driving skills, navigation, and the cleanness of my car. They say when we 
ride with male drivers, their cars smell like cigarette smoke, or they drive recklessly […] 
 
Zahra’s comment here shows how the difference ideology and a belief in inherent 
differences between men and women can feed women’s discourse of entitlement to the job. This 
emphasis on differentiating women-only taxis from the regular taxis led to a sense of 
responsibility among participants for making a social impact on improving the public image of 
women-only taxis and women’s status in the public space. About her motivation to remain in this 
job despite its difficulties, Somayeh, a retired high school teacher who wore Chador, was one of 
the drivers in Isfahan. She stated:  
The fact that I can do something and make an impact on the society keeps me motivated […] I  
always keep my car clean and treat my riders with respect. I think these behaviors remain in my 
riders’ minds and make a good reputation for women-only taxis.  
 
Azar, from Isfahan, particularly emphasized the importance of following decent and 
pious dress code, to present taxi driving as a good fit for women and challenge those accounts 
that view taxi driving as a threat to women’s social status, honor, and decency: 
When I am driving [this green] taxi, I am responsible to follow some rules. For example, I need 
to follow the [standard dress code] to send this message to men and people that us, women, can 
do anything while protecting our dignity and decency. 
 
The statements from the participants so far signal the fact that they viewed their 
segregated taxis as venues of empowerment, not just for themselves but for other women as well. 





empowerment. It further highlights women’s agency in giving empowering meaning to their 
taxis through narratives that depict their labor as a necessity for women’s safe mobility in the 
public space.  
 
Driving Taxis, Negotiating Motherhood 
Motherhood was also central to the way these women made sense of what they did. Being 
a taxi driver is certainly not an easy job. In large cities like Isfahan and Terhan, traffic is heavy, 
air pollution is intense, and driving full-time, especially with manual transmission cars, is 
physically demanding. In addition to these factors, my fieldwork provides in-depth information 
on discrimination facing these women as they drive their taxis on urban streets. In navigating the 
masculine constructions of the public space and a masculine job such as taxi driving, the notion 
and status of motherhood was an essential resource for these women to speak out against 
discrimination and to lament the lack of better institutional support for women. Here what Azar 
says about police officers’ double standards with female drivers, as one example of how 
motherhood is essential to the way these women understand their jobs and give meaning to their 
decisions to undertake an otherwise masculine profession.  
A while ago, when a couple of my co-workers were waiting to be called on, a police officer 
reached and accused them in a very brutal way for making that street corner their “hangout.” 
This is very interesting, isn’t it?! We are out on the streets to work, and this country’s police 
officer says we are just ‘hanging out’.  
In this sense, the feminine role of motherhood, as a valorized status within the state’s 
overarching gender discourse, and, ironically, a justification for occupational segregation, 





In Isfahan, I was allowed to sit in a group meeting between drivers and the managers of 
their company. The meeting was on a Friday5 morning in a building located in a green park. I 
arrived early and saw a group of drivers having breakfast outside the building while discussing 
what topics they should raise in this meeting, and which of their issues to emphasize. As a 
number of drivers told me later, the company had been sending periodic announcements about 
the meeting to encourage a high participation rate; all drivers expected the meeting to be a 
chance to voice their problems and ask for solutions. Surprisingly though, the opening address 
turn out to be an advertisement speech given by a male representative of a tire company. Another 
male speaker was invited to give women some business advice on how to improve their markets.  
He started with examples of memos written by a successful taxi driver in New York City, who 
had managed to secure loyal, regular passengers. He moved on to say how a clean, perfumed taxi 
with a well-dressed driver who offers beverages and light snacks to the passengers, provides 
books and magazines for them to use during their time in his taxi, and is well-versed in how to 
engage in conversations with passengers can make a profitable business out of taxi-driving. His 
entire speech was to encourage women to devote more effort to improve the quality of their 
service, thereby removing the responsibility from their company to provide a better-quality 
infrastructure such as updated GPS, communication devices, and stop signs. After a while, one of 
the drivers raised her hand and said:  
Excuse me sir! What you are saying is very interesting, but we thought the meeting will be for us 
to talk about our problems. It is Friday noon, my children are at home, my food is on the stove 
now, and I have so many other things to do! When do we get to talk about our problems? 
 
Following her, other drivers started objecting to the way the meeting was planned, and 
asked their manager to let them talk about their issues. Eventually the speaker left and the 
                                                             





manager started listening to the women. The majority of the women in that meeting simply could 
not afford the luxury of being a prestigious driver of a perfumed taxi loaded with beverages, 
snacks, and books. They were primary breadwinners of their families with household 
preoccupations, delayed mortgages, and unpaid loans. Drawing on the language of motherhood, 
a handful of women in the meeting said they felt entitled to interrupt the speaker and ask for a 
better use of meeting time. This belief in what they viewed as the essence of motherhood was 
also enabling, as it provided women with an alternative to missing institutional supports and 
resources for enforcing equal working conditions for them. Senobar, from Tehran and the single 
mother of two children commented: 
The job is a masculine job! But it is fine with us! We do it anyway! The problem is the 
discriminations they make against us. These are the things that annoy us. […] Unfortunately our 
society always downgrades women. Despite all of these discriminations, all of us stand 
courageously! I have no doubt that if conditions were the other way around, not even one man 
would stay in this job! But thank God we have all stood courageously just for the love of our 
children! Such a pity that neither our company nor the society appreciate my colleagues’ efforts. 
 
Ashraf is a middle-aged woman, the mother of three children, and an informal taxi-
driver6; her husband was unemployed at the time of interview due to his drug addiction. From 
Ashraf’s perspective: 
 When [women] work outside the house, [their] children and husbands still get hungry at 
noon. No matter how tired [they] are from work or how much pain [they] have because [they] 
are on a period, the food must be on the table. Only women can handle it because of the love 
they have in their hearts. 
 
When I met Ashraf she was financially devastated; her husband was unemployed due to his drug 
addiction, and her older daughter was getting married. In Iran’s culture, the bride’s parents are in 
charge of a dowry, which includes all home appliances and furniture. The dowry is a large 
                                                             
6 Informal taxi drivers use their personal, commercial cars to take passengers, whereas formal 





financial burden, even to middle-class families. Despite her economic conditions, Ashraf took 
pride in “working her fingers to the bone” to run her family.   
Motherhood was the motivation for many of taxi drivers, used to overcome the 
difficulties of their job. During her interview, Azar, a driver of women-/family-only taxis in 
Isfahan and the mother of two children, explained at great length the challenges facing female 
taxi drivers. She expressed frustration with inequalities between male and female taxi drivers, 
and the discriminatory behavior of officials, laws, and regulations. She also discussed how 
women’s decision to become taxi drivers is viewed as lack of family honor by the public, in 
addition to the negative impact of such stigma on female drivers’ personal lives. Despite these 
challenges, when asked “What motivates you to come to work every morning?” she responded: 
The positive energy for me comes from the fact that I can provide a better condition for my kids 
with this job; when I want to buy them something I can get a better brand, or I can put them in 
more extracurricular classes […] I gain energy when I see my kids are safe and happy.” 
 
The discourse of motherhood in some cases enabled women to incorporate their own 
evaluation of the extent to which segregation impacted their work. The mobility that women gain 
with women-only taxis and the opportunities to navigate the public space on a day-to-day basis 
cannot be easily regulated or taken back. Being a taxi driver comes with a handful of situations 
in which women can take control over the extent to which they abide by the norms and 
regulations related to segregation. For example, while, according to the law, women were not 
allowed to pick up male riders (unless accompanied by women) or work as rotating taxis, a few 
of them mentioned doing so after their regular working hours in order to make some extra cash. 
Saboor recited one of her experiences with a male rider: 
It was after midnight. I stopped for a young man on the street side. He sat in the front seat 
without looking at me. After a while when he was handing me the ride-fee, he said, “Here, sir!” 





scared to let me [a man]in your car [late at the night]? I said: “No my dear! Why would I be 
scared? Do you think you are scary? You are like my son!” 
 
The Islamic concept of “mahramiat” underlies norms of interpersonal interactions 
between Muslim men and women. In the case of Iran, the top-down Islamization of the public 
space after the revolution further reinforced the norms of mahramiat and criminalized physical 
contact, or any form of intimacy between non-related men and women (i.e. maharems). In this 
context, the language of motherhood and sisterhood plays a central role in legitimizing close 
human relations between men and women who believe in religious bounds of cross-gender 
relations and yet seek open social relations in a public space. For women such as Saboor, 
therefore, the discourse of motherhood and sisterhood was empowering, as it gave her a language 
to legitimize, culturally, choices to give service to “namahram” male passengers. 
While the vast majority of my interviewees were drivers of women-only taxis, I came 
across a few women who drove mixed-gender taxis. These were women who had taken 
advantage of ambiguities in work laws and regulations of The Transportation Institute, which do 
not clearly stipulate whether or not women can drive mixed-gender taxis. Zohreh, a married 
women in her late 40s, for example, was working for her neighborhood small taxi-service agency 
along with her husband, providing service to both male and female customers. When asked 
whether she feels comfortable having male passengers in her car, she responded:  
I see all of them as my sons and brothers. Sometimes male passengers ask me if they can sit in 
the front. I always say, “No problem! You are my brother! 
 
In this case, too, Zohreh adopts the concepts of sisterhood and motherhood into her 
navigation of the social arena as a female taxi driver. While motherhood and sisterhood are 
widely conceptualized as women’s roles in private space and a double burden to those who work 





appropriated by women to open up empowering spaces in the public arena and claim access to 
masculine domains. Saboor, previously mentioned, and a driver of women-only taxis in Isfahan, 
recalled an experience when she picked up male street-hail passengers in her private car, before 
being employed by the women-only taxi firm:  
It was Ramazan: my children and I were all fasting, we did not have any dates in the fridge for 
the Iftar, and I had no cash in my pocket! I jumped in the car, drove to the nearest crowded area 
and picked up four male passengers. A police officer stopped me right away. He confiscated my 
car registration and driver’s license. 
 
In her visit to the police office to get her documents released, she was charged for 
carrying passengers by private car. This is despite the fact that carrying passengers is a typical 
primary or secondary job for men of lower-middle and lower-class households. Actually, these 
private cars (Shakhsi) are de-facto integrated segments of public transportation, especially in 
large cities like Isfahan and Tehran. It was therefore not difficult for Saboor to see how she was 
being penalized as a woman and to respond furiously to the police officer:  
It is Ramezan and I needed money to get some dates for my children’s Iftar. I have not stolen 
from anyone nor done anything unethical! I just picked up and dropped off a few passengers 
[just like men do]!  
 
As Saboor said, he “was clearly touched” by her response, removed the charges, and returned her 
documents. The power imbedded in the discourse of motherhood appeared to defy institutional 
resistance against women’s gender transgressions, as Saboor’s example shows.  
 
Driving Taxis, Striving for Equality 
Many scholars have argued that segregated spaces, especially in the Middle Eastern 
context, serve toward the empowerment of some groups of women, especially the religious, by 
facilitating their access to the public domain (Andrews and Shahrokni, 2014; Paidar, 1995; 





consumers of segregated spaces, such as those who enjoy women-only green parks or women 
who sell their products in women-only sections of mosques, buses, and trains. Drivers of 
women-only taxis are different in the sense that they are creators rather than consumers of 
segregation. Without their labor, the very idea of women-only taxis would not become 
materialized; through their work, these women embody and reinforce the rhetoric of spatial 
segregation. Women’s productive role in creating segregated spaces was central to the way they 
understood their jobs, which gave meaning to their decisions to undertake the masculine job of 
taxi-driving. Zahra, one of the drivers in Esfahan, remarked: “I, for one, am proud of my job 
because I feel we secure the safety of women and girls in our cities.”  
While admitting the difficulties of the job, women pride themselves in their ability to 
undertake a job that was perceived as beyond women’s capabilities, as Atefeh from Tehran 
noted: 
I feel so proud of my job, and this feeling comes from my ability to do a man’s job! Male taxi 
drivers say to us,“Why do you do this? It is a tough job even for us men.” This makes me proud 
as a woman! 
 
Avaa from Tehran, a married mother of one, stated: 
Now, in society, women are more successful than men. We wanted to show our ability to work 
outside the house and that we like to be active in society. Nothing is impossible and we can do 
everything. 
 
It is with these women’s labor that the idea of segregated taxis is materialized; this gives them a 
sense of entitlement to question the discriminatory outcomes of the difference ideology that 
justifies segregation in the first place. It also give them the self-confidence to claim their rights to 
equal access to the labor market. For example, Zohreh, one of the drivers in Tehran, stated: 
We, women, must step forward and change our conditions. Some of my female riders and friends 
say, we are not comfortable with driving. I ask them, “What does scare you?!” Look at me! I am 





margins and slowly! Don’t think it is impossible! We should show men we can do whatever they 
do! We can drive, we can fuel the car, we can take it to auto-shop! It is not that big of a deal! 
 
While owing their jobs to the institutionalization of gender segregation, participants 
refuted beliefs that burden woman’s entry into masculine sectors of the labor market. Spatial 
segregation provided a venue for these women to undermine segregation of labor market and 
claim their right to access all types of jobs. As Zahra from Esfahan asserted:  
I do not like labeling jobs as masculine and feminine. What is wrong with having women in all 
types of jobs? I am so sad for the fact that women cannot work as judges in our country! Or why 
don’t they let women in police and military departments? When women have proved that they 
can do anything, there is no reason to limit them […] Right now, we do not have any female bus 
drivers in Esfahan, but if one day they give us the option I will be among those who go for it. I 
enjoy when I see women who do these types of jobs. 
 
In the same way, Zohreh argued: 
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Segregation, as Shahrokni  (2014) argues, has been a part of the “subject making” process 
in post-revolutionary Iran; it permeates the ways in which public spaces is produced, imagined, 
and consumed. In many cases the very concept of segregation and its perceived benefits for 
women have led participants to condemn structural burdens to women’s entry into other male-
dominated fields. For example, Shohreh, one of the drivers in Esfahan, argued: 
Women are entering all types of jobs nowadays. We have female firefighters, too. I think we need 
female drivers for ambulances for cases where patients are women. In these cases, the driver can 
easily help managing the emergency situation because she won’t have to worry about not 
touching the patient or things like that. 
 
Women-only taxis provided women with a site to navigate and negotiate equality by 
expanding their networks with women of other backgrounds. Many of these women were 





family. This job was enabling, as it served as a venue for women to form networks with other 
women. Azar from Esfahan said she believes: 
With this job we become an experimental sociologist [like yourself] because we get to talk and 
interact with women with a whole conditions and lives, with different culture and attitudes. Many 
of my passengers talk to me and share their life stories. It is always very interesting to me. 
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:socially her transformed had job the that believes she said Tehran, in driver another Sima, 
I used to be a shy person, I could not speak up and make my voice heard. But this job has 
changed me. I am more bold now and I can talk with men; I can defend my rights. When I was at 
home the whole day I did not know any of these. 
 
As Bayat (2009) argues, women’s public presence in years after the revolution 
established the core of their success in overturning patriarchal domination over their lives. 
Without the freedom to form a collective movement for pressing for equality, women managed 
to assert their rights to access the public space for work, education, and entertainment through 
what he calls the “art of presence.” Public presence gave drivers of women-only taxis the self-
confidence, social skills, and knowledge to undermine traditional gender ideologies that limit 
women to the domestic sphere. Many found themselves more capable than men as they managed 
to reconcile the masculine job of taxi driving with their household responsibilities. Faezeh, a van 
driver in Isfahan, for example, stated:  
Iranians believe work is for men. But I say work is for any healthy human being. I, for one, 
believe that a woman should be strong and do not rely on her man. She should be able to take 
care of herself. At the same time she should be delicate, be a good mother for her kids, a good 






On a similar note, Malmal said: 
Men just carry the title of being “men”. Women are more strong. When they come home from 
work, men lay back in front of the T.V. expecting their wives to serve them; bring tea, fruits, food. 
But thanks God women are able to take care of the household and be active in the society.   
 
While the ideal model of Muslim women as put forward by conservative segments of the 
state in Iran associated the divine essence of womanhood with their family roles, participants 
found this essence in their ability to merge work with family. As Belgheis from Isfahan stated:  
Women can do men’s jobs, but men cannot easily do women’s. I myself have been a taxi driver 
for four years now. During these years I have also been a mother and a father to my daughters, 
and a nurse for my sick mom. At the same time I worked on my taxi and managed my life. No 
man can handle all these things together.  
 
By transgressing boundaries into a hyper masculine domain and gaining visibility in the 
public space as taxi drivers, these women viewed themselves as pioneers for opening up space 
for other women. Soodabeh, one of the first-generation drivers of women-only taxis, remarked: 
We stepped into this field because of our economic needs. However, it was us who opened this 
way for other women. We set the ground for this job, but it also made us stronger as individuals. 
 
responded: Azar improved, has drivers taxi female for acceptance cultural if asked When  
We need to work on our culture. I, as a mother, must give my kid enough awareness before 
he/she gets into the society. I should tell him/her that there is no difference between men and 
women and in many cases, women are better. I, as a mother, should teach my kid to respect to 
women’s/girls’ rights. There is much room for improvement in our society. 
 
Closing Remarks 
In this chapter I explored the work experiences and attitudes of drivers of women-only 
taxis in Iran. This group of women have unsettled the norms of both labor market and the public 
space by driving their women-only taxis on the streets of Isfahan and Tehran, a job that is made 
available to them through the very institution of gender segregation. My goal was to understand 





segregation as a structure and ideology and how various approaches to or ideas about difference 
and equality are represented in their discourse of empowerment. As my analysis in this chapter 
has shown, gender segregation can lead to destabilization of its own roots by creating a condition 
for social transformation among women. This condition emerges as women creatively 
appropriate opportunities created for them through the process of segregation to disprove 
traditional assumptions about their roles and capabilities.  
My participants creatively appropriated the ideology of difference, centered on women’s 
family roles but especially in the realm of motherhood, to claim equal access to the most 
inaccessible sectors of labor market. This is crucial, as within the predominant gender politics of 
the state, family roles justify women’s underrepresentation in the labor market and systematic 
limitations on their access to work and public mobility. Women want to become taxi drivers, bus 
drivers, judges, fire fighters, etc., because they believe that, in spite of men’s opinions or 
disapproval, they can handle family and work. These women did not view their segregated taxis 
as flags of patriarchy; instead they imbued empowering meaning to them by priding themselves 
in providing safety to other women. Equality and difference were not counterparts in these 
women’s narratives. Rather, these women invested in the potential within the difference ideology 
to claim equality and undermine discrimination. This is an essential concept to keep in mind as 
we try to think about constructions of femininity among Muslim women or in the Middle East in 
general. My participants were women wearing hejab who are participating in the institution of 
segregation, which in many journalistic and popular narratives are simplified to simply being 
signs of women’s suppression. In contrast, these women constructed an unsettling femininity, 
one that destabilizes masculine norms of public space by taking on jobs in the masculine domain 





public space. In so doing, these women did not turn their back to the difference ideology and its 
emphasis on women’s family role in order to champion equality. Women’s discourse of 
empowerment was instead constructed through a creative engagement with the discourse of 
difference and a family-oriented womanhood centering on their desire to achieve equality. 
Through their jobs, these women navigate the possibilities and limitations of segregation on a 
daily basis while embodying a stance against traditional gender ideologies. Beyond abiding by 
segregation as a religious order or fighting against it as a sign of patriarchy, these women 
creatively engage with the discourse and logic of segregation to navigate possibilities for 





















CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
 
In June 2015, Salma, a female mining engineer identified as the first woman working as a 
coalmine supervisor in South East Iran, was invited to appear on Mah E Asal, a popular live TV 
show that has been broadcasted for more than a decade by Iran’s state-run national TV. Her 
appearance took place during Ramezan, Muslims’ fasting month. The show’s main mission is to 
make viewers aware of the unheard, inspiring stories of marginalized or token groups. The guests 
are very diverse and include, for example, survivors of fatal diseases, war veterans, religious 
figures, community leaders, and successful professionals and entrepreneurs. Their narratives are 
framed as inspirational manifestations of divine empowerment of human agency, following the 
state’s broader agenda to boost spirituality, religious faith, and revolutionary values in the 
society during Ramezan.  
As one of the oldest and most favored live shows— and arguably among the few 
successful products of the state-run national T.V. —  Mah E Asal, constitutes a good example of 
the state’s technologies of power for producing religiously devoted, value-centered, and 
spiritually motivated subjects. It represents a discourse that differentiates between inherently 
right and wrong ways of being, grounded in the idea(l)s of revolutionary ideology. The show is 
very careful in presenting cases and stories that feed the state-promoted meta narratives of 
subjectivity. Even though in recent years it has enjoyed more flexibility in the types of targeted 
social issues and the way it addresses them, the show is careful to avoid crossing lines between 
Islamic-revolutionary versus Western-modern models of living and being.  
Not surprisingly, issues concerning women are central to the shows’ strategic efforts for 





to female invitees is centered on their motherhood and wifehood roles, reiterating the state-
promoted discourse in which home is the main arena for women’s social contributions and 
personal empowerment. Mothers and wives of war veterans, martyrs, successful entrepreneurs, 
disease survivors, or ex-felons, to name a few, are invited to be celebrated as pillars of care and 
love in their families, nurturing the Islamic-revolutionary model of womanhood. Most of the 
female invitees who discuss their professions on the show tend to be heads of their households 
— the most recognized and cared about category of women regarding work and employment. 
Their womanly power in balancing motherhood with breadwinning is praised, and most often the 
discussion provides a venue for them to make their problems heard.  
Very occasionally though, women are invited because of their professional lives, as 
Salma was. She was invited to narrate her story as the first of a handful of female mining 
engineers who make their way in the working world as supervisors. The 30-minute conversation 
between Salma and the host captures, in a fascinating way, the paradoxes embedded in and 
emerging from women’s entrance into traditionally masculine jobs and the ambiguities and 
uncertainties this entrance creates. To avoid crossing state-produced discursive boundaries of 
femininity and to narrate Salma’s story without giving credit to the “Western” conceptualizations 
of gender equality and women’s empowerment, the host had to create a space in which 
desegregation could be recognized without an undervaluation of segregation. In this way,  public 
empowerment could be celebrated without scratching the sacredness of the private, and equality 
could be valued without stepping away from the difference ideology.  
During the interview, the host juggled between depicting Salma’s career choice as 
inconsistent with her feminine identity on one hand and appreciating her ability to work in a 





Iranian woman. In the beginning, Salma was asked to describe her story of becoming a mining 
engineer. The host searched for exceptional reasons, something about her socialization, family 
environment, or psychological state that in his eyes would be viewed as a major yet 
unconventional choice for a woman. Salma, however, had no exceptional reason to share. She 
was raised in an industrial city where, as she described, mines and mining are integrated into 
families’ economies and culture. Like many boys in their town, she argued, being raised in that 
environment was a key to her career choice: 
Most families had someone working in the mines or were exposed to the mine and mining issues 
in some ways. We were the same; two of my uncles were miners and I always was curious to 
know what they exactly do while under the ground. The image of miners and workers climbing 
up the mine with blackened, dirty faces fascinated me from when I was very young and kept me 
interested until I got to college and chose mining engineering. 
 
Not convinced with the ordinariness and gender neutrality of Salma’s story, the host stated: 
 
But this is also a reality that your job is physically demanding; it contradicts with the core of 
womanhood and its delicacy. So from this perspective, your job could be frowned upon a little 
bit. After all it is a rough job. At least in our culture, the family expects love and care from a 
woman, a wife, a sister. That’s the only thing! 
 
Salma was no stranger to gender norms and cultural expectations from women. However, 
to her, expressing her own femininity while pursuing the masculine job of mining were not 
inherently contradictory, in opposition to the viewpoint of the show’s host. She went on to 
remark:  
No one has ever been disappointed with me for not fulfilling my responsibilities as a mother, 
wife, sister, or daughter because of having a masculine career. Never! I have always tried to 
maintain my career and family life together although it is a tough job! Just the fact that I am 
proving that women can do this type of job is very important for me and keeps me going. After 
me, I have seen many girls who dare to work in mines in my city and this is an invaluable 
achievement for me […] No one must feel threatened when women step into male-dominated 






Moving the conversation forward by agreeing with Salma that women can bring unique 
talents to workplaces, the host re-directed Salma’s point to a contradictory conclusion to the 
message she had tried to convey to audiences: 
 But the point is that recently our ladies show more interest in hard sciences and engineering 
and are overlooking human and social sciences in which they can be more helpful for building 
our society and the future of our children and youth. I want our dear Iranian girls to think about 
this!  
 
This was the closing remark and the interview ended at this point. This paradoxical 
moment in what turned out to be a contentious conversation on a widely watched live show 
occurred when state-run national TV specifically scrutinizes programs for the messages they 
send out and the kind of life models they put forward. And that is precisely what this dissertation 
has been about: the clash between contracting ideas about womanhood, as manifested in Salma’s 
story, and the host’s final statements.  The implications of these discursive encounters in 
women’s day-to-day lives, particularly in context of work, demonstrate the nuances and 
characteristics of discursive spheres in which segregation and desegregation, equality and 
difference, and the public and private are navigated collaboratively.  
The goal of this dissertation is to explore how women navigate these discursive domains 
while dealing with highly discriminatory working environments, given that they work in 
institutions with bare minimum policies and practices for protecting them against incidents of 
inequality. In addition, these women must negotiate their identities as females while their career 
choices are highly gendered or sexualized at different levels. These are the main questions that I 
set out to address, by drawing on the experiences and narratives of female taxi drivers and 
engineers, as discussed in the previous chapters.  
The Islamic revolution changed the spatial, social, and discursive spheres in which 





radically (Moallem, 2005). The Islamic ideology of gender difference legitimized the 
institutionalization of segregation, leading to deprivation and the discouragement of women from 
many areas of education, employment, and entertainment. At the same time, however, the 
opportunities given to women to explore the public arena in an alternative way — while wearing 
hejab in mixed-gender environments and pursuing public activities in the comfort zone of 
segregated spaces — created alternative possibilities for them to navigate empowerment and 
equality from within the limitations and oppression resulting from a patriarchal gender ideology.  
Through an analysis of the characteristics and complexities of the discursive setting in 
which, women’s subjectivities, desires, and aspirations are shaped, and following an interpretive 
approach for understanding participants’ experiences, my findings in this dissertation complicate 
previous approaches to women’s work and employment at two levels. First, my findings uncover 
the heterogeneity of impediments to women’s economic participation, livelihoods, and success.  
These findings show that reducing the multifaceted nature of women’s struggles and 
challenges in the male-dominated labor markets of Middle Eastern countries to an overarching 
state patriarchy deprives scholars and activists from opportunities to address the problem. 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation showed that to a great extent, the substance of issues facing women 
in their atypical gender-centered jobs is similar to those of women living in democratic states. 
Women are challenged to balance work with family life, open paths into the gendered structures 
of their workplaces, make their voices heard and valued by supervisors and managers, “undo” 
(Deutsch, 2007) stereotypical assumptions about their capacities, and negotiate equal pay and 
benefits. While the state’s patriarchal gender discourse sets out the context in which possibilities 
for women’s economic participation are produced, the issues women face on day-to-day basis 





discourse demonstrate how women such as Salma, men such as the host of Mah E Asal, and 
institutions like the national broadcasting company implement state-promoted gender discourse 
in daily encounters with issues surrounding women’s work. Regardless of how patriarchal the 
state is, Salma is a mining engineer whose voice has come from the margins of a male-
dominated labor market to the center of a widely watched TV show. She is given a space to 
make her voice heard and her experiences shared. On the flip side of the coin, regardless of how 
powerfully Salma’s agency shines in the face of structural burdens and inequalities, throughout 
the conversation the host deliberately reproduces the overarching gender system that devalues 
these transgressions. Between Salma as a woman and the state as a patriarchal structure stand a 
whole set of interpersonal and institutional dynamics that are filled with ambiguities, 
uncertainties, improvisations, and paradoxes. It is from these conditions that limitations to 
women’s public mobility and possibilities for empowerment emerge.  
Second, my analysis shows that women’s discourse of empowerment does not have to be 
shaped in absolute contrast to gender ideologies that emerge from patriarchal discourses. What is 
more important is how women live and interpret manifestations of patriarchal gender discourses 
in their day-to-day lives as they navigate opportunities for maintaining their own, their families’, 
and their communities’ livelihoods. Of course it is discriminative, sexist, and essentialist to argue 
that women are inherently fitted for care giving and household labor. It is a threat to idea(l)s of 
equality to deprive or discourage women from economic and political participation, as in the 
case in Iran. Compulsory hejab is a violation of individual freedom and choice, which constitute 
the main promises of modernity and development. But do women spend their days and nights 
lamenting structural dead-ends, awaiting collective actions to dismantle patriarchy at once? No! 





communities by actively re-defining segregation, hejab, and difference, cultivating them toward 
day-to-day empowerment. With almost no structural support or discursive foundation to justify 
their non-traditional career choices, by the very fact that they are working these jobs, they create 
a space to prove wrong the discriminative implications of the state’s difference ideology. These 
women claim equality from within the difference discourse and have become agents of 
occupational desegregation from within the institution and its ideology of segregation.  
To close my discussion in this dissertation, I would like to leave the readers with a 
snapshot of my interview with Fatemeh, as one of a handful of women in Iran who work as truck 
drivers. Increasingly, these women, along with female bus drivers, are attracting more attention 
in social media, in the press, and occasionally through national broadcasting. But Fatemeh was 
one of those who resisted media visibility. She commented: 
I have read a number of interviews with my fellow female truck drivers now and then. But 
nobody really asks them under what conditions they do this arduous job! Are the married? Do 
they have kids? What kind of truck they have? An old one like me or better? A while ago a 
reporting team from our regional broadcasting T.V. had come to our village and I was 
introduced to them as one of the successful women in the area. They wanted to record my 
driving, interviewing me, and these sort of things but I did not accept. Media usually expects you 
to smile and say everything is great in this country and you are easily doing this job as a woman. 
The only reason I accepted to talk with you is that you are a university student and want this for 
research! It is not an easy work to do for a woman but I am doing it because it has been a part of 
my life from young ages!  
 
The following few quotes from my phone interview with her do not do justice to the rich 
conversation we had and the inspirational power I could glean from her voice, tone, and even her 
silence.  But this short snapshot of her life leaves us with a great story so that we may continue 
thinking about women whose day-to-day lives are shaped around spatial and social 
transgressions, and who unavoidably destabilize gender and spatial norms through the work that 





Fatemeh, was born into a religious family in Ghom, the religious capital of Iran, the 
daughter of a truck driving dad and a mom who she described as the first female driving trainer 
in Iran. Fatemeh described herself as a devoted Muslim, wearing the most strict form of hejab 
practiced among Iranian women, providing service to religious communities and volunteering for 
religious ceremonies. Fatemeh had married a truck driver in her early 20s and was working both 
alongside her husband and independently: 
I started helping my husband for to earn income first. He had a truck but could not handle long 
and frequent road trips by himself. He could not afford to hire an assistant either. So I decided to 
work with him so we can make more money for our children.  
 
She had begun driving truck at a young age with her dad, who trained her. He later 
encouraged her to get a license. After some twenty years of truck driving, however, the job was 
beyond being either an income source or an economic constraint. Driving a truck was so 
integrated into how she had experienced different stages of her life and navigated her identity as 
a woman that she did not imagine herself resigning from it despite the difficulties she describes 
below:  
I love driving in the roads, too! Nothing can calm me down like loading my truck and hitting the 
road! It gives me peace of mind when I feel I am being productive, doing something useful in this 
world! transporting a load and making some money for my family. It is a very difficult job for a 
woman! Maybe I have spent the energy I was supposed to spend during 40 years, in the past 20 
years that I have been working. I also run the household by myself. When I am not on the road, I 
am buried with house chores and making things ready for the kids. But thank God I love what I 
do and I can handle it!  
 
Besides the shared challenge of the work-life balance, Fatemeh described conditions on the road 
as one of the worst for women like her: 
The roads we drive on are not ready for women! The public restrooms are awfully dirty! I myself 
never can use them! Almost none of the rest areas designated for truck drivers have a space for 
women. You step in there and you see rows of men sleeping next to each other. I always have to 
sleep in the truck! The other day I stopped by a mosque to do my noon prayer and even the 





If your truck breaks down in the middle of the way, as ours did just a few weeks ago, you will be 
desperate! Me, my daughter, and my husband were stuck in the middle of nowhere for six nights 
just a few weeks ago. I cannot even describe how hard it was for us! 
 
Similar to what taxi drivers have reported, Fatemeh viewed police officers as biased and 
unprepared to deal with women behind the wheel as professionals:  
I have had the worst experiences with police officers. Most of them have never seen a truck with 
female driver. They assume something must be wrong, stop you, inspect the truck, and find a 
reason to give you a ticket. They ask for all sort of documents and if they don’t find an issue with 
your license, registration, and permits, they pick on your vehicle or yourself: Are you driving by 
yourself? Who is in the truck? Where is your husband? Why are your tires worn out?  
 
But despite the struggles, Fatemeh described the job as central to her and her family’s 
livelihoods. At the time of the interview, she was mother of two sons and one teenage girl. As 
Fatemeh described it, her daughter was almost raised in their truck. She had resumed driving 
only two weeks after her daughter was born, and Fatemeh been taking her on most of their trips 
afterwards: 
When she was born, a truck ride was the only way to get her to sleep. I think it is still with her. 
Our truck is very old but she sleeps in the back cabin as if she is in a comfortable pension! She is 
the loyal passenger of our truck! Always ready to pack and hop in whenever we get a service 
request. I have took her to all sorts of places with me; to south, north, everywhere! 
 
A truck, in Fatemeh’s narratives, was central to how her family life was structured, and 
interwoven with how she was imagining the future for them. When asked to describe her ideal 
job in an ideal world, she stated: 
In an ideal world, I would still want to be a truck driver! If you come to our house, you will see 
despite all other people who have pictures of themselves, their weddings, their kids hung on their 
walls, we have posters of trucks all over the house [laughing]. Every now and then, we buy new 
posters and remove the old ones! My kids, my husband and myself are all truck lovers. You are 
asking me about an ideal world which is way far away. But in such a world I would want a 
brand-new cargo truck, one of those that you see on foreign T.V. shows, with big living cabins, 
kitchen facilities, bathrooms, everything inside them. I would want to carry loads to Europe, and 






As a self-identified devout Muslim, a voluntary follower of the Islamic hejab, a mother, 
wife, and a truck driver, does Fatemeh reinforce or destabilize the Islamic state’s idea(l)s of 
womanhood and femininity? Where does she fall along the binary of Islamic versus Western-
liberal femininity? Is she progressive in an Islamic way or Islamic in a modern way? Does she 
embody agency in the face of structural patriarchy or patriarchal suppressions of women’s 
freedom and mobility? As I set out to suggest in this dissertation, beyond falling into the binaries 
that constitute the core of modern-liberal discourse (Moallem, 2005; Mahmood, 2009), the 
narratives of women such as Fatemeh, Salma, and other participants who participated in this 
research expose the inaccuracy of these very binaries by allowing readers to understand the lives 
of women living in patriarchal states, particularly in the Middle East. These women navigate the 
public arena and the challenges and opportunities that come with destabilizing gender norms in 
their own way, undermining those accounts that either reduce Muslim women in the Middle East 
as silent victims of patriarchy or imagine their empowerment only as part of collective 
movements against the states. The narratives of these women concern the complexity of how 
oppression and empowerment happen, raise alternative interpretations of gender inequality and 
equality in male-dominated labor markets of the Middle East, and outline the lives of women 
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